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Abstract 
Purpose – This thesis investigates the environmental and economic effects of emissions 
pricing policies in Australia. By considering emissions as a by-product, that is, as a function 
of production, it can be seen that emissions follow output fluctuations. Ignoring the 
correlation between economic fluctuations and emissions may increase the risk of 
encountering undesired changes in emissions over a period of time. This issue has motivated 
the current research to investigate the impacts of emissions reduction policies on emissions 
fluctuations during business cycles. This thesis specifies four emissions reduction scenarios, 
in line with programs which have been designed and/or implemented in Australia: first, a 
business-as-usual or no policy scenario; second, a fixed emissions tax scenario resembling a 
carbon tax program; third, a variable emissions tax system as a proxy for an emissions trading 
scheme and fourth, an abatement subsidy scenario such as the Australian government’s 
current Emissions Reduction Fund. 
Methodology – This thesis applies a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model 
to investigate the impacts of real shocks, such as total factor productivity (TFP) shocks, on 
the Australian economy under the abovementioned emissions reduction scenarios. To this end 
the current research benefits from, and extends upon, a real business cycle (RBC) model 
developed by Heutel (2012). The model developed in this thesis, however, is different from 
his in three ways: the scenarios tested, parameterisation and analysis technique. After 
developing and solving the model, a calibration method is used for parameterisation to obtain 
and evaluate the empirical results. To this end, parameters from previous RBC studies for the 
Australian economy, and from the environmental literature, including literature on the 
Regional Integrated model of Climate and the Economy (RICE), are used. Only one 
parameter of the model, emissions from the rest of the world, which has not been estimated in 
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previous studies, is estimated in this thesis using Australian databases including the 
Australian National Accounts and Australia’s National Greenhouse Accounts. 
Findings – The results show that a variable emissions tax or subsidy should be set to be pro-
cyclical to business cycles so as to be able to provide motivation for firms to make abatement 
efforts. The results also show that when using a fixed emissions tax system, when the 
marginal cost of emissions does not change over time, the system loses its power to motivate 
firms to make abatement efforts. The results also indicate that under a variable tax or an 
abatement subsidy policy, emissions are less affected by business cycles and thus, they can 
enable the government to stabilise emissions. Additionally, the cumulative impact of various 
emissions reduction policies over the entire adjustment period reveals that a fixed tax 
program has the lowest cumulative effect on emissions and output. This implies that the 
policy choice depends on the regulator’s perspective and priorities. If the regulator’s priority 
is emissions reduction during a boom period, a subsidy or a variable emissions tax is the 
appropriate solution, while if the regulator’s main concern is to minimise the impact on 
output, a fixed emissions tax is preferable. 
Research Contributions – This thesis provides the first analysis of Australian environmental 
policy in the presence of TFP shocks. It does so by applying a DSGE model. This thesis also 
contributes to the environmental DSGE literature by extending Heutel (2012) in three ways: 
the scenarios tested, parameterisation and analysis technique. This is the first study in the 
environmental DSGE literature to compare a fixed versus a variable emissions tax scenario. 
In addition, this thesis finds that the approach Heutel (2012) used to parameterise one of his 
exogenous variables, emissions from the rest of the world, would make it endogenous in such 
a way that any changes in domestic emissions would result in a change in emissions from the 
rest of the world. To avoid this distortion the current research applies another approach by 
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calculating emissions from the rest of the world under a business-as-usual scenario and using 
that value in emissions reduction scenarios. In addition, this thesis conducts a policy analysis 
in a dynamic context by calculating the cumulative effects of a TFP shock on variables under 
different emissions pricing programs. This technique can capture the effects of emissions 
reduction programs, not only on the steady state values of key variables, but also on the 
response paths of variables to shocks and thus, it can express the total effects of the shock 
under an emissions reduction program. Finally, this thesis contributes to policy analysis by 
providing unique insights into the costs and benefits of Australian emissions pricing 
programs by investigating the outcomes of such programs in boom and recession periods. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
1.1. Introduction 
Over the last three decades scientific evidence on global warming issues has attracted the 
interest of national governments, international institutions and researchers. A report, for 
example, was published by the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1990 which 
showed that a doubling of greenhouse gas emissions (GHGs) in the atmosphere over pre-
industrial levels would result in a rise in global temperatures of 1.5 to 5o C. The report also 
predicted that melting glaciers would increase sea levels by 50 to 100 cm by 2100 (IPCC, 
1990). This IPCC report has since been updated and similar, and more alarming, estimations 
have been revealed in each update. The IPCC report in 2013, for instance, showed that during 
the last 30 years the Northern Hemisphere has experienced its warmest period since records 
began. A recent study published by the World Meteorological Organisation also indicated 
that the years 2011–2015 were the warmest years on record (World Meteorological 
Organization, 2015).  
The main reason for global warming has been an increase in greenhouse gases (GHGs), 
especially carbon dioxide, in the atmosphere. It has been proven that carbon dioxide 
concentrations in the atmosphere have been amplified by 40 per cent since pre-industrial 
times (IPCC, 2013). Scientific evidence reveals that global carbon dioxide concentrations in 
the atmosphere have reached 400 parts per million (ppm) for the first time in recorded history 
(NASA, 2013). Highlighting the scientific evidence of global warming, the 2013 IPCC report 
emphasised the role of human activity in climate change. The IPCC investigated climate 
systems, global warming, atmospheric GHG concentrations and radioactive forcing and 
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found that it is extremely likely (i.e. there is a 95–100 per cent probability) that humans are 
responsible for more than half of global warming (IPCC, 2013, p. TS–25). 
What problems can global warming cause? This question has become the main focus of 
interest of researchers since global warming issues were raised, and many studies have 
attempted to estimate the impacts of an increase in the global temperature in terms of its 
economic effects. A survey of these studies has been conducted by Tol (2009) and updated by 
Tol (2015). A summary of Tol (2015) findings is presented in Table 1.1. The estimated 
values are broad ranging in different studies since the methodology adopted is not the same, 
with different assumptions about future emissions, the pattern and extent of global warming, 
the extent of sea level rise, rainfall and extreme weather events (Tol, 2009). As the table 
shows, the estimated economic effects of global warming vary widely based on different 
temperature increases, but all estimates indicate that a welfare cost in terms of a decrease in 
global income can happen as a result of a 2.5 °C or 3°C increase in the global temperature. 
One of the initial estimations, derived by Nordhaus (1994b), estimated that a 3°C global 
temperature increase would result in a 1.3 per cent decrease in global GDP. In one of his 
latest studies Nordhaus (2010) re-appraised this estimation and showed that a 3.4°C increase 
in global temperature would cause global damage equal to US$12 trillion, or a 2.8 per cent 
decrease in global output if GHG emissions are not controlled.  
 In Australia, the evidence of warming is significant. For instance, the autumn of 2016 was 
the warmest autumn on record in Australia (Vaughan, 2016). In their latest report the 
Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) and the Bureau of 
Meteorology (2012) indicated that Australia’s annual-average daily mean tempreture has 
increased by 0.9°C since 1910, and will be 1°C to 5°C higher than the 1910 figure by 2050. 
Figure 1.1 shows average temperature changes in Australia over the period 1910 to 2010. The 
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orange line indicates the annual average, the grey boxes show decade averages, and the black 
line shows an 11-year average which is the standard period for the IPCC. This figure has not 
been updated as more recent data is not yet available. 
 
Table 1.1: Estimated effects of global warming on global welfare in terms of annual income 
change (per cent) 
Study Warming (°C) Impact (% of 
global GDP) 
Nordhaus (1994b) 3.0 -1.3 
Nordhaus (1994a) 3.0 -3.6 
Fankhauser (1995) 2.5 -1.4 
Tol (1995) 2.5 -1.9 
Nordhaus and Yang (1996) 2.5 -1.7 
Plambeck and Hope (1996) 2.5 -2.5 
Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) 2.5 -1.5 
Maddison (2003) 2.5 -0.1 
Rehdanz and Maddison (2005) 1.0 -0.4 
Hope (2006) 2.5 -0.9 
Nordhaus (2008) 3.0 -2.6 
Maddison and Rehdanz (2011) 3.2 -12.4 
Bosello et al. (2012) 1.9 -0.5 
Roson and van der Mensbrugghe (2012) 2.9 
5.4 
-2.1 
-6.1 
Source: Tol (2015), p. 10. 
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Figure 1.1: Australian average temperature changes 1910–2010 
 
Source: CSIRO and Bureau of Meteorology (2014), State of the Climate, p. 9. 
 
Based on the latest available data, Australia was the 16th-largest producer of greenhouse gas 
emissions in the world in 2013, and produced about 1.2 per cent of global GHG emissions. In 
per capita terms Australia ranked 12th in the world in 2013 (CDIAC, 2013). The relatively 
small contribution of Australia to GHG emissions in global terms may raise the question of 
why Australia needs to address the issue of emissions reduction.  
There are two considerations which highlight the importance of emissions reduction in 
Australia. The first is the need to avoid the risks that climate change imposes on the economy 
and environment, including damage to ecosystems, changes in rainfall, and increases in 
extreme events such as heatwaves, droughts and floods. Such extreme events can impose not 
only moral costs but also economic costs to Australia.  
One of the most vulnerable economic sectors, which will face severe economic costs if 
climate change is not addressed, is the agriculture sector. Employing more than 307,000 
people, this sector is the largest employer in rural areas in Australia. Taking into account all 
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those employed in food manufacturing, input and output sectors, retail and distribution, the 
agriculture sector employs more than 1.6 million people in Australia (Batt, 2015). 
Additionally, about 52% of the Australian landmass is occupied by agriculture (Australian 
Bureau of Statistics, 2015). Australia produces more food than its population consumes 
(Department of Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry, 2011) and Australia’s exports of food are 
enough to feed 60 million people (Australian Bureau of Agriculture and Resource Economics 
and Science, 2011). In fact, Australian farmers contribute to 93 per cent of the domestic food 
supply and more than 13 per cent of the nation’s export revenue (Australian Bureau of 
Agriculture and Resource Economics and Science, 2014).  
The capacity and price of agricultural production can be directly influenced by climate 
change and Australia has already experienced this (Climate Council of Australia Limited, 
2015). For instance, during the 2005–2007 droughts, the growth rate of food prices was more 
than twice that of the Consumer Price Index (CPI), with the price of fresh fruit and vegetables 
increasing by 43% and 33% respectively. Similarly, Cyclone Larry in 2006 destroyed 90% of 
the North Queensland banana crop which resulted in a 500% increase in the price of bananas. 
A drop in rainfall in parts of Western Australia and Queensland also caused a decrease in 
total national crop production by 12% and a reduction in the value of beef and veal exports of 
4% in 2014–15 (Climate Council of Australia Limited, 2015). This shows how vulnerable 
this sector is to climate change.  
Australia has very specific rainfall features which can present a serious threat to the country: 
Australia is the driest inhabited continent on Earth. The variability of rainfall over Australia 
is four times greater than it is in Russia, three times greater than in the US, and more than 
double that of New Zealand, the UK and India (Hanna et al., 2011). Changes in rainfall 
patterns as a result of increased temperatures are estimated to be the most significant factor 
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affecting the future of agricultural productivity in Australia (Crimp et al., 2014). The impacts 
of extreme climate events on Australia’s agriculture sector will directly affect food exports 
and imports as well as the food security of Australia and its trading partners. Currently, 
Australia is the sixth-largest food exporter in the world (Australian Academy of 
Technological Sciences and Engineering, 2014) and more than 50% of its food exports are 
traded in Asia, with China and Japan together purchasing 30% of the total (Climate Council 
of Australia Limited, 2015). A reduction in Australian food production as a result of climate 
change could also adversely affect these countries. Additionally, it is estimated that global 
food demand will increase by 70–100% by 2050 (Alexandratos and Bruinsma, 2012). This 
will impose a notable opportunity cost on the Australian agriculture sector if it experiences a 
productivity reduction due to climate change (Climate Council of Australia, 2014).  
Rising sea levels due to climate change can also impose a significant cost to Australia since 
most of its cities, towns and infrastructure are located in coastal areas which makes this 
nation very vulnerable to coastal flooding and a rise in sea levels. Without any programs to 
control global warming, more than $226 billion worth of assets located in Australia’s coastal 
regions are potentially at high risk from a 1.1 metre increase in sea levels by 2100. Such an 
increase is at the high end of expectations, but it is very plausible (Climate Council of 
Australia, 2014).  
The extent of the abovementioned costs will depend on the size of temperature increases and 
there is significant evidence that Australia is already encountering climate change problems. 
For example, based on existing records, the frequency of high temperatures has increased 
while that of low temperatures has reduced; snowfall has decreased; the frequency and 
duration of heatwaves have increased and the coral population of the Great Barrier Reef has 
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been halved (Department of the Environment, 2014a). Such evidence suggests the need for 
quick action to slow global warming and avoid further environmental issues.1 
The first consideration, highlighting the importance of emissions reduction programs in 
Australia, is explained above as the need to avoid the risks that climate change imposes on 
the Australian economy and environment. The second consideration, highlighting the 
importance of emission reduction policies in Australia, is the country’s commitments made 
under international emissions reductions agreements. Before clarifying these commitments, a 
brief review of international climate change meetings is now presented. Evidence on global 
warming and its predicted negative effects have raised the concerns of national governments 
and international institutions and spurred action to avoid these predicted problems. To this 
end, several global conventions and programs have been initiated which are aimed at 
addressing global warming by reducing human-induced GHG emissions. The main aim of all 
national and international climate programs is to persuade countries to reduce emissions. 
Table 1.2 provides a summary of the most significant meetings and commitments.  
In 1992 representatives from the world’s most developed countries, known as Annex I 
Parties, gathered in New York to discuss rising global temperatures and to agree on a way to 
limit their GHGs emissions. The outcome was an international treaty, named the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and it was signed in Rio de Janerio. This 
gathering is known as the “Rio Earth Summit” and it resulted in the “Rio conventions”. The 
conventions came into effect on 21 March 1994 and currently, 197 countries and/or regions, 
known as Parties, are signed up to the Convention (UNFCCC, 2014b).  
 
                                                     
1 Despite these developments there are still climate change deniers both in Australia and globally which are 
explained in Chapter 2 Section 2.2. 
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Table 1.2: Most significant international climate change meetings and their key outcomes 
International 
Meeting 
Outcomes Australia’s Contribution 
Kyoto (1997) Achieved the world’s first greenhouse 
gas emissions reduction treaty which 
committed participating Parties including 
industrial countries and the European 
Community to reduce emissions by an 
average of 5% below the 1990 levels 
during a five-year period from 2008 to 
2012. 
Attending the protocol, 
Australia eventually committed 
to decreasing its emissions by 
5% relative to 1990 by 2012.  
 
Copenhagen 
(2009) 
Quantified emissions reduction targets 
for 2020 for each of the 114 Parties 
which signed it. 
Attending the meeting, 
Australia committed to 
decreasing its emissions by 5% 
below 2000 levels 
unconditionally by 2020.  
 
Doha (2012) Continued the Kyoto Protocol to the 
second phase from 2013 to 2020 in which 
Parties are committed to reducing their 
emissions by at least 18% below the 1990 
level. In this meeting the number of 
Parties increased to 192.  
After attending this meeting, 
Australia follows the same 
target. 
Warsaw 
(2013) 
Committed Parties to initiate their 
intended nationally determined 
contribution (INDCs) before the Paris 
agreement. 
Australia set and submitted its 
INDC to reduce emissions 
economy-wide by 26 to 28% 
below the 2005 level by 2030. 
Paris (2015) Reached a global consensus, of keeping 
global warming below 2oC above the pre-
industrial temperature, agreed by 177 
countries. To this end, all Parties set their 
NDCs and must commit themselves to 
them. 
Attending this meeting, 
Australia signed the agreement 
in April 2016. 
Source: Compiled by the author from the UNFCCC website: 
http://unfccc.int/meetings/paris_nov_2015/meeting/8926.php  
 
In 1995 the Parties gathered in Berlin to negotiate on reinforcing the convention and this led 
to adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, in which the Parties made commitments to 
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decreasing their greenhouse gas emissions by an average of five per cent below the 1990 
levels during a five-year period from 2008 to 2012 (UNFCCC, 1992). Many developing 
countries also joined the protocol in the early 2000s and were categorised as non-Annex I 
Parties at the Montreal Conference in 2005 (UNFCCC, 2014a). Australia was one of the 
Annex I Parties that joined the Kyoto Protocol on 24 April 1998 and ratified its commitment 
on 12 December 2007 (Parliament of Australia, 2010). The Kyoto Protocol commitment 
period was subsequently extended from 2013 by eight years (The United Nations, 2013). 
Currently, there are 192 Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. 
The Kyoto Protocol introduced three mechanisms to assist Parties to achieve their climate 
goals and all these mechanisms remain in operation. The first mechanism is emissions trading 
in which countries which produce less than the permitted emissions can sell this excess to 
countries which cannot meet their emissions targets. This method has been successfully used 
by the European Union (EU) countries and is clarified in more detail below and in Chapter 2 
Section 2.4.2.  
The second type of mechanism is the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) where the 
Parties can earn Certified Emission Reduction (CER) credits if they implement 
environmental projects in developing countries. Each CER is equal to one tonne of CO2 and 
can be traded in a carbon market (The United Nations, 2013). This mechanism has been 
operating since 2006 and more than 7708 projects have been registered and more than 1600 
million CERs have been issued for project activities (UNFCCC, 2016a). 
The Joint Implementation (JI) program is the third mechanism introduced by the Kyoto 
Protocol. Under this program Parties can earn another type of credit, called Earned Emission 
Reduction Units (ERUs) if they support an emission removal project conducted in the 
territories of other Parties. Like CER, each ERU is equal to one tonne of CO2 and can be 
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traded in a carbon market. The top 10 JI projects implemented so far have been conducted 
between the Czech Republic, Denmark, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Netherlands, Austria, 
Russian Federation, Germany, Ukraine, Lithuania and France. They have resulted in more 
than 5.9 million tonnes CO2 equivalent (CO2e) of ERUs (The United Nations, 2013). 
How successful was the first phase of the Kyoto Protocol? Clark (2012) attempted to answer 
this question by calculating the gap between the emissions reduction target and the actual 
change in emissions for each party to the Kyoto Protocol and plotted those gaps in terms of 
percentage. Figure 1.2 shows the gaps based on emissions data in 2010. The Parties which 
reduced their emissions to the level required by their protocol target or more are shown in 
blue and those which failed are displayed in red. As the figure shows, 21 nations successfully 
reduced their emissions while 16 countries failed to meet their targets. Among the latter 
Australia is the third-largest failure, producing 22 per cent more emissions than its target.  
The Kyoto Protocol has been followed by other international meetings including Copenhagen 
in 2009, Cancun in 2010, Durban in 2011, Doha in 2012, Warsaw in 2013, Lima in 2014, 
Geneva in February 2015, Bonn in October 2015 and the most recent and important one, 
Paris from 30 November to 12 December 2015. These meetings were generally aimed at 
convincing nations that global warming is a serious threat and that it is critical to control 
global warming.  
At one of the later meetings in Warsaw in 2013, countries including Australia agreed to set 
their emissions targets, or their intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs), and 
submit them to the UNFCCC before the Paris meeting.. The Paris meeting is a historical one 
in which 196 countries attended and they agreed to keep the global temperature increase 
below 2°C of the overall global pre-industrial level. The agreement was designed to enter into 
force when at least 55 countries, which together are responsible for 55 per cent of global 
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greenhouse gas emissions, sign off on its ratification between April 2016 and April 2017 
(Taylor, 2016). The agreement was signed by 170 countries including Australia on 22 April 
2016 and now countries must ratify the agreement through their domestic procedures 
including votes in parliament. 
Australia, also set and submitted its INDC and committed to reducing its emissions by 26 to 
28% below their 2005 levels by 2030 (Center for Climate and Energy Solution, 2015). 
Australia also made a commitment to decreasing its per capita emissions by 50–52 per cent 
between 2005 and 2030 and to decreasing its emissions intensity by 54-56 per cent in the 
same period (Department of the Environment, 2015a). These targets, plus those of other 
countries including the two largest emissions producers China and US, are displayed in 
Figure 1.3. As the figure shows, Australia’s emissions intensity target is in line with those of 
other countries. For example, China has decided to decrease the emissions intensity of its 
economy by 65%, the US by 62%, New Zealand by 61%, and the EU, Canada and South 
Korea by 57%. The different populations and population policies of each country, however, 
make it difficult to compare the emissions reduction targets in per capita terms. For example, 
although Australia and China have similar emissions reduction targets in terms of intensity, 
their targets differ significantly in per capita terms as Australia is predicted to achieve a 50–
52 per cent decrease while China will face a 127 per cent increase in emissions per capita 
(Department of the Environment, 2015a).  
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Figure 1.2: Kyoto successes and failures (the gap between the nations’ percentage reduction 
targets from 1990 and the real percentage change between 1990 and 2010) 
 
Source: Clark (2012), the Guardian website: 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2012/nov/26/kyoto-protocol-carbon-emissions  
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Figure 1.3: Emissions reduction targets by country, 2005–2030 
 
 Source: Department of the Environment (2015a) 
 
In addition to the abovementioned INDC, which shows longer-term commitments, Australia 
has made pledges under the Copenhagen Accord to reduce emissions by the year 2020 as 
follows (Borrello, 2016): 
• a 5% reduction relative to the 2000 level unconditionally 
• a reduction of up to 15% if a global agreement secures the stabilisation of greenhouse 
gases at 450 parts per million (ppm) carbon dioxide equivalents, and if, under this 
agreement, major developing economies commit to substantially restraining their 
emissions and other advanced economies also take on commitments of around 15%  
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• a 25% reduction if the world agrees to an ambitious global deal capable of stabilising 
levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at 450 ppm. 
From these pledges, Australia is currently committed to an unconditional 5% emissions 
reduction relative to its 2000 emissions levels by 2020. Australia’s current and future pledges 
require it to implement an emissions reduction program.  
In order to decrease emissions and meet international commitments, countries have applied 
several types of practical programs, including an emissions price arrangement under which 
polluters have to pay for each tonne of pollution they produce. This price can be determined 
by the government at a fixed rate, or by the market and at a flexible rate. The former is 
known as a price-based instrument, a so-called carbon tax, while the latter is a quantity-based 
instrument, called a cap-and-trade, or emissions trading scheme. A carbon tax was first 
introduced by Finland in 1990. Afterwards, the Netherlands (1990), Sweden (1991), Norway 
(1991), Denmark (1992), Great Britain (2001), New Zealand (2005), Switzerland (2008), 
Ireland (2010), France (2010), Japan (2012), Australia (2012, temporarily), and Chile (2014) 
implemented their own carbon tax systems (Carbon Tax Centre, 2011). These carbon tax 
programs, however, have been diverse, ranging from levying a tax directly on emissions, to 
having an ‘incentive tax’ on fossil fuels. These programs are explained in more detail in 
Chapter 2 Section 2.4.1. 
In the flexible rate approach, the government specifies a limit, or cap, on pollution that each 
sector is permitted to produce. It does so by issuing a limited number of emission permits, 
each of which represents one tonne of carbon emissions. The government sells these permits, 
or allowances, to sectors or allocates them freely to some industries to support them. 
Generally, there are two reasons for free allocations. The first reason is political and the 
second is to avoid carbon leakage (Jegou and Rubini, 2011) that is, an environmental policy 
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provides an opportunity for countries with no emissions reduction policies to improve their 
international competitiveness at the expense of those countries that do have emissions 
policies (Parker and Blodgett, 2008).  
Free allowances, however, may not be able to provide enough of an incentive for polluters to 
decrease emissions. Thus, governments usually try to reduce the number of free allowances 
over time. For example, in the European Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), explained 
further below, the manufacturing sector received 80 per cent of its allowances for free in 
2013 but it is planned to decrease this to 30 per cent by 2020 (World Bank, 2016). Permits 
can be traded: if a sector emits more than the permits that it has been allocated, it needs to 
buy permits from other sectors to offset the extra volume of pollution they produce. On the 
other hand, a sector which pollutes less than its permits allow can sell its excess permits. This 
trade, known as emissions trading, leads to the emergence of a market, called a carbon 
market, and this market determines the price of permits based on the demand and supply of 
permits. 
A carbon market is supposed to be a competitive market where emissions producers compete 
to buy the permits they require to fulfil their commitments as determined by the government. 
Businesses with high emission reduction costs prefer to buy carbon permits even at high 
prices, while for others it is more economical to cut their emissions instead of buying permits. 
A good example of a cap-and-trade mechanism is the European Emissions Trading Scheme 
(EU ETS) which is the largest carbon trading system in the world (Ellerman and Buchner, 
2007b) and was launched in 2005. The EU ETS is the only international carbon market. It has 
31 participating countries, including the 28 members of the EU, plus Iceland, Liechtenstein 
and Norway and it covers more than 11000 manufacturing plants and power stations 
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responsible for approximately 45 per cent of total EU emissions (European Commission, 
2013a). 
In Australia, an emissions pricing program was implemented but it experienced significant 
volatility as a result of the lack of a political consensus on the issue. Despite the scientific 
evidence highlighted earlier in this section, there is still debate on the existence and impact of 
climate change, which has led to different attitudes among policy makers about the 
importance of emissions reduction policies and the costs and benefits of such policies. 
The political concern of emissions reduction policies in Australia was first raised when Stern 
(2007) published his review in which he highlighted the importance of quick actions to avoid 
economic and social problems that climate change would impose globally. The initial steps 
towards emission reduction programs were taken by the Australian government under the 
prime ministership of John Howard. The Howard government decided to implement an ETS 
in July 2007 (Crimp et al., 2010). This program, however, was not carried out due to a lack of 
political support.2 The first implemented program in Australia was the Clean Energy Program 
under the prime ministership of Julia Gillard in 2011. The program included two phases of 
emissions pricing: first, a fixed price, or a carbon tax, for a period which commenced on 1 
July 2012. This phase was originally intended to continue until 30 July 2015 when the second 
phase, with a variable price system under an emissions trading scheme, would begin.  
Under the prime ministership of Kevin Rudd, however, it was announced that this fixed price 
period would finish one year earlier, on 30 July 2014 (Australian Government, 2013). This 
program was further changed under the prime ministership of Tony Abbott who abolished the 
carbon pricing system with effect from 1 July 2014 (Australian Government, 2014a). As an 
                                                     
2 The history of Australian emission reduction policies is presented in detail in Chapter 2, Section 2.7. 
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alternative, the government introduced the Emissions Reduction Fund program which came 
into effect on 13 December 2014. Under this programme the government funds emissions 
reduction activities (Department of the Environment, 2014a). This really shows the division 
over the emissions reduction issue in Australia and how the Abbott government’s policy 
conflicted with Stern’s (2006) recommendations.  
In April 2016, the Australian Labor Party proposed two emissions trading schemes, one for 
the electricity sector and one for industrial polluters with a total cost of $355.6 million over 
four years. The program is similar to the model first proposed by the current prime minister 
Malcolm Turnbull in 2009 (Taylor, 2016). The proposed industrial ETS included two phases: 
phase one specifies a cap, or a certain level of emissions that the industries can produce 
without any penalty while they have to buy permits for the extra units of emissions. Phase 
two is yet to be designed (Borrello, 2016). The program confirms that the Labor Party is 
pledged to reducing emissions by 45% by 2030 and is committed to shifting electricity 
generation toward renewable resources (Grattan, 2016).  
Despite the volatility in the implementation of environmental policies in Australia, the 
significance of environmental problems remains a great motivation for researchers to find an 
efficient climate change program in conjunction with studies of the environmental and 
economic impacts of alternative policies at both the national and global levels. This is the 
primary aim of this study. It evaluates the economic effects of competing emissions pricing 
policies in Australia. The policies examined include a carbon tax and a subsidy system. While 
the focus of this study will be on Australia, the framework developed could in principle be 
applied more generally to other countries if suitably adapted to local circumstances. 
The chapter continues as follows: the significance of the current study is clarified in Section 
1.2 and the questions addressed in this thesis are presented in Section 1.3. Section 1.4 
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specifies the hypotheses that are tested. Section 1.5 provides the background to the research 
by reviewing the literature and Section 1.6 presents the contributions of this thesis. Section 
1.7 clarifies the major concepts of the methodology and Section 1.8 explains the 
parameterisation method used, and software used in this research. Section 1.9 outlines the 
structure of this thesis and Section 1.10 summarises and concludes this chapter.  
1.2. Significance of the Research 
As discussed in Section 1.1 emissions pricing policies in Australia have undergone several 
changes. This volatility in the attitudes of policy makers, or “the lack of cross-party political 
support”, is one of the fundamental sources of uncertainty about Australia’s carbon pricing 
mechanism (Jotzo et al., 2012). In addition to the effects of this political uncertainty, 
Australian emissions pricing policy is greatly influenced by other types of uncertainty which 
are common to all environmental policies. The source and size of uncertainty can affect 
optimal choices3 of environmental policies (Angelopoulos et al., 2013).  
This research categorises these uncertainties into two groups: first, environmental uncertainty 
arising from unknown geological and environmental factors. As yet, no precise estimation of 
the life of carbon in the atmosphere and the contribution of GHGs to climate change and 
global warming is available. Additionally, the sensitivity of the earth to global warming also 
remains unknown, and consequently, an accurate estimation of the size and timing of damage 
due to pollution has not yet been suggested. 4 In Australia it is predicted that the annual 
average temperature will increase by 2.8 to 5.1°C relative to the 1986–2005 period by the end 
of this century (CSIRO and the Australian Bureau of Meteorology, 2015). If the upper 
                                                     
3 Angelopoulos et al. (2013) specify optimal choices of environmental policies in terms of maximising social 
welfare.  
4 Tol (2009) and Tol (2015) provided a survey on estimations of the global economic effect of climate change 
which was presented in Section 1.1. 
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estimate proves to be accurate the temperature increase in Australia will be higher than the 
average global increase as it is predicted that the global temperature will increase by between 
2.6 and 4.8°C (Lloyd, 2013). This would result in severe problems since Australia is already 
the driest inhabited continent on earth (Preston, 2009). These estimations call for effective 
interventions which take into account the possibility of such events while addressing 
economic considerations. 
The second category of uncertainty is economic uncertainty. This type of uncertainty is 
related to the social and economic costs of emissions abatement, the social and economic 
costs of climate change damage, and the trade-off between these two expenses. Economic 
uncertainty comprises factors which can affect the future of this trade-off such as the 
development of alternative renewable sources of fuel, the progress of backstop technology 
and the arrival of new, cleaner technology. In Australia, the progress of renewable energy 
technology can significantly affect the approaches that policy makers adopt to achieve 
emissions targets, since production relies heavily on fossil fuels. Over eighty-six per cent of 
Australia’s electricity was generated by fossil fuels in 2012–13 (Bureau of Resources and 
Energy Economics, 2014).  
Both types of uncertainty highlight the need for a model which can facilitate taking 
uncertainty into account in environmental policy analysis. To this end, dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium (DSGE) models can be applied. Such analysis, however, has not yet been 
applied for Australia and is the main motivation of the current research. This is the major 
contribution of this research and it is expected that this thesis can provide a new modelling 
approach for Australian emissions pricing analysis which recognises the responses of 
economic and environmental variables to uncertainties and can have the potential to assist 
policy makers to learn about the effectiveness of different emissions reduction programs.  
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The emphasis of this thesis is on the effects of economic uncertainty on Australian emissions 
pricing policies. In particular, this research focuses on sudden changes in production 
technology in terms of total factor productivity (TFP) shocks. The role of TFP shocks in 
unexpected changes in macroeconomic fluctuations was first investigated by Kydland and 
Prescott (1982). A TFP shock leads to a change in the level of output obtained from the same 
level of inputs. The change in output subsequently results in changes in other economic 
variables and can trigger new business cycles or affect the amplitude of existing business 
cycles. Considering production as the main source of pollution, it can be expected that 
pollution flows, or emissions, follow the same fluctuations of production so that an expansion 
(recession) in production will bring about an increase (decrease) in emissions. In fact, the 
focus of this thesis is on neoclassical economics5 in which it is assumed that the market is 
self-stabilising and there are only real effects where a real shock, such as a TFP shock, 
occurs.  
Why does the government need to consider TFP shocks? If the government ignores 
fluctuations that inevitably occur in emissions as a consequence of economic fluctuations, 
and sets emissions reduction policies based only on the currently observable economic and 
environmental situation, it may face undesired levels of emissions and increase the risk that 
emissions targets will not be met. To avoid this, the government should take emissions 
variations into consideration when formulating policies and attempting to control and 
stabilise emissions. This requires recognising the integration of climate policies with business 
cycle and macroeconomic fluctuations will help policy makers to understand how an 
Australian emissions pricing system can affect or be affected by business cycles, and how 
                                                     
5 As explained in Chapter 4, Section 4.2 this thesis does not adopt a New Keynesian approach since the focus of 
this research is not the effects of nominal shocks, and neither is it the relationship between monetary policy and 
emissions reduction policies.  
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best to adjust the system to shocks in order to stabilise emissions and obtain lower emissions. 
The aim of this thesis is to address these questions.  
Since the focus of the current research is Australia, it specifies the emissions reduction 
systems in ways that resemble policies already implemented or planned to be implemented in 
Australia. The systems include a fixed emissions tax which resembles the Australian Carbon 
Tax, an abatement subsidy like the Australian Emissions Reduction Fund program, and a 
variable emissions tax. Based on theory and under conditions of perfect certainty, where both 
the regulator and firms have access to the same information, a tax will be set at the market 
price of a cap and trade system. Thus, the variable emissions tax specified in this thesis can 
be identified as a proxy for the emissions trading system which was planned to be applied in 
Australia. The next section clarifies the main research questions of this thesis. 
1.3. Research Questions 
The following research questions are addressed in this study: 
1. What would be the effect of emissions reduction programs, including a fixed 
emissions tax, a variable emissions tax and an abatement subsidy, on Australian 
emissions and welfare6? 
2. Which one of these emissions reduction programs is likely to be the most efficient in 
terms of having less negative impacts on Australian GDP and welfare? 
3. What would be the effect of TFP shocks on the Australian economy under each of 
these emissions reduction programs? 
4. What would be the effect of these programs on Australia’s business cycles? 
                                                     
6 This research considers welfare in terms of total discounted expected utility. 
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5. How can these emissions pricing programs be adjusted to business cycles in order to 
stabilise emissions?  
1.4. Research Hypotheses 
The main hypothesis of this research is that any type of emissions pricing mechanism 
imposes extra costs on producers and may affect the level of output. As a result, the economy 
will be affected by emissions pricing systems and this can negatively affect major 
macroeconomic variables including output. On the other hand, the imposed costs of such a 
policy on polluters can provide motivation for polluters to decrease emissions. Thus, the main 
hypotheses of this research are: 
1. Australian GDP and welfare will be lower under emissions reduction programs than 
under a business as usual scenario.  
2. Australian emissions would be lower under emissions reduction programs than under 
a business as usual scenario. 
3. A TFP shock would increase output and, consequently, emissions. 
4. An emissions tax program will produce lower emissions than an abatement subsidy. 
5. An abatement subsidy program will result in a lower economic cost of abatement than 
an emissions tax program. 
In order to test these hypotheses the background to this research is reviewed first to identify 
how previous studies have addressed similar questions.  
1.5. Research Background 
In order to investigate the effects of policies on different sectors of an economy, and their 
relationships, general equilibrium models have been broadly applied to analyse the effects of 
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monetary and fiscal policies (Odior, 2014; Chen, 2015; Vella et al., 2015). In the case of 
environmental analysis, computable general equilibrium (CGE) models have been broadly 
used as an appropriate approach for analysis of the income distribution and resource 
allocation implications of emission control policies (Brendemoen and Vennemo, 1994; 
Muller-Furstenberger and Stephan, 2002; Bohringer et al., 2015; Karplus et al., 2015; 
Springmann et al., 2015).  
The contribution of CGE models to Australian environmental policy analysis has also been 
dominant (Asafu-Adjaye and Mahadevan, 2013; Adams et al., 2014; Meng, 2014) and 
several sophisticated models such as ORANI (Dixon et al., 1977), MEGABARE (ABARE, 
1996), Monash Multi-Regional Forecasting (MMRF) (Adams et al., 2000), the Global Trade 
and Environment Model (GTEM) (Ahammad et al., 2004) and G-Cubed (McKibbin, 1998) 
have been developed and each of them has been updated several times to illustrate 
widespread interactions between economic agents. These models are all deterministic in 
nature, and ignore any environmental or economic uncertainty related to environmental 
policies. However, as discussed in Section 1.2, the choice of environmental policy depends 
not only on factors such as the country’s circumstances, the particular sector(s) to which the 
program will be applied, and interactions with other policies (Stern, 2007), but also on the 
size and sources of uncertainty7 (Angelopoulos et al., 2010).  
The role of uncertainty in environmental policy analysis was first discussed by Weitzman 
(1974) in the form of asymmetric information about abatement costs (i.e. the regulator cannot 
observe the real firm’s abatement costs). He shows that under such asymmetric information 
conditions a price-based (quantity-based) control, such as a carbon tax (cap), will be the most 
                                                     
7 Here, uncertainty refers to the lack of information about the current or future value of a variable(s). See 
Section 1.2 for a detailed explanation of uncertainty.  
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effective type of measure if the marginal cost curve is steeper (flatter) and the marginal 
benefit curve is flatter (steeper). Following him, many contributions have focused on 
asymmetric information as the main source of uncertainty in environmental policy analysis 
(Pizer, 2002; Newell and Pizer, 2003; Fell et al., 2012). These studies used different reduced 
quadratic forms for the cost function and for the benefit function. In order to add other types 
of uncertainty into environmental policy analysis, a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
(DSGE) model can also be used which involves all sectors of the economy and is more 
compatible with economic theories. A great advantage of DSGE models is that they are 
micro-founded models based on the optimisation behaviour of agents with different 
constraints, technologies and equilibriums. In contrast to CGE models, in DSGE models the 
modeller can include uncertainty and solve the model for exogenous shocks. 
The literature on DSGE environmental analysis is still at a preliminary stage and mostly 
focuses on real business cycle (RBC) 8  models. They show how environmental policies 
respond to economic fluctuations. These models were first introduced by Fischer and 
Springborn (2011) who applied an RBC model with technology shocks in terms of TFP 
shocks to provide a comparison between three climate policies: an emissions tax, an 
emissions cap, and an intensity target.9 Another primary study in the environmental DSGE 
literature was conducted by Heutel (2012) who developed an RBC model with TFP shocks to 
show how emissions tax policies should be adjusted to business cycles.  
Following these two contributions other studies have applied DSGE models for 
environmental policy analysis. For instance, Hassler and Krusell (2012) developed a DSGE 
model by applying a Regional Integrated model of Climate and the Economy (RICE) 
                                                     
8 RBC models are briefly explained in Section 1.7. 
9 An intensity target limits emissions relative to some measurement, mostly output, being constant. 
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combined with stochastic 10 TFP shocks to provide an integrated investigation of climate 
policies on oil-producing and oil-importing countries. These contributions have focused on 
real shocks in terms of TFP and have recently been extended to other shocks such as 
environmental shocks by Angelopoulos et al. (2013) and nominal shocks by Annicchiarico 
and Di Dio (2015). This thesis follows the literature by analysing emissions reduction 
policies in an RBC framework, however the approach of the current research differs in 
several ways as explained in the next section.  
1.6. Research Contribution 
This research makes four contributions to the literature. First, it makes a practical 
contribution by applying a DSGE model in an Australian environmental policy analysis 
context. As discussed in the research background provided in Section 1.5 the literature 
analysing Australian emissions reduction policies is wide ranging, and many researchers have 
attempted to investigate the effects of these policies on different economic and environmental 
variables. However, they have ignored the significant role of uncertainty in environmental 
policies and applied different types of deterministic models. This thesis provides the first 
environmental analysis under the condition of uncertainty by applying a DSGE model to 
Australian emissions pricing policy analysis. To this end it applies an RBC model to 
investigate how technology shocks in terms of TFP can affect the economy under different 
emissions pricing policies. 
The second contribution of this thesis is related to the specification of the policies. The 
policies which are analysed in this thesis are similar to policies recently implemented in 
Australia, including a fixed tax policy similar to the carbon tax program, and an abatement 
                                                     
10 A stochastic event is an unpredicted event caused by a random variable. 
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subsidy policy like the Emissions Reduction Fund program. A variable emissions tax 
scenario is also tested in this thesis. Specifying and testing these policies is the second 
contribution of the current study to the environmental DSGE analysis literature, since other 
studies have mostly focused on emissions taxes. For instance, Heutel (2012) and 
Angelopoulos et al. (2013) examined a variable emissions tax, Dissou and Karnizova (2012) 
compared the outcomes of taxes and permits, Hassler and Krusell (2012) specified climate 
policy in terms of taxation on oil, and Fischer and Springborn (2011) and Annicchiarico and 
Di Dio (2015) examined three policies: an emissions tax, an emissions cap, and an intensity 
target specified in terms of the shadow price of emissions.  
The third contribution of this research is related to the parameterisation method applied in 
this research. As discussed in Section 1.7 this research applies and adapts a model presented 
by Heutel (2012). He specifies an exogenous variable, emissions, produced by the rest of the 
world in his model. However, this thesis finds that the approach he used to parameterise this 
variable would make it endogenous in such a way that changes in domestic emissions would 
result in changes in emissions from the rest of the world. To avoid this problem the current 
research applies another approach to keep emissions from the rest of the world exogenous 
under all emissions reduction scenarios.  
Finally, the fourth contribution is in regard to the techniques used for the analysis. The 
studies reviewed in Section 1.5 mostly conducted policy analysis by comparing the response 
paths of variables to a TFP shock and/or the steady state of variables under different 
emissions pricing programs. In addition to these two techniques, this thesis conducts a policy 
analysis in a dynamic context by calculating the cumulative effects that a TFP shock can have 
on the variables under different emissions pricing programs. This technique can capture not 
only the effects of emissions reduction programs on the steady state values of key variables, 
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but also the effects on the response paths of variables to shocks and, thus, it can express the 
total effects of the shock under an emissions reduction program. 
Having reviewed the background of the research and the contribution of the current study to 
the literature, the methodology applied in this thesis is explained in the next section.  
1.7. Methodology 
A DSGE model was first introduced by Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Long and Plosser 
(1983) for the purposes of analysing real business cycles. DSGE models are macroeconomic 
models derived from microeconomic foundations, including market clearing, rational 
expectations and optimising agents. These types of models were developed to address the 
Lucas critique. Lucas (1976) argues that applying macroeconomic models based on historical 
data and not on economic theory can only indicate estimated relationships and are not 
appropriate for providing any predictions. To have a suitable framework for predictions, he 
argues, a model should indicate the real structural relationships in which current and lagged 
values of observable variables form expectations. 
As can be understood from their name, DSGE models are: 
• dynamic, that is they can be used to investigate an economy over time 
• stochastic, so they can show the effects of uncertainties or shocks on the economy 
• general equilibrium; that is, they describe the behaviour of a whole economy through 
analysing the optimising behaviour of micro agents where all agents are in 
equilibrium. 
Generally, there are two schools of DSGE modelling. One uses RBC models, which were the 
first type of DSGE models introduced by Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Long and Plosser 
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(1983). These researchers developed a dynamic general equilibrium model to investigate if 
real shocks, in terms of TFP shocks, are the main source of business cycle fluctuations. RBC 
models are based on neoclassical growth theories under the assumption of flexible prices. 
This assumption was later changed to allow for price stickiness. Other modifications included 
adding a monetary side and monopolistic competition in order to make DSGE models more 
appropriate for monetary policy analysis. These changes in RBC models resulted in a second 
type of DSGE model known as New-Keynesian. The New-Keynesian models were 
introduced by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) who employ monopolistically competitive 
market assumptions in which price adjustments involve time and costs.  
This thesis applies an RBC model since the aim of this research is to investigate how an 
optimal emissions pricing system should be adjusted to business cycles. Applying a DSGE 
model involves six steps: First, the main structure of the model is set by specifying different 
sectors of the model. Second, each sector is optimised and the first order conditions are 
found. Additionally, market clearance conditions and shocks are specified. Third, the system 
is usually nonlinear and without a closed analytical solution. To obtain a numerical solution 
the model needs to be approximated in the neighbourhood of a non-stochastic steady state 
point. Fourth, the model is parameterised. Fifth, the size and direction of the shock is 
specified. Sixth, the model is solved numerically and the results are analysed. All these steps 
are covered in different chapters of this thesis. The model is parameterised to the Australian 
economy. The parameterisation method and software used to solve the model are explained in 
the next section. 
1.8. Data and Software 
After developing and solving the model, a calibration method is used for parameterisation to 
obtain and evaluate the empirical results. Calibration is a popular approach for 
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parameterisation introduced by Kydland and Prescott (1982) in which the parameters of the 
model are taken from the literature in order to study the behaviour of variables. In this thesis 
an RBC model is developed and then calibrated using parameter values estimated in previous 
RBC studies for the Australian economy. The environmental parameters are calibrated to the 
environmental literature including the Regional Integrated model of Climate and the 
Economy (RICE). In the latest version, RICE–2010, Nordhaus (2010) divided the global 
economy into 12 regions: the United States, the European Union, Japan, Russia, Eurasia, 
China, India, Middle East, Africa, Latin America, Other High Income (OHI) countries and 
Other Asia. Australia is included in the OHI group. Therefore, this research uses the 
parameters of the OHI group to calibrate the environmental coefficients for Australia. The 
economic parameters, which were taken from Australian RBC literature, and the 
environmental parameters, will be used directly, except for three environmental parameters 
relating to the damage function. These parameters are taken from the RICE model and 
amended.  
This research also uses estimations for one of the environmental parameters which has not 
previously been estimated in the literature. To this end Australian databases including the 
Australian National Accounts (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2014) and Australia’s National 
Greenhouse Accounts (Department of the Environment, 2014b) are used. A sensitivity 
analysis will then be conducted to investigate how sensitive the results are to this estimated 
parameter. Finally, the model is coded and run on MATLAB to solve the model and simulate 
the responses of economic and environmental variables to shocks under different emissions 
reduction scenarios.  
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1.9. Thesis Structure  
This thesis contains eight chapters. The chapters are organised as follows. Chapter 1 provides 
an introduction to the thesis by highlighting the significance of the study, the questions that 
this study attempts to address and the method it applies. Chapter 2 provides the background 
of the study including the importance of emissions reduction policies in the world and in 
Australia, the instruments and programs which can be applied to obtain emissions reduction 
targets, and the history of emissions reduction policies. Focusing on Australia, the chapter 
reviews the main features of Australian emissions, Australia’s international emissions 
reduction commitments and the history of emissions reduction policies in this country.  
Chapter 3 provides the literature review. The focus of this chapter is on reviewing emissions 
reduction policy analysis which aims to show the effects of such policies on the whole 
economy. To this end general equilibrium models have been broadly used. Thus, this chapter 
reviews the application of general equilibrium models including CGE and DSGE models in 
environmental policy analysis. The chapter reviews the major CGE models which have been 
developed and applied to analysing Australia’s environmental policy. Then the literature on 
environmental DSGE models, which have been mostly applied to the US economy and not 
for Australia until this research, is reviewed. 
The model used in this study is presented in Chapter 4. The chapter starts by clarifying the 
main features of DSGE models and then specifies the model applied in this thesis. The model 
comprises a production sector, a consumption sector and environment sector which can affect 
each other. The model is extended to four emissions reduction scenarios. These scenarios are 
specified to be similar to the programs designed and/or applied in Australia. They comprise: a 
business-as-usual or no policy scenario, a fixed emissions tax, a variable emissions tax and an 
abatement subsidy scenario.  
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The model is then calibrated in Chapter 5. In order to obtain the impulse response functions, 
(i.e. the response paths of economic and environmental variables to a shock), the model needs 
to be log-linearised which is also done in Chapter 5. The simulation results are presented in 
Chapter 6, including the numerical results for the steady state (i.e. with no shock), the 
impulse response functions and the numerical results for the cumulative effects. Chapter 7 
investigates the sensitivity of the results to a change in a parameter and also discusses key 
policy implications from the findings of this study. Chapter 8 summarises the major results 
from this thesis and identifies answers to the research questions posed in Chapter 1. It also 
identifies areas for future research. 
 1.10. Summary 
This chapter has provided an explanation of the importance of a study of Australian 
emissions pricing policies utilising a DSGE model. It has briefly described the importance of 
environmental policies in Australia and reviewed relevant policies implemented in Australia. 
It has also pointed to the importance of considering uncertainty in environmental policy 
analysis which requires a stochastic analysis approach such as that of a DSGE model. This is 
the first attempt at applying an environmental DSGE model for the case of Australia. Then 
the general concepts and characteristics of a DSGE model were clarified. The 
parameterisation approach and software to be applied in current research were also specified. 
Finally, the structure of the thesis was presented. The next chapter provides a more detailed 
discussion of the background to this study. 
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Chapter 2  
An Overview of Global and Australian Emission Reduction Policies  
2.1. Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to present background information to this research. This includes 
highlighting the importance of emissions control policies, a review of global environmental 
actions including targets and agreements, a review of market policies to achieve the targets, a 
review of Australian emissions control policies, and an examination of the role of uncertainty 
in policy analysis. An examination of these issues related to environmental policy helps us to 
understand the significance and difficulties of emissions pricing policies in Australia.  
This chapter refers to two distinguished studies which discuss different aspects of emission 
control programs: the Stern Report (Stern, 2007) and the Garnaut Report. The report, the 
Review of the Economics of Climate Change was conducted by Sir Nicholas Stern from the 
London School of Economics and it was released on 30 October 2006. Stern believes that 
climate change is a very serious economic challenge as “it is the greatest and widest-ranging 
market failure ever seen”. To overcome this high-risk problem he suggests taking “strong, 
early action on climate change” by stimulating good market signals, overcoming market 
failures and reducing the risk of severe consequences from emissions. Stern (2007) applied 
different economic models such as integrated assessment models to calculate the economic 
impacts of climate change on an economy. He also used macroeconomic models to estimate 
the costs and benefits of transition to low emission systems. The findings of the models 
suggested that the benefits of such strong, early action would outweigh its costs.  
The second study used in this chapter is the Garnaut Report written in 2007 and updated in 
2011, which focuses on Australia. Garnaut (2011) divides his report into three sections. In the 
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first section, “the Global Review”, he provides information about the necessity of a climate 
system for Australia. In the second part “Australia’s Path” he suggests a carbon tax as an 
efficient instrument for achieving Australia’s abatement targets, and in the third part 
“Australian Transformation” he concentrates on the transformation that Australia would 
experience after the introduction of a carbon tax. Several points from each of these reports are 
presented in this chapter.  
The debate on the implementation of emissions control policies worldwide, as well as in 
Australia, has been divisive. For many centuries, and before the industrial revolution in the 
1800s, the inflows of GHGs produced by animals and sediment, and outflows of carbon 
absorbed by ocean and plants, was naturally balanced. The major human activity which 
changed this balance is the burning of fossil fuels, which caused carbon dioxide emissions 
from fossil fuel to increase by more than three per cent per year on average in the 2000s 
(Garnaut, 2011). This role of humans in climate change is emphasised in other studies 
including the report published by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 
which indicates that there is a 95 per cent probability that humans are responsible for global 
warming (IPCC, 2013).  
The accumulated GHGs impose externalities (i.e. costs on the environment and all people 
around the world) not only in the present but also in the future. The externalities and their 
negative effects on social welfare result in the world having become increasingly concerned 
about environmental issues over recent decades and attempts to control pollution caused by 
human activity. One of the earliest and most significant steps towards this end was the Kyoto 
Protocol, signed in 1997, in which 37 industrialised countries and the European community 
committed themselves to decreasing their greenhouse gas emissions. To achieve this aim, 
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governments needed to intervene by implementing emissions control policies which would 
motivate economic agents to decrease the amounts of pollution they produced.  
This issue was previously raised by Pigou (1920) who introduced the concept of externalities 
in welfare economics and highlighted the role of government intervention to correct these 
externalities. He argues that setting a price, or a tax, equal to the social costs of the activity 
which imposes the externality is necessary to correct the inefficiency of the market and to 
provide an incentive for the producer to internalise the social cost. This type of price is 
known as a Pigovian tax. For human activities which generate pollution of the atmosphere, 
the damage is borne by a range of sufferers worldwide over long time periods. This requires 
an effective global response to correct such market inefficiency. This idea has been applied in 
environmental economics to address the externality of pollution and led to the advocacy of an 
emissions tax, also known as a carbon tax.  
However, estimating in monetary terms the costs of the pollution and the benefits from 
controlling its level, especially in detail and based on economic theory, is very difficult and 
perhaps even impossible (Spash, 2002). Despite associated difficulties, environmental 
taxation is identified as a useful public policy measure. For instance, Ekins and Barker (2001) 
believe that emissions taxation is simple and cheap to administer, with insignificant 
regressive side effects that minimise the economic problems associated with a pollution 
externality, while at the same time generating revenue and stimulating innovation and 
investment in renewable technology. 
In a carbon tax system, the polluting agents must pay for each tonne of pollution they 
produce. Paying a price on emissions is an effective instrument to make polluters address the 
social costs of their actions by internalising the cost of the pollution in their private costs and 
stimulating them to move away from high-carbon technologies and goods and services to 
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low-carbon ones. A carbon tax was first introduced by Finland in 1990. Afterwards, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Great Britain, New Zealand, France, Switzerland, 
Ireland, Japan and temporarily Australia, implemented their own emissions tax systems 
(Carbon Tax Centre, 2011). 
During the 1990s, and with the introduction of new climate policies, many economists 
attempted to investigate the short-run and long-run economic impacts of the policies that had 
been introduced. The literature on the environmental and economic effects of emissions 
control policies such as carbon taxes is wide-ranging with different results obtained from a 
large variety of countries, assumptions and methods. The results of such analyses, however, 
are highly influenced by a broad range of uncertainties about emissions control policies, 
including the size of pollution externalities and the future of low-carbon technologies. Such 
uncertainties can influence the choice of environmental policies (Angelopoulos et al., 2010).  
The implementation of emissions control policies in Australia has experienced significant 
volatility over the last decade and remains in doubt due to different attitudes towards such 
policies by policy makers. The Australian emissions pricing system was introduced under the 
Clean Energy Program introduced during the prime ministership of Julia Gillard in 2011. The 
program included two planned phases: first, a fixed price, or a carbon tax, commenced in 1 
July 2012 and was originally planned to continue until 30 July 2015 when the second phase, 
with a flexible price system under an emissions trading scheme, would begin. However, 
under the prime ministership of Kevin Rudd in 2013, it was announced that this fixed price 
period would finish one year earlier, on 30 July 2014 (Australian Government, 2013).  
This program was further changed under the prime ministership of Tony Abbott who 
abolished the carbon pricing system with effect from 1 July 2014 (Australian Government, 
2014a). As an alternative, the government introduced the Emissions Reduction Fund program 
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which came into effect on 13 December 2014. Under this program the government funds 
emissions reduction activities including the improvement of energy efficiency standards 
(Department of the Environment, 2014a). The history of Australia’s emissions reduction 
programs is explained in more detail in Section 2.7 and summarised in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1: Summary of Australian emissions reduction programs 
Time Performer Emissions Reduction Action 
July 2007 Howard Proposing an Emissions Trading Scheme 
July 2008 Rudd Introducing the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) 
intending to become effective in 2010 
2009 Parliament Rejecting CPRS 
July 2011 Gillard Introducing Securing a Clean Energy Future, the Australian 
Government’s Climate Change Plan 
• a carbon tax program from 2012-2015 
• an emissions trading scheme from 2015 onwards 
November 2011 Parliament Passing the Securing a Clean Energy Future, the Australian 
Government’s climate change plan 
July 2012 Gillard Beginning of a carbon tax 
July 2013 Rudd Announcing that the tax period would finish in July 2014 
November 2013 Abbott Introducing legislation to abolish the carbon tax 
July 2014 Parliament Passing the repeal of the carbon tax 
December 2014 Abbott Introducing the Emissions Reduction Fund program 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
Such volatility in policy implementation stands in contrast to actions advocated by Stern 
(2007), who emphasises that a successful scheme requires that society, especially consumers 
and investors, are made to believe in the continuity and stability of policies, such as the 
implementation of a carbon tax, and particularly those measures addressing high-carbon 
goods and services. The government also has to support the development of technology and 
extend its collaboration with the private sector, since the private sector is the major player in 
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research and development and in technology transmission (Stern, 2007). Currently, low-
carbon technologies are more expensive than fossil-fuel ones; however this is anticipated to 
change in the future as the result of progress in research and development (Nordhaus, 2010). 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: Section 2.2 presents an overview of 
estimated global environmental problems due to GHG pollution and the call for emission 
control programs. Global emissions reduction agreements and targets are presented in Section 
2.3. Section 2.4 reviews emissions tax and permit policies as the two most popular emissions 
control instruments, and Section 2.5 discusses the role of uncertainty in such policies and the 
importance of conducting an emissions reduction policy analysis which includes uncertainty. 
Section 2.6 discusses some issues regarding the importance and targets of Australia’s 
emissions control programs. Then the history of emissions reduction policies and the 
implemented programs, including former emissions pricing policies and the current 
Emissions Reduction Fund, are reviewed in Section 2.7. Finally, Section 2.8 summarises the 
main points from this chapter. 
2.2. The Importance of Emissions Control Policies 
In previous centuries all economies focused on development through increasing industrial 
production and extending their share of markets. Over the last three decades the effects of 
human activities on the environment have become a growing concern worldwide. These 
effects include the impacts of pollution on public health problems (Janke, 2014; Malina and 
Scheffler, 2015; Wang et al., 2015), and human health quality and life expectancy 
(Varvarigos, 2008; Pautrel, 2009 and 2012; Mariani et al., 2009; Jouvet et al., 2010). 
According to a World Health Organisation report published in 2011, air pollution is the main 
health risk to the extent that about two million deaths a year are caused by indoor smoke from 
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biomass fuels and coal used for cooking and heating, and 1.3 million deaths are caused by 
outdoor air pollution, mostly in developing countries (World Health Organization, 2011). 
The effects of human activities and pollution are not limited to human health issues.  Over the 
last decades the evidence of climate change and the role of human activities in global 
warming have increasingly attracted the attention of many in the scientific community. 
Recent observed global changes, such as rising temperatures, climate volatility, increases in 
sea levels and the melting of land ice have encouraged many scientists to find ways to reduce 
GHG emissions and control their causes. World Meteorological Organisation statistics show 
that global temperature from January to June 2016 breaks a new record which implies that 
2016 is expected to be recorded as the world’s hottest year (World Meteorological 
Organization, 2016). So far, the years 2011–2015 were the warmest years on record (World 
Meteorological Organization, 2015) followed by 2010, 2005 and 1998 (The World 
Meteorological Organization, 2010).  
The evidence of global warming has motivated many researchers to investigate the effects of 
climate change. Among others, Stern (2007) conducted a comprehensive study to investigate 
the economic and environmental impacts of a 2–3°C increase in temperature by 2050. The 
results and implications of his study were considerable. He found that the consequences of 
the increase in temperature would be broad and would include: the melting of glaciers which 
would increase in the risks of floods and water supply shortages thereby threatening one-sixth 
of the global population; a reduction in crop yields; an increase in diseases and deaths related 
to heat stress; and negative changes in ecosystems as 15–40 per cent of species would 
become extinct with further warming of 2°C. These negative impacts will accelerate as the 
planet gets warmer.  
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Climate change and global warming may impact positively on some cold, developed 
countries such as Canada and Russia for a while, but the impacts will be more severe for the 
poorest countries, which are mostly in hot, dry places, and for coastal countries. In other 
words, the distribution of the negative impacts of climate change is not equal worldwide in 
that it will hurt the most vulnerable and poor people and countries earliest and most severely. 
A good example is Bangladesh. This country generates about 0.3% of global emissions but 
will be severely and disproportionately impacted by the consequences of climate change 
since about 70% of the country’s total area is less than one metre above sea level (Gardiner, 
2014). Once climate change occurs, reversing the process is almost impossible (Stern, 2007). 
Similar results have been found by other researchers. For instance, Mendelsohn et al. (2000), 
Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), Tol (2002) and Rehdanz and Maddison (2005) found that some 
of the countries which would be most adversely affected by climate change would be African 
countries.  
Stern (2007) extended his study to estimate the economic effects of a 5–6°C warming in the 
next century. As he explains, the time lags between actions and their effects are very long. He 
applied integrated models and found that an increase of 5–6°C in the global temperature 
would lead to 5–10 per cent cuts in world GDP and reductions in GDP would be more than 
10% for poor countries. Using a particular model, PAGE2002, Stern (2007) studied possible 
changes of the estimations derived from the integrated assessment models in response to 
possible increase in the degrees of temperature. This model enabled Stern to estimate the total 
costs of climate change related to a business-as-usual (BAU) path of emissions (i.e. no 
emission reduction policy, over the next two centuries). The results indicated the impacts 
would be severe, equivalent to at least a 5% reduction in global per-capita consumption. The 
costs would increase to a 20% reduction in consumption per capita if we consider non-market 
effects including the effects on human health and on the environment. Moreover, weighting 
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the inequitable distribution of costs on poor countries could increase the cost of a 5–6°C 
warming by 25% compared to the estimates when we exclude the weighting for inequality. 
However, Stern (2007) points out that because he considers a wide range of environmental 
factors and a time frame of 100 to 200 years, the costs may appear very large. He believes 
that a deliberate mitigation policy would be able to decrease some of these risks and could be 
implemented at a lower cost than the costs he has calculated. On the other hand, any attempt 
to decrease GHG emissions may be interpreted as slowing economic growth since emissions 
are driven by production. A strong policy, however, can benefit the world by stabilising the 
level of GHG emissions. That is, by reducing GHG concentrations to a level that can be 
absorbed by the earth. Obviously, this stabilisation level will be higher if emissions remain 
above this natural level for a longer period of time. Mitigation measures can be applied in 
four ways and costs will be depending on the combination of these methods: 
• decreasing the demand for emissions-intensive goods and services 
• improving production efficiency which leads to savings in terms of both emissions 
and money 
• implementing non-energy emissions actions (e.g. avoiding deforestation) 
• shifting to technologies which use less carbon to produce heat, power and transport. 
In order to estimate the costs of stabilisation, macroeconomic models can be used to study the 
wider effects of a transition to a cleaner energy economy. Although this is complex and 
involves a wide range of assumptions, it can provide an opportunity to track the dynamic 
interactions of several factors. Using a macroeconomic model, Stern (2007) found that 
stabilisation at the level of 500-550 parts per million (ppm) of CO2 would cost approximately 
1% of annual global GDP by the year 2050. This cost seems very large, but compared with 
the costs associated with doing nothing about climate change, these costs may be acceptable. 
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Moreover, measures to reduce GHG emissions would also have the benefit of reducing 
inefficiency in some sectors of the economy. Generally, the more flexible and adaptable an 
economy is the more successful it will be in achieving positive environmental outcomes. 
Finally, Stern (2007) suggests that stabilisation should occur at 450-550 ppm CO2. This range 
varies in other studies. For instance, Hassol (2007) reviewed several studies on stabilisation 
and concluded that CO2 concentrations must be stabilised at 400-450 ppm to avoid crossing 
the threshold into dangerous climate change. Achieving such levels would require the 
introduction of fundamental programs and policies. Stern (2007) suggested that when 
designing such policies governments should consider three strategies, which should be 
applied together: a carbon price, a technology policy, and the removal of barriers to 
behavioural change. In order to achieve the last non-economic policy outcome, the 
government must provide certainty for consumers and businesses by developing a clear 
information system. He explains that ignoring climate change will destroy economic growth 
eventually, and emphasises that the earlier effective action is taken, the less costly it will be; 
and that the longer mitigation action is delayed, the more difficult its adoption in the future 
will be. 
Like Stern (2007) a large number of scientific studies emphasise that increased 
concentrations of GHGs due to human activities have caused global temperatures to increase, 
leading to several environmental problems which are predicted to worsen if they are not 
controlled (IPCC, 2013; 2014; Center for Climate and Energy Solution, 2015). However, 
several studies have been sceptical or in denial about global warming issues including the 
existence of global warming and its threat (UNFCCC, 2014b; Environmental Defence Fund 
et al., 2015; Business Council of Australia, 2016; Fueki et al., 2016). These studies argue that 
there is not enough accurate evidence of global warming and that the models applied to 
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predict current and future global temperatures are not precise, suffering from several 
assumptions and limitations. 
Although the global warming issue still remains controversial for many economists and 
politicians, the estimated costs that it can impose, such as the Stern (2007) estimation 
discussed above, are considerable, so that even a small possibility of its occurrence requires 
serious actions to avoid. This issue has been of global concern since the 1990s, when several 
programs and conventions were developed to control emissions. These programs are 
reviewed in the next section.  
2.3. Global Emissions Control Policies 
As explained in the previous section, global warming, and excessive increases in greenhouse 
gas emissions, attracted worldwide attention in the last few decades of the twentieth century, 
resulting in the modification of economic targets. To control greenhouse gas emissions many 
policies have been applied and several agreements have been reached and implemented. In 
1992, countries were encouraged to combat global temperature increases and limit their 
greenhouse gas emissions through an international treaty, the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Article 3, p.4, of the UNFCCC states that 
(UNFCCC, 1992): 
“The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future 
generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, 
the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and 
the adverse effect thereof.” 
 
43 
 
In 1997, countries reinforced the convention by introducing the Kyoto Protocol in which 37 
industrialised countries and the European Community, known as Annex I Parties, committed 
to decreasing their greenhouse gas emissions by an average of five per cent against 1990 
levels in the five-year period from 2008 to 2012. Afterwards, the governments of the Parties 
to the Kyoto Protocol added a second commitment period following the end of the first one, 
from 2013 onwards, for eight years (The United Nations, 2013).  
Following the UNFCCC targets and the Kyoto Protocol several meetings were held to 
investigate the efficiency of performed actions and to set new targets and commitments. 
Subsequent annual conferences have included Copenhagen in 2009, Cancun in 2010, Durban 
in 2011, Doha in 2012, Warsaw in 2013, Lima in 2014, Geneva in February 2015, Bonn in 
October 2015 and the most recent one in Paris from 30 November to 12 December 2015. A 
summary of the most significant meetings and their outcomes was presented in Table 1.2. 
While the Kyoto Protocol involved only developed countries, subsequent conferences 
brought both developed and developing countries to the table to set targets and sign 
commitments after prolonged negotiations.  
The Copenhagen meeting is regarded as one of the most significant global meetings, as 
binding commitments were set for participating Parties. After the United Nations 2009 
Copenhagen Climate Change Conference, and the 2010 conference in Cancun, more than 100 
countries agreed to keep their emissions to a level that would limit the average global 
temperature growth to less than two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. This target 
has been the clearest commitment ever made and has been repeated in subsequent 
conferences. China and the United States, the world’s two biggest emissions producers, also 
joined these global climate plans (URS Australia Pty Ltd, 2011) and set their emissions 
targets in subsequent meetings. In Warsaw in 2013, for example, all countries agreed to set 
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their emissions targets, or their intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs), and 
submit them to UNFCCC before the Paris meeting.  
In the Paris meeting a historic agreement was reached. The 196 countries who attended 
agreed to keep the global temperatures to less than 2°C higher than pre-industrial levels. The 
agreement is to come into force between April 2016 and 2017 after at least 55 countries, 
which together are responsible for 55 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions, ratify it 
(Taylor, 2016). The agreement was signed by 170 countries including Australia on 22 April 
2016 and now countries must ratify it through their domestic procedures including their 
parliaments. 
Although the abovementioned conferences achieved different outcomes, all negotiations to 
control climate change have focused on two types of aims: 
• Mitigation: to reduce not only GHG emissions by producers, but also to avoid any 
actions, such as deforestation, that will lead to a rise in GHG intensities. 
• Adaptation: Parry et al. (2007), p.6 defines adaptation as: 
“Adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected 
climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial 
opportunities.” 
As a Party to the agreement, Australia is also involved in these negotiations. The next sub-
section reviews Australia’s emissions obligations to date.   
2.3.1. Australia’s International Pledges 
Australia signed the Kyoto Protocol on 24 April 1998 and ratified it on 12 December 2007 
(Parliament of Australia, 2010). The most significant commitment of Australia has been 
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specified in the Copenhagen Accord in which Australia pledged to decrease emissions by the 
year 2020 as below (Borrello, 2016): 
• a 5% unconditional reduction relative to 2000 levels  
• a reduction of up to 15% if there is a global agreement that falls short of securing 
stabilisation of greenhouse gases at 450 ppm carbon dioxide equivalent and under 
which major developing economies commit to substantially restraining emissions and 
advanced economies take on commitments comparable to Australia’s 
• a 25% reduction if the world agrees to an ambitious global deal capable of stabilising 
levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at 450 ppm. 
The research conducted for this thesis investigated whether it would be possible to reach 
these targets. To this end data from the National Greenhouse Gas Inventory (including the 
land sector) was collected from 2004 to 2014, as shown in Table 8 pages 45-47, of the 
Inventory (Department of the Environment, 2015b) and the percentage changes of emissions 
compared to the 2000 level are calculated and displayed in Table 2.2. As the table shows 
Australia’s emissions significantly increased compared to the 2000 level during the 2000s. 
From 2010, however, emissions started to decrease in absolute terms. A possible reason for 
this decrease could be the introduction and implementation of environmental policies in 
Australia which were seriously followed by the government during those years, as explained 
below in Section 2.7. The highest emissions reduction occurred in 2013 and 2014, when there 
were 1.485 and 1.986 per cent reductions below the 2000 level respectively. During these 
years the carbon tax system was in force. This implies that Australia’s carbon tax system 
could have achieved the desired environmental outcomes and could be considered as an 
effective instrument for Australia to meet its Copenhagen commitment of reducing emissions 
by 5 per cent below the 2000 level to 2020. 
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2.4. Emissions Control Instruments 
To achieve emissions reduction targets governments have applied several instruments which 
can be classified into three groups (Perman et al., 2003): first, market-based instruments 
which affect market variables such as prices in order to provide incentives for emissions 
control and/or abatement. The market-based instruments include emissions taxes and 
subsidies, resource taxes and marketable emissions permits. The second approach is to use 
command and control instruments in which the regulator sets restrictions or standards on 
inputs, outputs, production methods or even the location of activities. The third group of 
instruments are institutional methods which facilitate emissions abatement targets by means 
of socialisation and education programs which promote social responsibility. Among all of 
these, market-based instruments are the most popular. In this section, two market-based 
instruments are explained in detail: an emissions tax, known as a price-based instrument, and 
marketable emissions permits which are usually called a quantity-based instrument. 
2.4.1. Emissions Tax (a Price-Based Instrument) 
An emissions tax, also known as a carbon tax, is a mechanism in which each tonne of GHG 
emissions produced by an industrial sector is monitored and greenhouse gas emitters have to 
pay the cost. The price generates a cost as an incentive for profit maximising firms to take 
into account in their behaviour (Perman et al., 2003). The government can use the revenues 
from the emissions tax in several ways, such as reducing budget deficits, cutting existing 
marginal tax rates such as that of income or payroll taxes, or returning revenues to selected 
groups of households or firms in order to reduce the adverse effects of the tax (Congressional 
Budget Office, 2013). These taxes have been used worldwide for more than two decades. 
Below, the experiences of countries applying the emissions tax are reviewed:  
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Table 2.2: Australian emissions over 2004-2014 and changes from 2000 level 
Inventory Year Emissions (Mt CO2-e) % difference from 2000 level 
2000 558.8 0 
2004 576.3 3.131711 
2005 608.7 8.92985 
2006 614.1 9.896206 
2007 597.2 6.871868 
2008 591.7 5.887616 
2009 592.9 6.102362 
2010 577.4 3.328561 
2011 552.5 -1.12742 
2012 559.4 0.107373 
2013 550.5 -1.48533 
2014 547.7 -1.9864 
Source: Compiled by the author from Department of the Environment (2015b), Table 8, p. 
45-47. 
 
1. Finland was the first country to introduce an emissions tax in 1990. The structure of 
this tax was a combination of a carbon tax and an energy content tax. The rate of the 
tax was changed from €1.12/t CO2 in 1990 to €20/t CO2 in 2010 (Carbon Tax Centre, 
2011). 
2.  The Netherlands also initiated an emissions mechanism in 1990. The tax is on 
electricity, natural gas, blast furnaces, refinery and coal gas, coke ovens, coal 
signification gas, diesel, gasoline and light fuel. The tax rate was US$20 per tonne of 
CO2 in 1996. Revenue from the emissions tax is used to reduce the general tax burden 
for both businesses and individuals by decreasing other taxes, and for use in other 
climate programs. It was estimated that the tax would reduce CO2 emissions by about 
1.7 to 2.7 million tonnes annually in 2000, increasing to 3.6 to 3.8 million tonnes in 
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2010 and 4.6 to 5.1 million tonnes in 2020 (Sumner et al., 2011). In 2013 total GHG 
emissions reductions in the Netherlands resulting from the tax were estimated to be 
25.3 million tonnes, equal to an 11.5% reduction in emissions compared to the base 
year of 1990 (Caldara et al., 2014).  
3. Sweden introduced an emissions price in 1991. The tax was set at US$100 per tonne 
of CO2. Currently, the tax is US$150. Electricity generation was exempted and 
industrial consumers paid just 50% of the tax while non-industrial sectors had to pay 
not only the whole amount but also a separate tax on electricity. To encourage all 
sectors to use renewable energy the government excluded ethanol, methane, biofuels, 
peat and fuel from waste materials from the tax. These exceptions resulted in an 
increase in the use of biomass for heating and industry (Carbon Tax Centre, 2011).  
4. Norway also introduced an emissions tax mechanism in 1991. It was imposed on light 
and heavy fuel oil, gasoline, oil and gas at the rate of US$65 per tonne of CO2 
emissions. Fishing in Norway or in distant waters, foreign shipping and external 
aviation were exempted (Sumner et al., 2011). The program covered 50% of GHG 
emissions which includes 68% of CO2 emissions in 2005 (Environmental Defence 
Fund et al., 2015).  
5. Denmark initiated an emissions tax in 1992. The tax was imposed on light and heavy 
fuel oil, natural gas and pit coal at the rate of US$16.91 per tonne of CO2 at the 
beginning. In 2005 this was reduced to, and has remained at, US $16.41. Beside the 
carbon tax, fossil fuels are subject to an energy tax as well. Sixty per cent of the 
revenue from the carbon tax was returned to industries through different supporting 
packages, while the remaining 40 per cent was used for environmental subsidies. 
Total revenue from the carbon tax in 2008 was about US$905 million. Denmark 
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successfully reduced per capita emissions by 15 per cent from 1990 to 2005 including 
a decrease in industrial emissions by 23 per cent in the 1990s (Sumner et al., 2011).  
6. Great Britain made plans in 2001 to collect an emissions tax on the use of energy in 
the industry, commerce and public sectors. The plan included rates of 0.15p/kWh for 
gas (US$0.003), 0.07p/kWh for liquid petroleum gas (US$0.0014), 0.44p/kWh 
($0.0087) for electricity and 0.12p (US$0.0024) for any other taxable commodity. 
The government used revenue from the tax to support employment and energy 
efficiency and renewable energy, and also exempted electricity generation from new 
renewable resources (Carbon Tax Centre, 2011). 
7. New Zealand implemented a tax on carbon emissions in 2005 at the rate of US$10.67 
per tonne of carbon. The government cut other taxes to offset its negative effects. 
However, the emissions tax system was not efficient enough to decrease CO2 
emissions to the level permitted under the Kyoto Protocol, and a cap-and-trade 
scheme was then applied to help the economy achieve its climate goals (Carbon Tax 
Centre, 2011).  
8. Boulder (Colorado) is the only city in the US with a tax on carbon emissions from 
electricity. It was introduced in 2007 at a rate of US$7 per ton of carbon. The tax 
costs households about US$1.33 per month but they receive a discount if they use 
renewable energy. The state government uses the revenue to fund more climate 
projects in order to comply with the Kyoto Protocol (Carbon Tax Centre, 2011). 
9. Quebec was the first province in Canada to introduce an emissions tax system in 
2007. This included a petroleum tax equal to just 3.1 US cents per gallon of gasoline 
and 3.6 US cents for diesel. The effect of the tax on the price of power has been 
negligible since almost all electricity in Quebec is generated by hydropower (Carbon 
Tax Centre, 2011). 
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10. The Canadian province of British Columbia has been collecting an emissions tax 
since 2008. The tax started at a rate of CA$10 per tonne of carbon dioxide, rising by 
CA$5/tonne annually to reach CA$30 per tonne in 2012. The tax is offset by personal 
income and business income tax cuts. The British Columbia government believes that 
the tax has not weakened the economy which has been growing well especially in 
comparison to other provinces in Canada (Carbon Tax Centre, 2011). The tax reached 
its expected value of CA$30 per tonne in 2012 and has remained at this rate (Fagiolo 
and Roventini, 2012).  
11. France also implemented an emissions tax policy in 2010 and levied it on households’ 
and businesses’ consumption of oil, coal and gas. It did not include electricity since 
this is mostly generated by nuclear reactors. CO2 emissions from households and 
businesses are taxed at a rate of €17 per tonne of CO2. It was estimated that the 
government’s income from the tax was between €3 to 4.5 billion per annum, 55 per 
cent coming from households and 45 per cent from businesses (Saltmarsh, 2010). 
12. Ireland also introduced an emissions tax in 2010. The tax is applied to almost all types 
of fossil fuels including marked gas oil (MGO), kerosene, liquid petroleum gas, 
natural gas and fuel oil and it is not applied to solid fuels like coal or peat. The initial 
carbon tax rate was €15 per tonne of carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels, but in 
the 2012 budget it was increased to €20 (Citizens Information Board, 2012). It is 
estimated that the tax yield was approximately €250 million in 2010. The government 
uses the revenue to increase energy efficiency, reduce fuel poverty and improve rural 
transport (Burker, 2010). 
Since emissions tax systems do not have the same structures across all countries it is not 
realistic to expect the same results and effects. However, the pros and cons of all emissions 
tax systems can be discussed. An emissions tax encourages the emitters to apply the most 
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cost effective abatement strategies and also leads to CO2 emissions reductions and energy 
conservation by promoting a shift to cleaner fuels such as from coal and oil to natural gas 
(Mongelli et al., 2009).  
On the other hand, adopting an emissions tax system can negatively impact international 
competitiveness (Poterba, 1993). This negative effect is due to the fact that an emissions tax 
increases the cost of fuels and consequently domestic production costs, which leads to a 
reduction of competitiveness for firms that operate in international markets. This will cause 
firms to relocate to countries which have less stringent environmental policies. This concept 
is known as the “pollution haven hypothesis” (Jaffe et al., 1995; Ho et al., 2008). This issue 
is also known as “carbon leakage” in which the differentiated emissions policies in Annex I 
countries, who committed to decrease CO2 emissions under the Kyoto Protocol, and non-
Annex I countries will lead to a relative improvement in the international competitiveness of 
the latter (Parker and Blodgett, 2008).  
Another type of emissions pricing system that governments can apply to internalise the costs 
of emissions and provide motivation for polluters to decrease emissions is an emissions 
permit system. The main difference between a tax and a permit system is that the former is 
directed at prices while the latter is focused on quantities – a so-called quantity-based 
instrument. The next section provides an overview of how permit systems work. 
2.4.2. Emissions Permits (a Quantity-Based Instrument)  
An emissions permit is a quantity-based emission control program in which the regulator 
limits the emissions firms can produce by issuing a certain number of permits to relevant 
firms. The authority usually auctions the permits or allocates them for free (Kerr and 
Cramton, 2005). The regulator can also allow permit banking; that is, it allows firms to 
transfer unused permits to the next period(s) (Li, 2014). A marketable emissions permit 
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system, where firms can buy and sell their emissions permits, is based on the principle that an 
increase in emissions will be offset by an equivalent decrease elsewhere.  
A good example of an emissions permit system is the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU 
ETS), also known as the EU Emissions Trading System, which is the largest one in the world. 
It was launched in 2005 (Ellerman and Buchner, 2007a). Since then the scheme has gone 
through three phases. The first phase was from January 2005 to December 2007 with the 
target of controlling GHGs emissions, or setting a cap, at about 2.2 billion tonnes of CO2-
equivalent emission permits per annum. The cap included 12000 enterprises that were 
responsible for about 40% of CO2 emissions in the EU. These enterprises traded their credits 
at a total value of €7.2 billion for 362 million tonnes of CO2 (Hasselknippe and Roine, 2006). 
The price fluctuated dramatically, with a peak level of approximately €30 per tonne of CO2 in 
April 2006. However, verified emissions indicate an increase of 1.9% over the first period of 
the system. The second phase started in January 2008 and finished in December 2012. During 
this phase a lower cap, at the level of 2.08 billion per annum, was determined. As was the 
case in the first period the price fluctuated intensely with a peak of €22 per tonne in 2008 and 
a declining trend thereafter (Committee on Climate Change, 2009). The third phase started in 
January 2013 and will continue until December 2020. For this period the European 
Commission will apply several changes, including: 
• It will set an overall EU cap at first and then allocate permits to EU members. In the 
first two phases the members’ caps were set first and then the overall EU cap was 
calculated as the aggregation of the members’ caps. This centralised allowance will be 
decreased at a rate of 1.74% per annum and this will continue beyond 2020. 
• It will restrict the banking of allowances between Phases II and III. Banking enables 
businesses to save a current allocated allowance for the next period; borrowing 
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enables them use an upcoming allowance in advance. Both mechanisms are permitted 
in Phase III, but will be restricted since they were a major cause of carbon price 
volatility in previous periods. 
• It will shift from allowances to auctioning. The free allocation of emissions 
allowances resulted in an efficiency loss during the first two phases. In Phase III only 
the power sector will not be given auction emission allowances. It was estimated that 
about 40% of all allowances would be auctioned in 2013 (Committee on Climate 
Change, 2008). This estimation proved accurate as more than 40% of all allowances 
were auctioned in 2013, providing total revenue of €3.6 billion for the EU. From this 
about €3 billion earmarked for climate- and energy-related areas including energy 
efficiency and research and sustainable transport (World Bank, 2016).  
The EU ETS is operated by 28 EU members plus Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein. The 
number of countries in the EU ETS has now risen to 31, covering more than 11000 
manufacturing plants and power stations responsible for approximately 45% of total EU 
emissions in 2013 (European Commission, 2013b). 
Although both price-based and quantity-based policies are considered to be effective 
instruments (Weitzman, 1974; Perman et al., 2003) to achieve emissions reduction targets 
and have been applied over the last two decades, the choice between a price-based and 
quantity-based policy is still controversial especially among policy makers. Ekins and Barker 
(2001) explained that the main advantage of an emissions permit over a tax system is its 
flexibility, since the regulator can choose between different methods of allocation. Lohmann 
(2008) also favours a cap policy since it is based on the assumption of a competitive market. 
However, there are several concerns about emissions cap programs due to their strong 
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uncertainty, asymmetric of information, national protectionism and corporate power (Grubb 
et al., 2005; Lohmann, 2006; Spash, 2010).  
On the other hand, a tax system can be superior to a permit regime since the government 
receives all revenues in the tax system. Additionally, emissions taxation is considered to 
achieve a “double dividend”. The double dividend hypothesis refers to two types of benefits 
from levying a tax on pollution. The first is pursuing the major aim of improving the 
environment; the second is improving the efficiency of the taxation system via using the 
revenue from environmental taxes to reduce other taxes such as income taxes that impact 
labour supply and saving decisions (Goulder, 1995; Oates, 1995). The principle behind the 
first dividend is the stimulatory effects of emissions taxes in the development of cleaner 
technologies. According to neoclassical economics the most significant factor in driving new 
technology are the profits which the developers expect to receive. Businesses’ decisions are 
rational and they invest in research and development based on expected returns and the 
opportunity cost of capital (Spash and Lo, 2012). Emissions taxes tend to increase the 
incentives of budget-constrained households and profit-seeking firms to modify their 
consumption and production to be more energy efficient and cleaner.  
The second dividend comes from recycling the revenue from emissions taxes. If the revenue 
returns to the economy via transfers to sectors or other types of taxes the government’s 
budget remains unchanged, and emissions taxes would be revenue-neutral (Spash and Lo, 
2012). However, emissions taxes can be considered to provide an economic gain if the 
revenues are used to decrease the distortionary taxes on major economic inputs such as labour 
and capital (Goulder, 1995; Ekins and Barker, 2001). This second dividend is the strongest 
argument against quantity-based policies (e.g. cap-and-trade systems) in which  the 
government restricts the firms to produce a limited amount of GHG emissions because these 
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policies generate less public revenue (Humphreys, 2007). Table 2.3 summarises the pros and 
cons of the two emissions pricing instruments. 
Under perfect certainty, where both the regulator and firms have access to the same 
information, both price-based and quantity-based policies will result in the same economic 
and environmental outcomes. This is due to the fact that under perfect certainty taxes will be 
set at the market price of the permits and, thus, both systems will achieve the same 
environmental objectives and the costs of doing so will be approximately equal.  
Under conditions of uncertainty, however, the outcomes of the two systems are different. 
This was first pointed out by Weitzman (1974) who shows that under asymmetric 
information conditions – that is,  when the regulator cannot observe the firm’s real abatement 
costs, the policy choice depends on the marginal cost and benefit curves. A price-based 
(quantity-based) control will be an advantage if the marginal cost curve is steeper (flatter) and 
the marginal benefit curve is flatter (steeper). Asymmetric information is known as a type of 
macroeconomic uncertainty (Dissou and Karnizova, 2012). There are other types of 
uncertainty about environmental issues and policies which can affect emissions control 
policies. In the next section these uncertainties are clarified.  
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Table 2.3: A summary of the pros and cons of emissions tax and emissions permit programs 
Emissions Tax Emissions Permit 
Both systems can encourage the emitters to apply the most cost effective abatement strategies 
and also lead to CO2 emissions reductions and energy conservation by promoting a shift to 
cleaner fuels such as from coal and oil to natural gas. 
Both systems can negatively impact international competitiveness and result in the “pollution 
haven hypothesis” or “carbon leakage” in which firms tend to relocate to countries which 
have less stringent environmental policies. 
The price is set by the regulator. The price is set by the market and the system 
works based on the assumption of a 
competitive market. 
It is rigid as the regulator sets the price of 
emissions and collects the tax from polluters 
arising from  the emissions they produce. 
It is flexible since the regulator can choose 
between different methods of allocation: 
auction or free allocation. 
It is straight forward: polluters pay for each 
unit of pollution they produce at a certain 
price. 
There are several concerns about this 
program arising from: their strong 
uncertainty, asymmetry of information, 
national protectionism and corporate power. 
It generates revenue for the government and 
the revenue can be used to reduce the 
distortionary taxes on major economic inputs 
such as labour and capital, known as the 
“double dividend”. 
It does not generate revenue. 
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2.5. Uncertainty in Emissions Control Policies 
As explained above, according to theory first put forward by Weitzman (1974), the main 
criterion for the choice between price-based and quantity-based policies is uncertainty about 
the costs of pollution abatement. This uncertainty has also been highlighted by other 
researchers. Stern (2007), for instance, points to the role of uncertainty in estimating the cost 
of mitigation policies. This type of uncertainty arises since forecasting the costs of 
technology changes and estimating any future fossil-fuel price changes, and also people’s 
responses to these changes, cannot be valued precisely. An improvement in efficiency can 
decrease the cost significantly. The author estimates that efficiency in energy supply grew 
1000 per cent over the last century and that the energy sector will be the largest source of 
emissions reduction between now and the year 2050. Currently, there are several clean 
technologies which are too expensive to apply. Thus, the priority should be to find a way to 
decrease their costs and make them competitive under an emissions pricing mechanism.  
In addition to emissions abatement costs, there are other types of uncertainty which can 
significantly influence estimation of the costs and benefits of emissions control policies. Such 
uncertainties can be generally divided into two groups: first, environmental uncertainties 
arising from unknown geological and environmental factors. As explained in Chapter 1 
Section 1.2 no precise estimates of the life of carbon in the atmosphere and the contribution 
of GHGs to climate change and global warming are available. Additionally, the sensitivity of 
the earth to global warming also remains unknown, and consequently, an accurate estimate of 
the level and timing of the damage due to GHG emissions has not yet been calculated.11 For 
instance, Falk and Mendelsohn (1993) found that a half-life of atmospheric carbon dioxide is 
equal to 139 years while Reilly and Anderson (1992) estimated it to be 83 years.  
                                                     
11 See Tol (2009), Tol (2015) and Table 1.1 for a survey of estimates of the total global output effect from 
climate change. 
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The second type of uncertainty in emissions reduction policy is economic uncertainty: this 
type of uncertainty is related to the estimated social and economic costs of emissions 
abatement and the costs of climate change damage, and the trade-off between these two 
expenses. For instance, predictions about the welfare effect of a 2.5°C increase in average 
global temperatures vary widely, from a 1.9% loss of global GDP (Tol, 1995) to a 0.9% gain 
(Hope, 2006). Economic uncertainty also includes other factors which can affect the future of 
this trade-off such as substitution between fuels, the progress of backstop technology and the 
arrival of new and cleaner technology. Therefore, emissions control policies are highly 
subject to uncertainty to the point that the source and size of uncertainty can affect the 
optimal choice of environmental policies (Angelopoulos et al., 2013). This highlights the 
necessity of emissions control policy analyses which can display and track uncertainties. 
Australian emissions control policies are greatly influenced by both types of uncertainty. For 
instance, it is predicted that annual average temperatures will increase by 2.8°C to 5.1°C by 
the end of this century (CSIRO and the Australian Bureau of Meteorology, 2015). If the 
upper estimate is accurate Australia would become the warmest country in the world, which 
would lead to severe problems since it is also the driest inhabited continent on earth (Preston, 
2009). These estimates call for effective interventions which take into account environmental 
uncertainties. Additionally, the progress of renewable energy technology can significantly 
affect the approaches available to policy makers for achieving emissions targets since the 
production sector relies heavily on fossil fuels. For example, 86.9% of Australian electricity 
was generated by fossil fuels in 2012-13 (Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics, 
2014).  
Looking at Australia’s emissions control policies, it is easily seen that they have been highly 
influenced by political uncertainty, resulting in considerable volatility in policies over the last 
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decade, as discussed previously. This type of uncertainty is revealed as a “ lack of cross-party 
political support” and is one of the fundamental sources of uncertainty about Australia’s 
emissions pricing mechanism (Jotzo et al., 2012). In fact, climate change has become a 
political as well as an economic issue. The next section presents a review of Australia’s 
emissions control policies over the last decade.  
2.6. Australia’s Emission Control Policies 
This section reviews Australia’s emissions control policies. To this end some environmental 
issues which call for emissions control policies in Australia are first presented in Section 
2.6.1. Then the main features of Australia’s emissions profile are specified in Section 2.6.2. 
This section is followed by a historical review of policies developed and implemented in 
Australia in Section 2.7.  
2.6.1. The Importance of Emissions Control Policies in Australia 
As reviewed in Section 2.2, recent global changes such as rising temperatures have resulted 
in calls for emissions control policies (Tol, 2002; Stern, 2008; Lloyd, 2013; Crimp et al., 
2014; Department of the Environment, 2015a). In Australia there is significant evidence from 
the scientific community (Bureau of Meteorology, 2014; CSIRO and the Australian Bureau 
of Meteorology, 2015) that the country is being impacted by the effects of climate change. 
For instance, the Australian Bureau of Meteorology (BOM) time series data shows that the 
average temperature has increased by 0.9°C per annum more than 1910 and the increase in 
GHG emissions has been a key contributor to this temperature increase. The BOM data also 
shows that several mean, maximum and minimum temperature records were broken in 2013 
as Australia experienced the hottest summer and spring, the hottest January and September, 
the hottest summer day and the warmest winter day on record in that year (Perman, 2015). 
The year 2013 is the hottest year on record while 2015 is the fifth-hottest (Arimura and Iwata, 
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2015) and 2016 is shaping up to be the hottest of all (World Meteorological Organization, 
2016).  
These changes have resulted in an increase in the frequency of severe weather events 
including major droughts, floods, tropical cyclones, heatwaves and bushfires. These events 
have occurred at times of the year and in places where they have previously been considered 
rare. For example, Garnaut (2011) points to the 2009 Black Saturday bushfires in Victoria, or 
the Queensland cyclones in 2011, as being the result of global warming. He also points out 
that the pattern of rainfall intensity has changed as the risk of flooding has increased in areas 
close to the equator or poles, while the risk of drought in the mid-latitude regions such as 
southern Australia, is expected to increase. In other words, the extremes of both high rainfall 
and low rainfall in Australia have increased as greenhouse gas concentrations have increased.  
The main burden of such changes is on urban water supplies and agriculture. For instance, 
increases in temperature and decreases in rainfall could lead to agriculture yield reductions of 
more than 30% by 2050 in Western Australia (Zagaglia, 2005). Climate change can also have 
significant ecological impacts in Australia, including reductions in the populations of some 
species and shifts in the ranges of others, and changes in the dynamics and structures of 
biological communities (NASA, 2013). It is estimated that under a no emissions reduction 
policy the Great Barrier Reef would be severely damaged by 2050 and the three-dimensional 
coral of the reef is even likely to completely disappear (Garnaut, 2011). These consequences 
of climate change highlight the importance of adopting appropriate environmental policies in 
Australia.  
With increasing evidence of climate change and its negative effects, Australia has 
participated in global environmental conventions which oblige participating countries to 
implement emissions control policies, as explained in Section 2.3.1. To reach its Copenhagen 
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target, that is a five per cent reduction in emissions relative to 2000 levels, Australia needs to 
limit its net emissions to 537 million tonnes by 2020. This target is a 236 million tonne 
challenge in 2014–2015 (Tol, 2015). Garnaut (2011) showed that this target could have been 
achieved with an emissions pricing system starting at about AU$26 per tonne of carbon 
dioxide equivalents in 2012. He pointed out that this price would be comparable to 
international emissions prices. For example, the US government estimated that the price 
should be US$21 per tonne of carbon dioxide equivalents, rising to US$26 in 2020 and 
US$33 in 2030 based on 2007 exchange rates. In the United Kingdom the price is considered 
higher at £26 per tonne of carbon dioxide equivalents. However, the price would grow over 
time at a rate which was set at four per cent per year in Garnaut’s model.  
Garnaut’s recommended emissions price was initially applied as the key instrument in 
Australia’s emissions reduction policies. However, the current policy, which was introduced 
2015, does not include an emissions price. Instead, it consists of a subsidy on emissions 
reduction under the Emissions Reduction Fund program. These policies are explained in 
detail in Section 2.7 after a review of Australia’s emissions in Section 2.6.2.  
 2.6.2. The Features of Australia’s Emissions 
Although Australia’s emissions have fluctuated over the last few decades, they contributed 
little more than 1.2 per cent of global GHG emissions from 2000 to 2010 (CDIAC, 2013). 
Based on the latest available data, Australia was the sixteenth-largest emissions producer in 
the world in 2013, producing about 1.2 per cent of global GHG emissions and it was also 
ranked twelfth in per capita terms in the world (CDIAC, 2013). In terms of the sources of 
emissions, however, Australia has the third-largest emissions from burning coal in per capita 
terms (BNP Paribas, 2014), which illustrates the reliance of the economy on fossil fuels, and 
especially coal.  
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Reviewing the sources of emissions in Australia also highlights the role of burning fossil 
fuels, especially coal. Australia’s Emissions Projections 2014–15 report published by Tol 
(2015) showed that the major emissions producer in Australia is the electricity sector, since it 
depends to a significant extent on the burning of brown coal. The next two largest sources of 
emissions are the direct use of gas and other fuels by households or businesses, through direct 
fuel combustion, and transportation. Each of these sources contributes about 17 per cent of 
total emissions. Fugitive emissions, that is the carbon dioxide and methane generated during 
gas production and coal mining processes, are responsible for eight per cent of Australia’s 
emissions. Industrial processes, deforestation and forestry and waste decomposition are other 
sources of emissions. Figure 2.1 shows the proportions of Australia’s total emissions 
produced by different sources in 2014. 
Finally, this research investigates the relationship between Australian output and GHG 
emissions. To this end the seasonally adjusted data of emissions and GDP over the period 
September 2001 to September 2014 was collected from the Quarterly Update of Australia’s 
National Greenhouse Gas Inventory (Department of the Environment, 2015b) and Australian 
National Accounts (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2016). Both series of data are normalised 
to their September 2001 levels and shown in Figure 2.2. As the figure reveals, both emissions 
and GDP grew during this period. The growth of GDP is steeper and to a higher level, from 
1.0 per cent to 2.2 per cent, while emissions grew from 1.0 per cent to less than 1.1 per cent. 
This might be due to an increase in energy efficiency or technology advancements. 
Additionally, business cycle fluctuations can be observed in both series, including the 
recession of 2009 arising from the Global Financial Crisis.  Similar cyclical changes are also 
seen in emissions which motivate this thesis to study the relationship between fluctuations of 
emissions and GDP. This requires removing the trends of both series. To this end the log 
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values of both series are found and then the Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothness 
parameter 12 of 1600 is applied. The results contain only the cyclical component of both 
series, as shown by Figure 2.3. As the figure shows, although the cyclical fluctuations of 
GDP are greater than the fluctuations in emissions, generally both series follow similar 
cycles. This correlation between GDP and emissions implies that fluctuations in business 
output can result in similar fluctuations in emissions. The government should recognise this 
and take into account the relationship between emissions and output business cycles. 
Otherwise, even with an efficient emissions reduction program, the government might 
encounter undesired fluctuations in emissions. This issue has not been investigated before for 
the case of Australia and will be addressed in the current research.  
Figure 2.1: A comparison of emissions sources in Australia in 2014 
 
Note: LULUCF refers to land use, land use change and forestry. 
Source: Tol (2015), p. 9. 
The next section reviews the development of emissions reduction policies in Australia.  
                                                     
12 This parameter removes the cyclical component of a time series and determines the smoothness of the trend 
components. 
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Figure 2.2: Seasonally adjusted emissions and GDP of Australia from September 2001- 
September 2014 normalised to the September 2001 level 
 
Source: Compiled by the author using Department of the Environment (2015b) and 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2016)  
Figure 2.3: Cyclical component of Australian emissions and GDP from September 2001 to 
September 2014 
 
Source: Compiled by the author using Department of the Environment (2015b) and 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2016)  
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2.7. Australian Emissions Reduction Policies 
The first steps towards emissions reduction in Australia was taken when Stern (2007) 
published his review in which he highlighted market failure in controlling climate change and 
underlined the importance of serious and prompt actions to avoid economic and social 
problems that climate change would impose on the world. This report motivated the 
Australian government, under the prime ministership of John Howard, to develop and 
implement an emissions reduction policy. To this end ‘the Prime Ministerial Task Group on 
Emissions Trading’ was established in order to investigate the pros and cons of implementing 
an Emissions Trading System (ETS) in Australia (Adjemian et al., 2014). Based on the 
findings of the group the Howard government decided to implement an ETS in July 2007 
(Crimp et al., 2010). 
The first environmental actions, however, occurred after the Australian Labor Party won the 
2007 federal election and the Rudd Labor government ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 
December 2007. This ratification committed Australia to limiting increases to its GHG 
emissions to no more than 8% of its 1990 level by 2012 (Parliament of Australia, 2010). In 
September 2008 the Garnaut Climate Change Review was published in which Garnaut 
estimated the optimal emission price as being between $20 to $30 per tonne of carbon 
dioxide equivalent, rising by four per cent per year thereafter (Crimp et al., 2014). This report 
became one of the main foundations for designing Australian emissions reduction policies.  
In July 2008 the Rudd government announced its cap-and-trade program, the Carbon 
Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) which was intended to become effective in 2010 
(Alexandratos and Bruinsma, 2012). The scheme was designed to reduce emissions to 15 per 
cent below the 2000 level by 2020. The principle of the scheme was supported by the 
Liberal-National Coalition led by Malcolm Turnbull. However, it was criticised by industry 
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and business lobbies who believed that the permits and the assistance packages to decrease 
the costs imposed by the scheme were inadequate. On the other hand, the environmental 
lobby argued that the emissions reduction targets specified in the program were inadequate 
(Adjemian et al., 2014).  
The CPRS, however, was rejected by the Senate twice in 2009 which forced the government 
to defer it to 2013 (Shafik, 1994). Meanwhile, Tony Abbott, who was against the CPRS, 
deposed Turnbull as Liberal Party leader (UNFCCC, 2016b). Also, Rudd lost his leadership 
to Julia Gillard in 2010 (Cantore et al., 2016) and she then called a federal election. The 
Greens Party leader, Bob Brown, announced that if Labor was to win the election the Greens 
party would assist the government in passing a carbon tax policy in the Senate (Batt, 2015). 
During the election campaign, however, Gillard announced that she would rule out a carbon 
tax (Department of Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry, 2011). After the election, and in order 
to obtain a working majority in the Senate, the Labor Party entered into an agreement with 
the Greens which included a plan to introduce a carbon tax (Australian Bureau of Agriculture 
and Resource Economics and Science, 2011).  
The Gillard government introduced its emissions price system under the ‘Securing a Clean 
Energy Future, the Australian Government’s Climate Change Plan’ in July 2011. It included 
a carbon tax from 2012–2015 followed by an emissions trading scheme (Australian 
Government, 2011). Legislation for the plan was passed in the Senate in November 2011 and 
the carbon tax phase started in July 2012. In 2013 Kevin Rudd defeated Gillard in a 
leadership contest and became prime minister again, and he announced that the carbon tax 
period would finish one year earlier in 2014 (Australian Government, 2013).  
Shortly after this, the next federal election was held and the Liberal-National Party Coalition, 
led by Tony Abbott, won the vote and introduced legislation to abolish the carbon pricing 
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system with effect from 1 July 2014 (Australian Government, 2014a). The repeal was passed 
by the Senate in July 2014. In order to meet Australia’s international commitment to reducing 
emissions by 5 per cent compared to the 2000 level by 2012, the government introduced the 
Emissions Reduction Fund program which came into effect on 13 December 2014. This fund 
involves the use of government funds to finance emissions reduction activities, including the 
improvement of energy efficiency standards (Department of the Environment, 2014a).  
Prior to the 2016 federal election in which it was narrowly defeated, the Australian Labor 
party proposed two emissions trading schemes, one for the electricity sector and one for 
industrial polluters with a total cost of $355.6 million over four years. The program is similar 
to the one proposed by Malcolm Turnbull in 2009 when he was leader of the Opposition 
(Taylor, 2016). The proposed industrial ETS includes two phases: phase one specifies a cap, 
or a certain level of emissions, that industries can produce without any penalty, but they have 
to buy permits for the extra units of emissions. Phase two is yet to be designed (Borrello, 
2016). The program confirms that the Australian Labor Party is pledged to reducing 
emissions by 45% by 2030 and is committed to shifting Australian electricity generation to 
renewable sources (Grattan, 2016). In the next two sub-sections the implemented programs, 
including the Gillard and Abbott government programs, are reviewed in detail.  
2.7.1. Gillard’s Clean Energy Program 
The Gillard government introduced the ‘Securing a Clean Energy Future, the Australian 
Government’s Climate Change Plan’ on 10 July 2011. The plan was designed to transit 
Australia to a clean energy economy through initiatives in four areas: carbon pricing, 
renewable energy, energy efficiency and land management. Central to the plan was the 
introduction of a carbon pricing mechanism along with a significant package of 
complementary measures and assistance for businesses and households (Australian 
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Government, 2011). In fact, more than 50 per cent of the revenue from the carbon tax was to 
be returned to households through increasing family payments, cutting other types of taxes 
and paying higher allowances and pensions. These household support measures covered 90 
per cent of all Australian households (Gardiner, 2014). 
Under an emissions pricing system a price, such as a tax, is levied on each tonne of GHGs 
emissions. GHGs include carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), 
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6), all of 
which make the earth warmer. These gases can be found in nature but human activities since 
the industrial revolution have their atmospheric concentrations resulting in an increase in 
global temperatures. Carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and perfluorocarbons from 
aluminium smelting were included in Australian carbon pricing.  
The carbon price mechanism included two phases. The first was a fixed price period. This 
period commenced on 1 July 2012 and was originally designed to continue until 30 July 
2015. The price started at $23 per tonne of carbon rising by 2.5 per cent each year in real 
terms in the first three years. This was to be followed by the second phase beginning on 1 
July 2015 in which the fixed price system was going to transform to a fully flexible price 
determined in the global carbon market. During this period the government would place a cap 
on emissions, that is, it would place a limitation on annual greenhouse gas emissions by 
issuing a fixed number of carbon permits, each one of which would represent one tonne of 
emissions. Some of the issued permits would be sold by the government at auction while 
others would be donated freely to businesses to support jobs and competitiveness. Businesses 
could sell and buy the permits they gained from the government which would lead to the 
creation of a market. The government would determine the annual caps on emissions from 
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2015 to 2019 before the beginning of the flexible period. Afterward, annual caps would be 
determined annually to make businesses aware of the limits they would face.  
The government was planning to set safety values for the system for the first three years of 
the flexible price period to avoid price plunges. These safety values included a price ceiling 
and floor. The former was to be set $20 higher than the expected international carbon price at 
the beginning of the flexible price period and would rise by five per cent in real terms each 
year, while the latter would be set at $15 per tonne from 1 July 2015 rising by four per cent 
each year in real terms. The price floor would decrease the risk of a sharp price fall which 
would lead to a reduction of long-term investment in clean technologies.  
It was anticipated that the tax would be paid by industrial plants that emitted over 25,000 
tonnes of CO2 per annum. These plants comprised 315 liable entities which were burning 
fossil fuels. They included electricity generation, transportation including rail, domestic 
aviation and shipping, cement and steel making which produce industrial emissions, coal and 
LNG mining which release greenhouse gases naturally stored underground, and waste 
management. Land-based activities like farming, forestry and fishing were not covered by the 
carbon price. Households and light commercial vehicles were also exempted from carbon 
pricing.  
As planned in the Clean Energy Future program, Australian businesses were to be permitted 
to enter the global carbon market from July 2015. In the global market they could trade their 
permits and buy international permits from other countries if the permit in Australia was 
more expensive. This trade could ensure that the Australian permit price would be set at the 
global price which was determined by international supply and demand for abatement. To 
decrease the negative effects and risks of this new system the government was going to 
support enterprises with a number of packages including industry assistance ($11.9 billion), 
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the Jobs and Competitiveness Program ($8.6 billion), the Clean Technology Program ($1.2 
billion), the Steel Transformation Plan ($300 million) and Coal Sector Jobs Package ($1.3 
billion). 
The Australian emissions program, however, was not implemented as planned since it was 
not supported by subsequent prime ministers. The first change to the program was made by 
Kevin Rudd who announced that this fixed price period would finish one year earlier, 
(Australian Government, 2013). The program was abolished by the Abbott-led Liberal–
National government with effect from 1 July 2014 (Australian Government, 2014a). Instead, 
he introduced the Emissions Reduction Fund program in which emissions reduction activities 
are financially supported. The next section reviews the program implemented by the Abbott 
government. 
2.7.2. Abbott’s Emissions Reduction Fund Program 
In the Emissions Reduction Fund the government set aside $1.55 billion to support emissions 
reduction programs which could be extended to $2.55 billion in future budgets. The fund was 
to be allocated to ‘project proponents’ who included landholders, businesses and other 
organisations with plans to reduce emissions. The program involved four steps, as shown in 
Figure 2.4 Australian Government (2014b): 
Figure 2.4: Emissions Reduction Fund steps 
 
Source: Emissions Reduction Fund White Paper, Australian Government (2014b), p.9. 
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The first step involves proponents of projects estimating emissions reductions and registering 
their projects. To this end the government provided guidelines and tools for the proponents to 
use to estimate the emissions their proposed programs would eliminate. Next, the projects 
needed to be registered with the Clean Energy Regulator to participate in an auction.  
In the second step, the approved projects can sell their proposed emissions reductions on the 
basis of a price per tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent by submitting a bid at an auction. The 
successful bidders then go to step three and enter into a contract with the government in 
which the government commits to purchase the emissions reduction specified by the project. 
In the fourth step the proponents commence their project and report to the Clean Energy 
Regulator. The regulator then evaluates the reports and issues credits based on the reported 
emissions reductions. Finally, proponents receive payment for the credits at the contract price 
(Roson, 2013).  
To date, three Emissions Reduction Fund auctions have been held, one in April 2015, one in 
November 2015 and one in April 2016. The auctions together resulted in 348 contracts to 
purchase 143 million tonnes of abatement at a cost of $2.55 million dollars. The average 
price of abatement was $13.12 per tonne of abatement, being the average of the auction price 
in April 2015 ($12.14), the auction price in November 2015 ($12.25) and the auction price in 
April 2016 ($10.23) (Clean Energy Regulator, 2016). The Emissions Reduction Fund 
program, however, has been criticised by some environmental economists. For instance, 
Roson and van der Mensbrugghe (2012) applied a Computable General Equilibrium model 
and showed that the allocated budget for the Emissions Reduction Fund scheme is half the 
amount that would be required to meet the target of reducing emissions to 5 per cent below 
the 2000 level by 2020. Another criticism of the program is that it is designed to continue for 
only five years (Roson, 2013) while a successful policy, aimed at changing the attitudes of 
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both consumers and producers, would require the economy to believe that the policy will 
continue (Stern, 2007). Additionally, a tax system is straightforward, as polluters pay for the 
actual emissions they produce while in an abatement system it is possible that the government 
pays for abatements which will occur anyway. For instance, coal fired electricity generators 
may reduce their emissions due to a decrease in electricity demand, even if the firm does not 
make any abatement efforts (Roson and van der Mensbrugghe, 2012). 
As reviewed in this section, Australia’s emissions reduction policies have been highly 
influenced by political uncertainty in terms of different policy attitudes and programs. 
Despite the considerable volatility in the Australian emissions pricing program, however, it 
remains of research interest and several studies have analysed the costs and benefits of such 
programs. The next chapter reviews the literature on Australian emissions pricing policy and 
analysis and of its modelling. 
2.8. Summary 
In this chapter, the importance of controlling GHG emissions and the approaches adopted to 
achieve this target were introduced. Concerns over the environmental impact of human 
activities have increased since the 1990s and attempts have been made to find ways to 
manage emissions. This led to the establishment of several international agreements, such as 
the Cancun Agreement and Paris Agreement, with the aims of mitigation and adaptation. The 
Kyoto Protocol is the most significant climate agreement so far. In this agreement countries 
committed to reducing their emissions to particular levels. To achieve their targets 
governments have applied different types of instruments including emissions pricing systems 
which can be price-based or quantity-based.  
On a theoretical level both systems can induce polluters to internalise the social and 
environmental costs of their pollution. The effectiveness of each policy, however, is 
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influenced by different types of economic and environmental uncertainty and the sources and 
size of those uncertainties can affect the choice of environmental policies (Angelopoulos et 
al., 2013). These uncertainties emphasise the necessity of dynamic stochastic models to 
enable researchers to show and track such uncertainties in their analyses. 
This chapter also provided an overview of Australian environmental policies. In Australia the 
first policy introduced was a carbon tax which was imposed on 1 July 2012 for three years. 
The plan was for it to be in effect for three years, after which it was to be replaced by a 
flexible emissions system (i.e. a cap and trade). However, the program was abolished on 1 
July 2014 and instead an emissions subsidy program, named the Emissions Reduction Fund, 
was established. The current research provides a policy analysis of these programs using a 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model.  
Reviewing the structure of Australia’s emissions also revealed the correlation between 
emissions fluctuations and Australia’s business cycles. This leads to the question as to which 
one of the programs so far designed or implemented for Australia would be optimal in terms 
of reducing emissions and/or lowering costs in the presence of business cycles. This question 
will be addressed in the current research. To this end the literature on Australia’s emissions 
pricing policies, as well as the use of DSGE modelling for environmental policy, are 
reviewed in Chapter 3. Based on the reviewed study, a DSGE model will be applied to the 
Australian economy in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 3  
Literature Review 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter reviews the literature on emissions pricing systems as climate change policy 
instruments and their possible impacts on economies. As explained in Chapter 2 Section 2.4 
emissions pricing instruments are the instruments most commonly used to reduce emissions. 
They include price-based instruments or emissions taxes, and quantity-based instruments or 
cap-and-trade systems. A review of existing studies indicates that the environmental and 
economic effects of each type of program are wide-ranging, with different results obtained 
depending on which of a large variety of assumptions and methodologies are applied. 
Previous studies have primarily concentrated on the short- and long-run impacts of emissions 
pricing programs for the whole economy (Lu et al., 2010; Fischer and Springborn, 2011; 
Ghosh et al., 2012; Lim and Kim, 2012; Meng et al., 2013) or for a specific sector (Khanna 
and Zilberman, 1999; Morgenstern et al., 2004; Goulder et al., 2010; Dissou and Karnizova, 
2012; Lehmann, 2013).  
In theory, the outcomes of price-based and quantity-based policies will be the same under a 
full information situation. Under conditions of uncertainty, however, the outcomes of the two 
systems would be different. This issue was first raised by Weitzman (1974) who developed a 
static partial equilibrium model for an economy characterised by uncertainty, asymmetric 
information, costly policy adjustment and second-best policy alternatives. He developed cost 
and benefit functions as quadratic in the regulated input and linear in uncertainty. He finds 
that under asymmetric information conditions (i.e. when the regulator cannot observe the 
firm’s real abatement costs) the relative slope of marginal costs and benefits of emission 
control play a key role in choices between quantity and price controls, in such a way that a 
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steeper (flatter) marginal cost and a flatter (steeper) marginal benefit will increase the 
efficiency of price-based (quantity-based) controls.  
This finding was replicated in subsequent research. For instance Hoel and Karp (2002) and 
Newell and Pizer (2003) conducted two separate but very similar studies to investigate the 
impacts of price-based controls and quantity-based controls where the stock of pollution 
damages the environment, and polluters and regulators have asymmetric information about 
abatement costs. Previous studies prior to Hoel and Karp (2002) mostly assumed that 
environmental damage depends on the flow of emissions, while Hoel and Karp (2002) 
consider the damage caused by the stock of pollution. Both Hoel and Karp (2002) and Newell 
and Pizer (2003) compare the expected benefits from the two types of instruments, where the 
expected net benefit is a function of the benefits and expected costs of emission abatement. 
The major difference between these two studies is that Hoel and Karp (2002) assume that the 
cost shocks are serially uncorrelated while Newell and Pizer (2003) use correlated cost 
shocks over time. 
The initial results of both studies are the same as Weitzman (1974): an increase in the slope 
of the marginal cost and a decrease in the slope of the marginal benefit curve will increase the 
efficiency of price-based controls. The choice between the two policies also depends on 
emission stock decay rates and discount rates so that a higher discount rate and/or a higher 
decay rate decrease the importance of future stock impacts and, therefore, the regulator would 
prefer a price-based instrument. Not only are the theoretical results of the two studies the 
same, but also the empirical results are similar, as Hoel and Karp (2002) suggest that an 
emissions tax system is more efficient than an emissions quota system while Newell and 
Pizer (2003) argue that the benefits of price-based polices are greater than those of quantity-
based policies. 
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Weitzman (1974), Hoel and Karp (2002), and Newell and Pizer (2003) along with many other 
researchers such as Pizer (2002) and Fell et al. (2012) apply a dynamic model of 
environmental policy in the form of a cost-benefit analysis with uncertainty about the costs of 
abatement. These studies impose different reduced quadratic forms for the cost function and 
for the benefit function. Instead, one can apply a DSGE model which involves all sectors of 
the economy and is more compatible with economic theories. A great advantage of DSGE 
models is that they are micro-founded models based on the optimisation behaviour of agents 
with different constraints, technology and equilibriums. These models are able to include 
sources of uncertainty and to be solved for exogenous shocks or unexpected changes. These 
advantages of DSGE models have been attracting researchers since Fischer and Springborn 
(2011), and a few studies have developed a dynamic model to analyse the impact of climate 
policies using DSGE models.  
In the case of Australia all studies, to the best of the author’s knowledge, have applied 
deterministic approaches which ignore the impact of economic fluctuations on the 
effectiveness of emissions pricing programs. The main aim of this thesis is to address this gap 
by exploring how emissions reduction programs that have been used or slated for use in 
Australia are affected by economic fluctuations. Australian climate policy models have 
progressed significantly. Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models help policy makers 
recognise the costs and income distribution effects of emissions pricing policies for different 
sectors and for the economy as a whole. In order to review the major studies of Australian 
environmental analysis, this chapter first reviews the CGE models developed and applied to 
emissions pricing policy analysis in Australia. It then reviews the new, but rapidly increasing, 
literature on DSGE modelling of emissions pricing policy. Both CGE and DSGE models are 
general equilibrium models; that is, can be used to examine the effects of a policy on 
different sectors of an economy when they are in equilibrium. The pros and cons of each 
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approach are explained in detail in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 but they are summarised here in 
Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: DSGE vs. CGE models 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
This chapter has four main sections. Section 3.1 is the introduction. Section 3.2 reviews the 
application of CGE models as one of the most frequently adopted approaches to studying the 
effects of climate policies, especially for the Australian economy. Section 3.3 focuses on the 
application of DSGE models in the environmental area, followed by Section 3.4 which 
summarises the chapter. 
Advantages of 
CGE models for 
environmental 
analysis (Charney, 
2003)  
1) The model builder can make decisions about how to show economic 
relationships and interactions, and about what functions and what 
variables to use in each relationship and equation.  
2) There are different types of CGE models – short-run or long-run, 
static or dynamic.  
3) They are consistent with many economic theories. 
4) They can be applied to investigating the impacts of taxes or revenue 
changes on one or a number of sectors or regions, or a whole 
economy. 
Advantages of 
DSGE models for 
environmental 
analysis: 
The advantages of CGE models (except number 2), plus: 
1) They can consider exogenous shocks and uncertainties. 
2) They show the dynamics of a policy in policy analysis. 
3) They are appropriate for welfare analysis (Winschel and 
Kratzig, 2010). 
DSGE models are 
stochastic while 
CGE modes are 
deterministic 
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3.2. Computable General Equilibrium Models 
Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models attempt to represent the widespread 
interactions between economic agents. The advantages of CGE models are (Charney, 2003): 
1) These models are very flexible. In other words the model builder can make decisions about 
how to show economic relationships and interactions, and about what functions and what 
variables to use in each relationship and equation. 2) The model builder is able to choose 
from different types of CGE models: short-run or long-run, static or dynamic. 3) CGE models 
conform to many economic theories. 4) These models can be applied in investigating the 
impacts of taxes or revenue changes on either one or a number of sectors or regions, or a 
whole economy. Due to such advantages, researchers have shown an increased interest in 
using CGE models to model environmental issues. Below, a number of studies that have 
applied CGE models to study climate policy worldwide and in Australia are discussed. 
To investigate the effects of a price-based policy, Lu et al. (2010) constructed a dynamic 
recursive CGE model to examine the environmental and economic impacts of two different 
prices for a tonne of carbon, RMB¥100 and RMB¥200, on the Chinese economy. They also 
simulate such effects under two scenarios, with and without any complementary policies such 
as indirect tax cuts or with increased household subsidies. Their results suggest that a carbon 
tax at the rate of RMB¥100 leads to a reduction in China’s carbon emissions of 12.49 per cent 
per year at an annual cost of 1 per cent of GDP, while the rate of RMB¥200 reduces 
emissions by 12.33 per cent at the same cost of 1 per cent of GDP. This small cost in terms of 
GDP is due to an increase in investment in technology changes, making the carbon tax an 
effective policy instrument. Their results also indicate that the costs of a carbon tax would 
decrease if the government also used complementary policies (e.g. monetary and fiscal 
policy) in conjunction with the carbon tax. 
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In addition to taxing the units of pollution produced by emitters, some researchers argue that 
levying a tax on energy is another policy which can achieve environmental goals since the 
major polluters in all industries are fossil fuels. To show the environmental effects of this 
policy Wissema and Dellink (2007) quantify the effects of levying a tax on energy in Ireland. 
They develop a static CGE model comprising seven energy commodities and 19 other 
commodities. Their results indicate that imposing a carbon energy tax of €10 to €15 per tonne 
of carbon dioxide emissions leads to a 25.8 per cent reduction in Ireland’s carbon emissions 
compared to its 1998 levels. However, they emphasise that their results are very sensitive to 
the possibility of fuel switching for producers. Furthermore, comparing the impacts of a 
carbon tax with an energy tax, they find that a carbon tax would be more effective, with less 
negative impacts on the economy and greater abatement of carbon emissions, since it would 
increase the incentives to switch from coal and peat to renewable energy resources. 
The application of CGE models in environmental studies in Australia is also extensive, to the 
point that the most popular climate change models are of this type. During the last two 
decades the number of quantitative investigations of environmental issues in Australia has 
increased (Asafu-Adjaye, 2004; Asafu-Adjaye and Mahadevan, 2013; Meng et al., 2013). 
Many of these studies investigate the economic and environmental effects of carbon prices on 
the whole economy and/or specific sectors. The following sub-sections discuss some of the 
most prominent climate change models developed for the Australian economy. Table 3.2 
provides a summary of the CGE models reviewed in this section.  
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Table 3.2: CGE Literature Review Summary 
Year Author Aim(s) Region Method  Scope Findings 
2010 Lu et al. 
To investigate the economic and 
environmental effects of a price-based 
policy, with and without complementary 
policies (e.g. monetary and fiscal policy) 
China 
A dynamic 
recursive CGE 
model 
Theoretical contribution 
(a deterministic 
simulation). 
A carbon tax can reduce emissions (by about 12%) at 
the cost of 1 per cent of GDP which would decrease 
if a complementary policy, such as indirect tax cuts 
or increasing household subsidies, was applied in 
conjunction with the carbon tax. 
2007 Wissema and Dellink 
To study the effects of levying a tax on 
energy and to compare it with a carbon 
tax 
Ireland 
A static CGE 
model with a 
social accounting 
matrix (SAM). 
Theoretical contribution 
(a deterministic 
simulation). 
An energy tax can reduce emissions. However, a 
carbon tax is more effective and has little impact on 
welfare, and a significant shift in production and 
consumption patterns from higher to lower carbon 
intensity energies.  
1993 McDougall 
To simulate the short-run and economy-
wide impacts of a carbon tax Australia 
ORANI: a 
dynamic CGE 
model 
Theoretical contribution 
(a deterministic 
simulation). 
A carbon tax increases prices, especially the price of 
energy intensive commodities; decreases export 
volume, GDP and employment which call for a lower 
wage policy. Also, an energy tax (except on 
petroleum products) can be an effective alternative to 
a carbon tax. 
1998 Kennedy  
To simulate the economic and sectoral 
impacts of Kyoto Protocol commitments 
with and without an emissions trading 
scheme 
Annex B 
Countrie
s, 
including 
Australia 
MEGABARE: a 
dynamic CGE 
model 
Theoretical contribution 
(a deterministic 
simulation). 
Kyoto Protocol commitments negatively affect 
Australian competitiveness by decreasing export 
volumes. They also affect Australian coal, iron and 
steel sectors significantly. An emissions trading 
scheme can reduce such negative effects. 
2004 Ahammad et al. 
To investigate the effects of a Japanese 
carbon tax on Japan and Australia at two 
different rates as well as the effects of a 
joint emissions trading scheme between 
these two countries 
Japan 
and 
Australia 
GTEM: a 
dynamic CGE 
model 
Theoretical contribution 
(a deterministic 
simulation). 
A high carbon tax at the rate of ¥45000 per tonne of 
carbon and emissions trading scheme can decrease 
emissions close to the Kyoto Protocol targets with 
significant economic effects especially on the 
consumption and import of energy, which affects 
Australia as the major energy exporter to Japan. 
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Year Author Aim(s) Region Method  Scope Findings 
2007 Adams et al. To investigate the effects of a carbon emissions trading scheme Australia 
MMRF-Green: a 
dynamic CGE 
model 
Theoretical contribution 
(a deterministic 
simulation). 
The possible cost of an ETS is about 1.3% of income. 
To decrease the negative effects of the ETS on 
energy generation the government can use 
compensations or a free allocation of permits.  
2010 McKibbin et al. 
To simulate environmental and economic 
effects of the Copenhagen Accord’s 
targets 
Australia
, Japan, 
USA, 
Other 
OECD, 
China, 
LDCs, 
Eastern 
Europe 
G-cubed: a 
dynamic CGE 
model 
Theoretical contribution: 
(a deterministic 
simulation). 
The effects of the Accord’s targets on consumption 
and GDP are different across countries. A domestic 
carbon tax also has different impacts domestically, or 
on international trades, i.e. export and import, of the 
selected countries. 
2011 
Commonwealth 
of Australia, 
Treasury 
To provide a comprehensive carbon price 
model for the Australian economy Australia 
A combination of 
a number of CGE 
models. 
Overall: theoretical 
contribution (dynamic, 
deterministic). 
A AUD$20 per tonne carbon price will lead to a 
reduction in emissions to 80% of the 2000 level, and 
an increase in per capita GNI by 56% and 
employment will be 53% higher than its 2010 level 
by 2050. 
2013 Meng et al. 
To simulate the environmental and 
economic impacts of a carbon tax at a 
rate of AUD$23 per tonne on the 
Australian economy, with and without a 
compensation plan 
Australia 
A static CGE 
model based on 
ORANI-G with 
an 
environmentally 
extended social 
accounting matrix 
(ESAM). 
Theoretical contribution 
(static, deterministic). 
The carbon tax will efficiently mitigate emissions but 
will negatively impact the economy, and a 
compensation policy will significantly reduce these 
impacts with only a very slight effect on emissions 
mitigation. 
 Source: Compiled by the author.
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3.2.1. ORANI 
The ORANI model was first introduced by Dixon et al. (1977) and is a large multi-sectoral 
CGE model for the Australian economy with more than 100 industry sectors, in which an 
industry is allowed to produce more than one commodity. The model was initially designed 
to study the impact of tariff cuts on industries, regions and occupations, but the high 
flexibility of the model in choosing variables to be endogenous or exogenous makes it 
appropriate for analysing a wide range of policies.  
Application of the ORANI model to climate change analysis occurred in the 1990s when 
McDougall (1993a) applied an enhanced ORANI multi-sectoral model to simulate the short-
run and economy-wide impacts of a carbon tax. He finds that the impact of levying AUD$25 
per tonne of carbon emissions increases prices, especially the price of energy intensive 
commodities. The tax negatively affects Australian international competitiveness and 
contributes to a 0.6 per cent contraction in export volume which leads to a decrease in GDP 
by 0.9 per cent with the assumption of fixed domestic absorption, and reduces employment 
by 1.2 per cent with the assumption of fixed money wages. To decrease these negative 
effects, especially on employment, he suggests a lower wage policy. 
McDougall (1993b) also uses another version of the ORANI model, ORANI-E, to study the 
effectiveness of an energy tax (i.e. a tax on fossil fuels), and to compare it with a carbon tax 
in terms of carbon emissions reduction. This model is a version of the ORANI model which 
was upgraded by embedding several energy-specific enhancements including adding various 
substitution possibilities in energy production and consumption in the theoretical structure of 
ORANI, as well as more detail on energy production and consumption to its database. 
McDougall concludes that an energy tax, except on petroleum products, can be an effective 
alternative to a carbon tax since, like a carbon tax, it would lead to fuel switching. He also 
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finds that both carbon and energy taxes decrease real GDP by 0.5 per cent and national 
consumption by 0.07 per cent. 
3.2.2. MEGABARE 
The MEGABARE model is a dynamic CGE model introduced by the Australian Bureau of 
Agricultural Resource Economics and Sciences (ABARES) in 1996. The model is designed 
to provide a comprehensive framework with which to investigate the impacts on the 
Australian economy of national and international policies such as trade liberalisation or 
environmental policies implemented in Australia or other countries. The model comprises 30 
regions in the world economy, including Australia, with 37 industries in each region. The 
structure of industrial production is a function of energy inputs, intermediate inputs and three 
production factors, labour, capital and land, in which labour and capital are allowed to be 
substituted. The major contribution of MEGABARE is in the development of a technology 
bundle approach in modelling iron, steel and electricity production. In this approach, 
producers are able to choose between energy intensive technologies in response to price 
changes arising from emission abatement policies. 
An aggregated form of the MEGABARE model, with 19 regions and 16 commodity groups, 
was applied by Kennedy (1998) to analyse the impact of two environmental policies on the 
Australian economy: an independent emissions abatement program in which each country 
meets its Kyoto commitments without any international emissions trading scheme, and a 
program in which countries develop an emissions trading system. Kennedy employs a carbon 
tax mechanism in this model in which the revenue from the tax is returned to the economy in 
the form of a lump-sum transfers so that it has a neutral impact on the economy. The results 
indicate that achieving Kyoto Protocol commitments negatively affects Australian 
competitiveness by decreasing export volumes while an emissions trading scheme reduces 
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these economic costs. Moreover, Kennedy finds that coal, non-ferrous metal, and iron and 
steel production would be less affected under an international emissions trading scheme. 
MEGABARE, however, has been criticised in several works. Hamilton and Quiggin (1997) 
argue that “the principal characteristics of the MEGABARE model … make it a poor guide to 
formulating climate change policies”. They categorise these characteristics as ignoring 
possible technological change in response to environmental policies, emphasising changes 
occurring in types of fuels as inputs of production which is not consistent with Australian 
consumption patterns, overstating the degree of carbon leakage, excluding the benefits gained 
from emissions reductions, and making assumptions such as disregarding non-energy sources 
of greenhouse gas emissions and the lump-sum transfer nature of the taxes. These critiques 
led to the development of a new model, the GTEM. 
3.2.3. GTEM 
ABARE developed the Global Trade and Environment Model (GTEM) which is a dynamic 
multi-country model derived from the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model and the 
MEGABARE model. GTEM includes three major modules in a way that it can show both the 
positive effects including improving water quality and the negative effects, such as job cuts, 
of governmental actions. The first module is the economic core in which agents face different 
optimisation problems subject to particular constraints. The second is the population module 
which represents changes in the labour force and social structure such as public health. The 
third is an environmental module representing the greenhouse gas emissions produced from 
regular lifestyle or economic activities. In other words, GTEM is an economic core model 
with bilateral linkages with a population module and an environmental module. 
The economic core of the model comprises r economic regions which can be countries, parts 
of countries or groups of countries. There are j industries in each region; each of them 
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employs primarily factors and intermediate inputs, both can either be produced locally or 
imported in order to produce a single product. In each region households are the owners of all 
production factors. Hence, the representative household in each region receives the GNP per 
capita of that region and allocates it to the consumption of private and public goods and 
savings. The government imposes taxes on almost all transactions and transfers the proceeds 
to the representative household. The government also provides public goods from locally 
produced or imported inputs which are funded by the household. Additionally, technological 
change is assumed to be exogenous except in infant electric power generation technologies 
and in natural resource extraction.  
GTEM was used by Ahammad et al. (2004) to investigate the effects of a Japanese carbon tax 
on Japan and Australia at two different rates of ¥3400 and ¥45000 per tonne of carbon 
emissions, as well as the effects of an emissions trading scheme between these two countries. 
The results indicated that introducing a carbon tax at the rate of ¥3400 would have little 
negative effect on Japan’s economic growth, energy consumption, imports or greenhouse gas 
emissions. The rate of ¥45000, however, would decrease emissions to levels close to the 
Kyoto Protocol targets with significant economic effects. The most important effect would be 
on the consumption and importation of energy, especially coal, which affects Australia since 
Japan is the major importer of Australian liquefied natural gas and coal.  
3.2.4. MMRF 
The Monash Multi-Regional Forecasting (MMRF) model is a dynamic multi-regional model 
of the Australian economy designed by Adams et al. (2003; 2010). This model has been used 
in several reports and studies due to its advantages including: a dynamic structure, a strong 
disaggregated sectoral and regional database, the incorporation of a national labour market 
and a government finance module (Adams et al., 2010). MMRF is a comparative static CGE 
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model which includes eight regions, six states and the two territories of Australia. Each 
region has its own economic characteristics such as region-specific industries, region-specific 
consumers and region-specific prices. The model has four types of agents: households, 
producers, government and foreigners. Each region has 58 industries and 63 commodities. 
Each industry can produce various types of commodities but it can create only one type of 
capital. Each region has its own specific type of capital, representative household and 
regional government while all regions have a federal government. The model also has 
foreigners that supply regional international imports and their demand is equal to regional 
international exports. 
The MMRF model can be run using two methods: a comparative static model or a recursive 
dynamic model. In the first method the model specifies the short-run and long-run impacts of 
an indicated policy change. In the second, dynamic relationships like physical capital 
accumulation indicate the sequences of solutions for every year, and policy analysis is 
conducted through a comparison of the sequences of solutions with and without the policy. 
MMRF is a comprehensive model that has been used frequently in Australia to analyse the 
impacts of fiscal, transport and environmental policies.  
The MMRF-Green model is very close to that of MMRF and was designed by the Centre of 
Policy Studies to analyse Australian carbon emissions-related issues. The model has 
primarily been applied in carbon emissions trading areas (for instance, Allen Consulting 
Group, 2000; Adams, 2007) and also in the Treasury modelling of the Australian carbon 
pricing system. The model was subsequently enhanced to increase its consistency with 
environmental analysis in three areas. First, MMRF-Green makes it possible to account in 
detail for greenhouse gas emissions produced by each region and industry in the model. 
Second, it models the emissions from burning fuels due to fuel usage with equations that 
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make allowance for inter-fuel substitution in electricity generation by region. Third, the 
model provides an appropriate framework for the endogenous take-up of mitigation measures 
due to environmental policy measures.  
3.2.5. G-Cubed 
The G-Cubed model is a dynamic multi-country, multi-sector intertemporal CGE model 
which was originally developed by McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1992) and updated by 
McKibbin (1995). The model was designed to simulate policy impacts such as environmental 
policies, tax reforms, trade liberalisation and macroeconomic policies with a focus on global 
warming issues. The G-Cubed model was developed in an effort to provide a linkage between 
econometric general equilibrium modelling, modern macroeconomics and international trade 
theories. The model comprises eight regions, including Australia; each region has an energy 
sector and a non-energy sector. There are five industries in the energy sector and seven 
industries in the non-energy sector. The model includes three types of agents: producers, 
consumers and investors whose behaviour is based on forward-looking optimisation. At the 
international level the model allows the regions to have bilateral trade and endogenous capital 
flows.  
However, McKibbin (1995) points out two major limitations of the model. First, the applied 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility function caused budget shares to be 
independent of income, which is inconsistent with empirical studies. Second, the parameters 
used for a number of developing countries, especially for those outside the OECD, are 
calibrated from US time series estimations. This was due to a lack of time series input-output 
data for those countries.  
In another study, McKibbin et al. (2010) use the G-Cubed model to analyse the Copenhagen 
Accord’s targets. They estimate the environmental and economic effects of those targets and 
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also the spillover impact of abatement activities on the countries not adopting those targets. 
They show that the impacts of the commitments on consumption or GDP loss are different 
across countries and are affected by their economic situations in the future. They also show 
that the welfare effects of an overall agreement vary broadly between countries. For instance, 
the US would not experience a significant loss of consumption, although it would have the 
third-highest carbon price, while OPEC countries, with no carbon pricing, would have less 
consumption if other countries levied a tax on OPEC exports and decreased their demands for 
OPEC products.  
3.2.6. Australia’s Treasury Carbon Price Modelling 
The Australian Treasury developed the most comprehensive climate change model for 
Australia on 10 July 2011, and updated it on 21 September 2011. The model integrates a 
number of CGE models to conduct complex large-scale carbon price modelling for the 
Australian economy. First, the Treasury model includes the GTEM to take advantage of an 
international framework for both economic and environmental aspects of the model. Second, 
the MMRF model is applied to address the effects of a carbon tax at the sectoral, national and 
regional levels. Third, in order to evaluate the atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse 
gases the Model of Assessment of Greenhouse Gas Induced Climate Change (MAGICC), 
which was developed by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), is also 
employed. Fourth and fifth, to investigate the Australian electricity generation sector using a 
comprehensive bottom-up approach, the Sinclair Knight Merz Market Model Australia (SKM 
MMA), provided by the Sinclair Knight Merz group, as well as the ROAM model 13 
developed by the ROAM consulting group, are applied. Sixth, modelling of the road transport 
sector is done using the Energy Sector Model (ESM) developed by the Commonwealth 
                                                     
13 The model’s name is taken from the group that developed it.  
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Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO). Seventh, in order to study the 
income distribution effects of a carbon price on households, the Price Revenue Incidence 
Simulation Model and Distribution Model (PRISMOD.DIST) is employed. 
Each of the above models is integrated into the Treasury model with the objective of 
maintaining consistency at the macroeconomic level for the whole Australian economy, 
despite the different structures of each model. The results of the study, and the framework of 
the model, are presented in Strong Growth, Low Pollution Modelling a Carbon Price 
developed by The Treasury (2011). The model compares the Australian economy without any 
environmental policy and with two carbon prices (AUD$20, the core policy scenario, and 
AUD$30, the high price scenario) for 2012–13. 
The core policy scenario is an analysis of attempting to achieve emissions that are 5 per cent 
lower than the 2000 level by 2020 and 80 per cent below the 2000 level by 2050, while 
maintaining economic growth. This scenario assumes that a rate of AUD$20 per tonne of 
carbon dioxide emissions is set in 2012–13, increasing by 5 per cent per annum thereafter. 
The high price scenario targets are an emissions reduction of 25 per cent below the 2000 level 
by 2020 and a reduction of 80 per cent below the 2000 level by 2050. To this end the price 
would start at AUD$30 per tonne of carbon dioxide emissions in 2012–13 and increase by 5 
per cent per annum thereafter. 
The findings were significantly encouraging: in the first situation, without an environmental 
policy, the Australian GNI per capita increases by an average rate of 1.2 per cent per year to 
2050, while under a carbon tax policy it will grow by 1.1 and 1 per cent under the core and 
high price policies respectively. To be more explicit, without an environmental policy, the 
Australian GNI per capita until 2050 increases by 60 per cent and emissions by 74 per cent 
with respect to the 2010 level, while in the core policy scenario the GNI per capita increases 
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by approximately 56 per cent and emissions decrease by 80 per cent. Additionally, in the core 
policy scenario, employment increases by 14 per cent by 2020, and 53 per cent by 2050. 
Also, the model analyses the welfare effects of a carbon tax by investigating the short-run 
impact of a tax at the rate of AUD$23 per tonne of carbon dioxide emissions, and the findings 
show that household weekly expenditure would increase by 0.7 per cent in 2012-13. 
However, as Meng et al. (2011) point out, the iteration process in the integration of MMRF, 
ROAM and SKM MMA can provide a good approach to finding consistent data on the 
demand for, and the supply of, road transport and electricity generation, but these results 
depend to a significant extent on price setting which is not clear in the Treasury model. Meng 
et al. (2011) mention that although the model indirectly implies that electricity prices are 
estimated by the partial equilibrium models of ROAM and SKM MMA, a specified 
endogenous price setting method such as a CGE model like MMRF should have been 
incorporated.  
They also point to another two limitations of the Treasury model: first, the great number of 
assumptions behind the Treasury model as a whole and, second, the assumptions of the 
incorporated models and the compatibility of those assumptions. The former refers to the 
assumptions about global carbon prices, household taste modifications, energy efficiency, 
productivity and technology changes. The latter refers to the assumptions of the incorporated 
economic models. For instance, the dynamic characteristics of MMRF require specific 
assumptions on the future economy and growth trends, while the micro nature of the SKM 
MMA and ROAM models involve other specific postulates. Hence, the results obtained are 
sensitive to underlying assumptions.  
The models explained above are the main climate change models for the Australian economy, 
and have been mostly developed and conducted by government-funded research institutes. 
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Environmental issues in Australia are also of interest to many academic researchers and 
various papers have been published in these areas. Looking at these works, one can easily 
perceive the central role of CGE models in both static and dynamic forms in analysing carbon 
policies. For instance, Meng et al. (2013) use a static CGE model with an environmentally 
extended social accounting matrix (ESAM) to simulate the environmental and economic 
impacts of a carbon tax at a rate of AUD$23 per tonne of carbon emissions on Australia with 
and without a compensation plan. Their results indicate that the carbon tax can have a 
positive impact on the environment by mitigating emissions and negative effects on the 
economy. They also show that a compensation policy could significantly reduce the negative 
economic impacts with a very slight effect on emission mitigation. 
To study the dynamic effects of carbon policies, Asafu-Adjaye (2004) employs a dynamic 
CGE model to simulate the effects of environmental policies on the Australian economy. He 
analyses the short- and long-run effects of two environmental policies: a forest conservation 
policy, and a carbon emissions reduction policy, over a seven-year period. The results 
indicate that in the short run (i.e. years 1-3), both policies impact the economy negatively, 
while in the long-run (i.e. years 4-7), the emission abatement policy affects the economy 
positively as real output can increase by 6 per cent, aggregate employment by 6.4 per cent 
and real consumption by 4.4 per cent. This expansion in the economy is due to input 
substitution and improvements to productivity in response to the adjustments. 
In another study, Asafu-Adjaye and Mahadevan (2013) apply a dynamic CGE model to 
compare the sectoral and macroeconomic impacts of three environmental policies in 
Australia: an emissions trading scheme (ETS), a combination of ETS with technological 
innovation in the renewable energy sector and imposing a levy on fuel as an alternative to the 
ETS. They find that although all methods had approximately similar impacts on 
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macroeconomic variables (such as GDP growth, consumption, employment, exports and 
imports), a fuel tax mechanism would not be as effective as the other methods as it would not 
reduce emissions to the same extent as the other measures.  
The literature reviewed above has focused mostly on climate policy analysis aimed at 
indicating the effects of carbon policies on an economy and choosing the optimal carbon 
policy that will have a less negative effect on macroeconomic variables. However, they 
typically ignore the fact that the affected variables in their models, such as GDP or 
employment, fluctuate over time and generally in the form of business cycles, and such 
fluctuations can result in endogenous variations in emissions. This implies that an optimal 
policy requires establishing integration with economic fluctuations and adaptation to business 
cycles. To this end one would need to investigate the response of climate policies to business 
cycles (for example as done by Fischer and Springborn (2011) and Heutel (2012) which will 
be explained later). This can be done with a DSGE model such as that of Kydland and 
Prescott (1982) and Long and Plosser (1983) using a real business cycle (RBC) analysis, 
which has been broadly used in studying the effects of fiscal and monetary policies.  
An important feature of DSGE models, which makes them popular, is their ability to consider 
exogenous shocks and uncertainties based on the stochastic characteristic of these models. 
This characteristic makes them more complicated, but increases aggregation and decreases 
the number of variables, especially in higher-order estimations, which are necessary in 
welfare analysis (Winschel and Kratzig, 2010). A major difference between CGE and DSGE 
models is that the former are deterministic while the latter are stochastic. This feature of 
DSGE models makes them appropriate for studies involving uncertainty, including 
environmental policy analysis. In principle an optimal environmental policy is a policy which 
balances pollution-related damage with the costs of pollution abatement activities, while both 
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types of costs are currently uncertain and neither will be accurately recognised for a long time 
(Webster et al., 2012). This highlights the importance of extending environmental policy 
analysis to stochastic studies which involve uncertainty, although the objectives of such 
policies, such as the Kyoto Protocol, are announced well in advance.  
Another advantage of having a stochastic model is that it makes the model fit to time series 
data. On the other hand, CGE models, even dynamic ones, are regularly calibrated to cross-
sectional data, and are then used to simulate a balanced growth path based on existing 
exogenous conditions. In other words, in a CGE model, an equilibrium which is mostly 
known as a market clearing condition is estimated for each period given existing exogenous 
conditions such as the supply of labour and capital. Any changes in the supply of labour or 
capital would lead to a new equilibrium. The sequence of the set of calculated equilibriums 
can represent the time path of the economy. Hence, augmentations of factors are set in these 
models, given that equilibrium would happen in each period, instead of being empirically 
established. This would decrease the suitability of CGE models in forecasting (Partridge and 
Rickman, 1998). Therefore, DSGE models would be more suitable for the dynamic analysis 
of aggregate economies and the cyclical impacts of policies, while CGE models are suitable 
for studying the impacts of long-run policies, such as tax policies or international trade, from 
a microeconomic point of view. The contribution of DSGE models to environmental policy 
analysis is discussed in the next section. 
3.3. Application of DSGE Models  
Generally, there are two schools of DSGE modelling: real business cycle (RBC) and New-
Keynesian. The former is built on neoclassical growth theories under the assumption of 
flexible prices to investigate how an economy can be affected by real shocks. RBC models 
were first introduced by Kydland and Prescott (1982) who investigated how total factor 
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productivity shocks can cause business cycle fluctuations. The latter, New-Keynesian 
models, introduced by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), were built on RBC models but 
assume monopolistically competitive markets in which price adjustments involve time and 
costs. Due to such assumptions, New Keynesian models have been used in monetary policy 
analysis. The application of DSGE models to environmental studies is not very extensive in 
the literature and is mostly related to RBC models. However, the modelling features of this 
approach have recently attracted the interest of a number of researchers. 
Environmental analysis using a DSGE model was first introduced by Fischer and Springborn 
(2011) who apply a real business cycle (RBC) model with productivity shocks to provide a 
comparison of three emissions reduction policies: an emissions tax, an emissions trading 
system, and an intensity target policy in which the ratio of emissions to output is held 
constant. The three policies have the same aim of an exogenous and fixed level of reduction 
in emissions while emissions are an intermediate input. The authors conduct a cost-
effectiveness analysis for a particular abatement target and attempt to indicate labour market 
responses to policy and productivity shocks for two main reasons. First, the impacts of 
climate policies on the labour market are always highlighted in climate policy debates. 
Second, the impulse response of the labour market to productivity shocks in RBC models is 
usually unique, with a different pattern compared to the impulse response of other economic 
variables such as investment and production. 
In calibrating the model to the US economy, Fischer and Springborn (2011) find that 
compared to a business-as-usual scenario, under the three climate systems economic variables 
such as capital, production and consumption fall, except employment under the intensity 
target policy which remains unchanged. The results also indicate that under a deterministic 
system, and for a particular level of abatement, an intensity target policy is more efficient and 
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has higher total output, while the emissions tax and emissions trading system have identical 
outputs. 
In the presence of a productivity shock, however, these results will change. An emissions 
trading system will decrease the volatility of variables and variations in utility and production 
due to shocks. A tax policy, on the other hand, will increase the volatility of all variables, 
including investment, production and household utility. Finally, the sensitivity of variables to 
shocks will not change significantly under the intensity target policy. Thus, the choice of 
policy depends on the policy makers’ perspective. An emissions cap is the optimal policy in 
terms of the expected costs, i.e. the volatility of economic variables. An intensity target can 
maintain the highest economic growth without any negative impact on employment in the 
steady state, and a tax can achieve an emissions target with a minimum decrease in welfare. 
Another initial study in the environmental DSGE literature was conducted by Heutel (2012) 
to investigate the impact of emissions pricing mechanisms on the whole economy. He argues 
that an optimal climate policy should be adapted to business cycles since this would be more 
acceptable for firms, as it is the first-best response to cost fluctuations. Following this 
argument, he develops an RBC model with total factor productivity (TFP) shocks in which 
pollution is a stock variable that can impose damage to the economy in the form of the loss of 
potential output. He specifies emissions as a function of production and abatement activities, 
and TFP shocks as an AR(1) process. He conducts a welfare analysis for a centralised 
economy and for a decentralised economy with asymmetric information concerning TFP 
shocks. Using US economy data, he examines how carbon dioxide emissions would respond 
to cyclical fluctuations in monthly GDP data, and finds that emissions are inelastic with 
respect to output.  
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However, results from calibrating the model to the US economy indicate that the optimal 
climate policy should be responsive to business cycles with lower permitted emissions during 
economic recessions and higher permitted emissions during output expansion. This result is 
due to the fact that during an expansion (recession) the price effects will be more (less) than 
the income effects; that is, during an expansion (recession) the demand for clean air is higher 
(lower) than the costs of achieving a specific level of emissions. Heutel (2012) also develops 
a decentralised model under the asymmetric information condition in which the government 
cannot observe the TFP shocks. He finds that under this scenario an emissions tax policy and 
a cap policy are not equivalent in such a way that the variation of the optimal tax policy is 
significantly greater than the optimal quantity policy. 
Conducting an environmental analysis at the global level, Hassler and Krusell (2012) develop 
a DSGE model to provide an integrated investigation of climate policies and the global 
economy, and to analyse the economic impacts of different policy scenarios. They argue that 
the global nature of pollution means that it is necessary to find a dynamic and global solution, 
and they adopt a general equilibrium framework which is necessary for analysing the welfare 
effects of policies. They consider the heterogeneity between different global regions as the 
main difficulty in establishing international agreements and they attempt to measure the ways 
that this heterogeneity can affect preferences for different policy options. To this end they 
investigate the impacts of taxation on oil as an approach to controlling climate changes by 
applying a Regional Integrated model of Climate and the Economy (RICE) combined with 
stochastic productivity. The results indicate that levying a tax on oil in oil-importing 
countries is not a useful climate policy. However, the effects of such taxes in oil-producing 
countries are significant, especially when the proceeds of the taxes recycle in a lump-sum 
manner to the payer countries.  
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In another study, Dissou and Karnizova (2012) use a DSGE model to compare the responses 
of the economy to TFP shocks under two environmental policies, emissions taxes and 
emissions permits. They develop a multi-sectoral RBC model to investigate the sectoral and 
aggregate effects of climate policies in the presence of TFP shocks. To this end their model 
included six sectors with different sectoral productivity shocks: three energy sectors (coal, 
electricity, and oil and gas), plus services, energy-intensive goods, and non-energy-intensive 
goods. The energy input is a CES aggregate of electricity and fossil energy, while the fossil 
energy itself is a CES combination of coal, and oil and gas intermediate inputs. Burning fossil 
fuels produces emissions (coal more than oil and gas) while using electricity does not, and 
firms can substitute between primary and intermediate inputs with different substitution 
capacities. Since using each type of fossil fuel produces a constant amount of emissions, 
controlling emissions is equivalent to controlling energy usage.  
Climate polices, including emissions taxes or permits, will increase the price of fossil fuels 
and decrease their usage. Calibrating their model to the US economy, Dissou and Karnizova 
(2012) find that although the emissions permit policy imposes less volatility, it can lead to 
asymmetries in economic responses to shocks and, therefore, the emissions tax policy is 
found to be preferable to emissions permits. However, from a welfare point of view, the 
influence of each policy depends on the origin of the shocks. A productivity shock 
originating from non-energy sectors imposes the same welfare costs under both emissions 
taxes and emissions permit regimes, while for shocks emanating from energy sectors an 
emissions permit system is costlier than an emissions tax.  
The application of DSGE models in environmental analysis is relatively new, but Fischer and 
Heutel (2013) conducted a survey on the application of two macroeconomic approaches in 
environmental economics: RBC and directed technological change (DTC). Reviewing the 
 
98 
 
RBC literature, including the studies mentioned above, they suggest that the literature should 
be expanded to consider other types of shocks besides TFP shocks. DTC studies investigate 
how innovation, especially in clean sectors, can be affected by environmental policies. The 
results of these studies show that supporting innovation in clean technologies, even for a 
short period, can be sufficient to achieve environmental goals.  
Adding other types of uncertainty besides TFP, Angelopoulos et al. (2013) compare the 
second-most optimal environmental policy (i.e. an emissions tax policy), to first-best 
allocation, that is a social planner solution without any emissions policy. They develop an 
RBC model with two sources of uncertainty, productivity and pollution technology (which is 
measured as emissions per unit of output). The model specifies consumers who derive utility 
from consumption and environmental quality, which is a stock variable affected by 
governmental abatement activities and pollution. In this model pollution is a function of 
output and exogenous stochastic environmental technology. Only the government is involved 
in abatement activities by allocating the revenue from emissions taxation or permits to these 
activities. Both productivity and pollution technology follow an AR(1) process. The results of 
this research indicate that the optimal environmental policy is pro-cyclical when an economic 
shock occurs, and counter-cyclical in the case of an environmental shock. 
Extending the DSGE environmental analysis, Roach (2014) developed a model to 
demonstrate an optimal emissions tax in line with the cyclical movement of US GDP and the 
price of energy. He also attempts to find the best way of recycling emissions tax revenues 
between two choices: a lump-sum transfer to households and reducing the distortionary 
effects of a labour tax. To this end he develops a New-Keynesian model with monopolistic 
competition, price-adjustment friction and labour taxation. He specifies emissions as an 
intermediate input of production which affects household utility. The price of this 
 
99 
 
intermediate input is equal to the energy price plus an emissions tax. The energy price and 
TFP are both stochastic and exogenous variables following an AR(1) process. He examines 
three scenarios: 1) a baseline scenario without any environmental policy, 2) an environment-
first tax rule: a tax policy with the target of a specific level of emissions, and 3) a dynamic tax 
rule: a dynamic tax which increases as output increases, and decreases as energy prices 
increase. He finds that the optimal tax should be pro-cyclical, and the tax revenue should be 
recycled to the household sector in both scenarios.  
Previous emissions control policy analyses applying DSGE modelling have concentrated on 
the economic effects of such policies. However, Golosov et al. (2014) consider factors other 
than macroeconomic ones to estimate the best carbon price. They develop a DSGE model at 
the global level in which fossil fuel, as an energy input for production, is a source of a 
negative externality by producing carbon emissions. Their model includes two sources of 
energy, oil and coal. They attempt to find the optimal rate for an emissions tax by estimating 
the marginal externality damage due to emissions. The results indicate that the damage is a 
proportion of GDP and is determined by three factors. The first is, discounting, including an 
economic discount factor which indicates time preferences and an environmental discount 
rate which represents how quickly carbon emissions are naturally purified. The second is the 
expected elasticity of damage indicating the sensitivity of output reduction to an extra unit of 
carbon emissions in the atmosphere. The third is pollution damage which depends on the 
structure of carbon depreciation in the atmosphere.  
Hence, to estimate the optimal emissions tax one only needs to identify these three factors 
and one does not need any information about economic variables or the sources of energy 
that the economy uses, and this is what they point to as the major contribution of their study. 
Based on these factors, they find that the optimal emissions tax is equal to the marginal 
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externality. This is higher than the average estimated values of emissions taxes in the 
literature. They also computed and compare the economy without any climate policy (i.e. 
laissez-faire) and with an emissions tax and indicated that with an emissions tax the use of 
coal would decrease significantly, while there would be no change in oil usage. Moreover, 
with an optimal tax the global temperature, and subsequently total damage caused by 
emissions, would increase less than with a laissez-faire approach.  
As illustrated above, DSGE models have great potential for climate policy analysis, although 
their contribution to environmental analysis is very new and less than a decade old. For the 
Australian economy the application of DSGE models remains limited to a few studies. 
Jaaskela and Nimark (2011) developed an open economy New-Keynesian DSGE model for 
Australia and found that both domestic and foreign shocks have key roles in driving the 
economy’s business cycles. Robinson (2013) also investigated the effects of foreign shocks 
on Australia as a small open economy. Using an RBC model he found that this role is not 
large, while the results for a BVAR-DSGE 14  model that includes block exogenous 
restrictions indicated a more significant role.  
Rees (2013) also developed an RBC model for Australia as a small open economy in which 
agents have imperfect information about the persistence of terms of trade shocks – that is, 
whether a shock is transitory or permanent. He found that under incomplete information 
conditions, agents responded more cautiously to the shocks and did so in a way that meant 
the volatility of consumption, output and the trade balance were less than they were under full 
information. To the best knowledge of this author the current research is the first attempt to 
apply a DSGE model to analysing emissions pricing policies in Australia. This represents a 
major contribution to the literature in this context because it investigates the relationship 
                                                     
14 Bayesian Vector Autoregressive Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium 
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between emissions reduction policies and business cycles in Australia. Table 3.3 provides a 
summary of the DSGE studies reviewed in this section. 
3.4. Summary 
In this chapter, the contributions of two general equilibrium models applied to investigate the 
effects of environmental policies on different sectors of an economy were reviewed. First, 
computable general equilibrium models were discussed. These models have been used in 
Australian studies to examine the effects of emission pricing systems, mostly emission taxes, 
on the economy. Second, the chapter discussed dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
models which have not been used for the Australian economy as yet, but which have 
considerable potential to facilitate the study of the cyclical effects of such policies on the 
Australian economy. The stochastic feature of DSGE models is the main difference between 
them and CGE models, and it provides researchers with the opportunity to address 
environmental or economic uncertainties relating to environmental issues. 
Additionally, since pollution remains in the atmosphere for decades and affects 
environmental and economic variables for a period of time, any abatement activity or 
environmental policy with the aim of controlling pollution should be investigated in a 
dynamic framework. The literature on DSGE environmental analysis is still in a preliminary 
stage and focuses mostly on RBC models showing how environmental policies respond to 
economic fluctuations. However, as Fischer and Heutel (2013) suggest, these models should 
be extended to add other types of uncertainties beside those relating to productivity.  
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Table 3.3: DSGE Literature Review Summary 
Year Author Aim(s) Region Method  Scope Findings 
2012 
Hassler and 
Krusell 
To provide an integrated investigation of 
climate and the global economy through 
analysing different policy scenarios 
(taxation on oil) and measuring the ways 
that heterogeneity between different 
global regions can affect preferences for 
different policy options. 
US 
DSGE model (a 
RICE model 
combined with 
stochastic 
productivity). 
Theoretical 
contribution 
(dynamic, 
stochastic). 
A levy on oil usage in oil-importing countries is not a 
useful climate policy. However, it has significant 
effects on oil-producing countries, especially when 
the proceeds of the taxes recycle in a lump-sum 
manner to the payer countries.  
 
2012 
Heutel To develop a model with productivity 
shocks in which pollution is a stock 
variable that can have negative impacts 
on the economy. 
US 
DSGE model: 
RBC 
Theoretical 
contribution 
(dynamic, 
stochastic). 
A dynamic climate policy, both carbon tax and cap-
and-trade, adjusted with business cycles is more 
efficient that a static policy with an optimal constant 
emission target in the long run. 
2011 
Fischer and 
Springborn To provide a comparison between three 
climate policies: a carbon tax, a carbon 
emission trading system, and an intensity 
target policy that holds the ratio of 
maximum emissions to output constant 
US 
DSGE model: 
RBC 
Theoretical 
contribution 
(dynamic, 
stochastic). 
Under the three climate systems the economic 
variables including production and consumption will 
fall, except labour under the intensity target policy. 
Additionally, an emissions trading system will 
decrease while a tax policy will increase the volatility 
of variables including production and consumption 
due to the shocks. Finally, the sensitivity of variables 
to shocks will not change significantly under the 
intensity target policy. 
2012 
Dissou and 
Karnizova 
To investigate the sectoral and aggregate 
effects of a carbon tax policy and a 
carbon permit policy 
US 
DSGE model: 
RBC 
Theoretical 
contribution 
(dynamic, 
stochastic). 
Although the emissions permit policy imposes less 
volatility, it can lead to asymmetries in economic 
responses to shocks. Also, a productivity shock 
originating from non-energy sectors imposes the 
same welfare costs under both emissions tax and 
emissions permit regimes, while for shocks 
emanating from energy sectors an emissions permit 
system is costlier than an emissions tax.  
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Year Author Aim(s) Region Method  Scope Findings 
2013 
Fischer and 
Heutel To conduct a survey on the application of two macroeconomic approaches in 
environmental economics: RBC and 
directed technological change (DTC) 
_ DSGE and DTC models A survey. 
The RBC literature should be expanded to consider 
other types of shocks beside TFP shocks. The DTC 
literature concludes that supporting innovation in 
clean technologies, even for a short period, can be 
sufficient to achieve environmental goals. 
2013 
Angelopoulos 
et al. 
To compare an optimal emissions tax 
policy to a social planner solution 
without any emissions policy under 
economic and environmental 
uncertainties 
US 
DSGE model: 
RBC 
Theoretical 
contribution 
(dynamic, 
stochastic). 
An optimal environmental policy is pro-cyclical 
when an economic shock occurs, and counter-cyclical 
in the case of an environmental shock. 
2014 
Roach To demonstrate an optimal emissions tax 
in line with the cyclical movement of 
GDP and the price of energy. Also, to 
find the best way of recycling emissions 
tax revenues. 
US 
DSGE model: 
New-Keynesian 
Theoretical 
contribution 
(dynamic, 
stochastic). 
An optimal tax should be pro-cyclical, and the tax 
revenue should be recycled to the household in both 
scenarios.  
2014 
Golosov et al. 
 
 
To estimate the optimal tax on fossil fuel 
by estimating the marginal externality 
damage due to emissions. 
Global  
DSGE model: 
RBC 
Theoretical 
contribution 
(dynamic, 
stochastic). 
The pollution damage is a proportion of GDP and is 
determined by three factors: discounting, the 
sensitivity of output to an extra unit of carbon 
emissions and the structure of carbon depreciation in 
the atmosphere. 
Source: Compiled by the author.
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The literature on Australian environmental studies can be extended to the application of 
DSGE approaches to provide a new insight for Australian policy makers by showing the 
relationship between environmental policies and different types of uncertainties about 
environmental policies. This issue is the main target of the current thesis which attempts to 
represent the relationship between economic fluctuations due to business cycles and 
emissions pricing outcomes. To this end this thesis, in line with the literature reviewed in this 
section, provides an Australian RBC model for emissions pricing policy analysis to 
investigate how different types of emissions pricing programs, including a carbon tax and a 
subsidy, which have been already implemented in Australia, would respond to real business 
cycle fluctuations. This model is presented in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4  
Theoretical Framework 
4.1. Introduction 
This chapter focuses on developing a DSGE model for an analysis of emissions pricing 
programs in Australia. As reviewed in Chapter 2 Section 2.5 there are several types of 
environmental and economic uncertainty relating to the costs and outcomes of environmental 
policies. The source and size of uncertainty can affect optimal choices15 of environmental 
policies (Angelopoulos et al., 2013). These uncertainties emphasise the necessity of a 
dynamic stochastic analysis of environmental policies. To this end DSGE models can be 
applied. These models are still new to environmental economics and were originally 
introduced by Fischer and Springborn (2011). The existing literature focuses mostly on 
macroeconomic uncertainty, and mostly in terms of total factor productivity shocks. As 
Dissou and Karnizova (2012) point out, macroeconomic uncertainty in environmental 
policies should be considered since, firstly, it results in fluctuations in consumption which 
influence the costs of emissions policies and secondly, since uncertainty is considered to be 
the main factor to be considered when choosing between a quantity-based emissions policy 
and a price-based emissions policy since Weitzman (1974).  
This thesis is the first to attempt DSGE modelling for Australian emissions pricing policy 
analysis. Following the literature, along with the fact that Australia’s emissions follow 
economic business cycles as shown in Chapter 2 Section 2.6.2, a real business cycle (RBC) 
model is developed here to investigate how economic fluctuations in terms of business cycles 
can influence the outcomes of emissions pricing programs. To this end, the main structure of 
                                                     
15 Angelopoulos et al. (2013) specifies the optimal choices of environmental policies in terms of social welfare.  
 
106 
 
the model, including the sectors and environment, are specified. Then the model is extended 
to consider three emissions pricing scenarios which are similar to programs already applied in 
Australia. 
The first scenario is a fixed emissions tax system in which a constant emissions tax is levied 
on each tonne of emissions where the tax rate does not change over time. This system is 
similar to the Australian carbon tax system introduced in the Clean Energy Program. The 
second is a variable emissions tax policy in which the regulator chooses a tax rate for each 
tonne of emissions at the beginning of each period. Based on theory, under perfect certainty 
where both the regulator and firms have access to the same information, the tax will be set at 
the market price of a cap and trade system. Thus, the variable emissions tax specified in this 
thesis can be identified as a proxy for the emissions trading system which was planned as the 
second emissions pricing phase by the Gillard government in the Clean Energy Program. The 
third scenario is an abatement subsidy policy in which the regulator pays for the emissions 
reduction achieved by polluters. This scenario is similar to the current Australian emissions 
reduction policy, the Emissions Reduction Fund introduced by the Abbott government. A 
business-as-usual scenario is also specified as a benchmark to evaluate emissions pricing 
policy. Table 4.1 summarises the scenarios tested in this study.  
In addition, in the Australian Carbon Tax program, designed in the Clean Energy Future 
(Australian Government, 2011), the federal government planned to increase the tax rate by 
2.5 per cent per year. The current research is also interested in investigating the 
environmental and economic impacts of such a program, that is, an augmented fixed tax 
program, by simulating an increasing fixed emissions tax. To this end the fixed tax scenario 
developed in this chapter will be used when the tax rate increases by 2.5 per cent in every 
fourth period, equal to a year. This increase in the emissions tax is pre-announced at the 
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beginning of the program, so both production and consumption sectors expect the changes 
and take them into account in their optimisation behaviour.  
The model will be applied under different scenarios and the numerical results of each policy 
will be evaluated and compared in Chapter 6 in order to provide a comparison between these 
policies. The comparison will be conducted in terms of volatility in economic variables, such 
as output or social welfare, and environmental variables, such as emissions, as well as 
cumulative changes in each variable.  
Table 4.1: Emissions pricing policies to be tested in this thesis 
Emissions Pricing 
Policy Scenarios 
Emissions Pricing Policy 
Assumptions 
Corresponding Australian 
Policy 
Business-as-usual No emissions pricing system  
Fixed emissions price 
policy 
A constant emissions tax is levied 
on each tonne of emissions. The tax 
rate does not change over time. 
Carbon tax 
Variable emissions 
price policy 
The government levies an 
emissions tax on each tonne of 
emissions at the beginning of each 
period 
Emissions trading scheme 
Emissions abatement 
subsidy policy 
The government financially 
supports firms’ abatement efforts in 
each period. 
Emissions Reduction Fund 
Source: compiled by the author. 
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Following the literature on environmental RBC models the stochastic element of the model is 
contained in total factor productivity (TFP) shocks. These shocks can create a price effect and 
an income effect (Heutel, 2012) on all other sectors and variables including production, 
consumption, emissions and abatement. A positive TFP shock has an income effect by 
increasing consumers’ budgets, which in turn will lead to higher demand for a cleaner and 
less polluted environment. Therefore, the income effect from a positive TFP shock will lead 
to more abatement and thus, lower emissions. On the other hand a positive TFP shock will 
increase the productivity of inputs, such as capital, and therefore the opportunity cost of 
spending on abatement instead of increasing outputs, such as investment in capital, will be 
higher. Hence, abatement will be costlier and the price effects of a positive TFP shock will 
decrease the demand for abatement and lead to higher emissions.  
This thesis will investigate which effect would be greater for the Australian economy. To this 
end, it will benefit from the contribution of Heutel (2012). However, the model used here will 
deviate from his model in terms of scenarios to be tested, parameterisation and analysis 
technique. The first deviation is to make this model more applicable to Australia and then 
apply it to analyse planned and/or implemented emissions reduction policies, the second 
difference relates to a technical improvement on his model and the third one is an extension 
to the ways of using the model for policy analysis. These deviations represent the major 
contributions of this thesis and are explained further below. 
The first deviation relates to the scenarios. Heutel (2012) tested a variable emissions pricing 
scenario in which the policy (i.e. a tax or a cap) is not constant over time and can be chosen at 
the beginning of each period. To this end he starts with a centralised decision-making 
economy in which a representative agent’s choices on consumption, investment and 
emissions match those of a social planner. Thus, polluters pay the costs of pollution they 
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produce and all externalities from pollution are internalised. However, as Heutel (2012) also 
explains, such a model cannot explicitly provide a comparison between different policies 
since it does not include emissions externalities. In order to make a policy comparison he 
extends the model to a decentralised economy with asymmetric information about total factor 
productivity shocks.  
An assumption of a centralised economy in which polluters automatically internalise the costs 
of the emissions they produce, would not be realistic. Thus, the current research starts with a 
decentralised rather than centralised economy. Moreover, while Heutel (2012) tests only for a 
variable emissions pricing system where the government chooses the tax or cap at the 
beginning of each period, the current research analyses a variable emissions price, as well as 
a fixed emissions tax and an abatement subsidy policy. Investigating the other two scenarios 
is fundamental here, since the focus of this study is on analysing emissions pricing systems in 
Australia, and these policies have been the only policies implemented or planned so far in 
Australia. The outcomes from the fixed emissions pricing policies can be compared with the 
findings in the literature and this will result in interesting policy implications regarding the 
outcomes of such policies. Therefore, the effects of both fixed and variable emissions pricing 
systems on Australia are studied in this research. 
The second difference between this thesis and Heutel (2012) concerns the parameterisation of 
an environmental variable, emissions from the rest of the world. As explained in Chapter 5, 
Section 5.2, Heutel (2012) specifies the pollution stock at each period as a function of 
pollution in the previous period, plus domestic emissions and emissions from the rest of the 
world in the same period. He assumes that total emissions from the rest of the world are three 
times greater than those of the US. However, assuming emissions from the rest of the world 
as a fixed coefficient of domestic emissions under emissions pricing policies would provide a 
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channel to transfer the effects of domestic emissions pricing systems to the rest of the world’s 
emissions. In other words, such an assumption would imply that an emissions pricing policy 
could affect not only domestic emissions but also emissions produced by the rest of the 
world, which is not necessarily true. Moreover, it would contradict the assumption that the 
emissions from the rest of the world are exogenous to the economy.  
To avoid this, the current research assumes that emissions from the rest of the world are fixed 
under the three scenarios. Given the small size of the Australian economy and of its 
contribution to global emissions, this assumption is acceptable. This thesis first calculates 
emissions from the rest of the world under a business-as-usual scenario. Then, the calculated 
value will be used under the emissions pricing policies. This assumption will keep the rest of 
the world emissions constant over different policy scenarios. This is an appropriate condition 
here since the aim of this study is to analyse the domestic effects of a national emissions 
pricing program on Australia and not on the world economy. Hence, the contribution of this 
thesis is not only empirical, involving the application of a DSGE model to the Australian 
economy, but also technical due to the abovementioned differences between this study and 
Heutel (2012).  
The third contribution of this thesis is theoretical and is about the method to be applied to 
analyse the effects of environmental policies and to make a comparison between different 
emissions pricing programs. Heutel (2012) only uses the impulse response functions (IRFs) 
of variables, and chooses the policy which minimises the difference between the IRF of 
consumption in a scenario where information is asymmetric and the IRF of consumption in a 
scenario where information is not asymmetric. This research also studies the IRFs of 
variables under different emissions pricing policies and compares them with those under the 
business-as-usual scenario to investigate how such programs can influence those variables. 
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Additionally, this thesis adopts two other approaches for policy analysis. First, it compares 
the steady state values of variables (i.e. without TFP shocks). Second, it compares the 
cumulative effect of each policy over time by calculating the area under the IRF of a variable. 
Multiplying the cumulative effect by the steady state of that variable can express the total 
effects of the shock under an emissions reduction program. To the best of the author’s 
knowledge this method has not been applied in an environmental DSGE study before, and is 
another contribution of this thesis.  
The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 4.2 the evolution of DSGE 
models as macroeconomic and environmental modelling tools is discussed. Then the model 
to be used in this study is presented in Section 4.3. To this end the main agents of the 
economy, including the production and consumption sectors and the environment, are 
specified. The specified equations are extended to different scenarios, including business-as-
usual in Section 4.4, a fixed emissions tax policy in Section 4.5, a variable emissions tax 
policy in Section 4.6 and an emissions abatement subsidy policy in Section 4.7. Finally, the 
chapter is summarised in Section 4.8.  
4.2. The Evolution of DSGE Models 
A DSGE model was initially introduced by Kydland and Prescott (1982) to investigate the 
role of total factor productivity (TFP) shocks in business cycle fluctuations. DSGE models 
are based upon microeconomic assumptions which specify forward-looking agents. As 
indicated by their name these models have three characteristics: first, they are dynamic (i.e. 
they investigate an economy over time); second, they are stochastic, in terms of considering 
random changes imposed on an economy; and, finally, they are based on general equilibrium 
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when all sectors are in equilibrium simultaneously. The stochastic16 feature of DSGE models 
is the most significant distinguishing feature of these models. It makes them more complex 
but enables modellers to track the effects of any exogenous shock or uncertainty.  
These three features mean that the model can explicitly demonstrate the dynamics arising 
from the behaviour of different economic agents when it is based on rational expectations. As 
a result, DSGE models are less likely to suffer from the shortcoming highlighted by the Lucas 
critique (Lucas, 1976) than traditional econometric models are. The Lucas critique is a 
criticism of econometric models which utilise historical data in order to predict the future 
effects of a change in a policy without recognising the optimal decision rules of economic 
agents. 
There are two types of DSGE models: real business cycle (RBC) and New-Keynesian. RBC 
models were first introduced by Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Long and Plosser (1983). 
They developed a stochastic model to investigate whether real shocks, in terms of TFP 
shocks, are the main source of business cycle fluctuations. RBC models are built on 
neoclassical growth theories under the assumption of flexible prices. These models apply first 
principles of market clearing, rational expectations and optimising agents and present “a 
small and coherent dynamic model of [an] economy”, as stated by Fernández-Villaverde 
(2010, p. 4). The flexibility of the computation and recursive methods offered by Kydland 
and Prescott (1982) encouraged these economists to develop models of complete markets 
with fully flexible prices, which made their stochastic neoclassical growth model gain 
widespread support among researchers and policy makers (Fagiolo and Roventini, 2012; 
Caldara et al., 2014; Fueki et al., 2016).  
                                                     
16 A stochastic event is an unpredicted event caused by a random variable.  
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RBC models, however, were not appropriate for monetary policy analysis due to the 
predominant role of technology shocks, as well as the absence of frictions (Rickman, 2010). 
RBC models were therefore extended to address these problems by adding three components 
(Fernández-Villaverde, 2010). First, monopolistic competition, where firms are not identical 
and have some market power, was added. Such market power contributes to rigidities in 
prices and wages. Without market power, a firm must adjust its price to the market price 
immediately, otherwise it loses its sales and market. Second, an explanation of the role of 
money was added; this can be illustrated either in the consumer’s utility function or as a cash-
in-advance constraint. Third, a monetary authority was included to set monetary policy, 
usually in accordance with the Taylor rule or a money growth process. These expansions of 
the RBC model have led to the development of a new school of DSGE modelling: the New-
Keynesian school. The New-Keynesian model was introduced by Rotemberg and Woodford 
(1997) who employ the monopolistically competitive markets assumption in which price 
adjustments involve time and costs.  
Regardless of school, a typical DSGE model consists of a consumer who derives utility from 
consumption which is usually represented by constant relative risk aversion and a producer 
with a Cobb-Douglas production function (DeJong and Dave, 2011). For parameterisation, 
early DSGE models usually employed calibration using long-run averages of variables which 
made the predictions of DSGE models conflict with actual data (Rickman, 2010). To 
overcome this problem new parameterisation procedures were developed including Bayesian 
estimation, generalised methods of moment estimation, full-information maximum likelihood 
estimation and matching VAR and DSGE dynamic responses to structural shocks (Canova, 
2007).  
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The progress made in DSGE modelling make it suitable for business cycle theory, fiscal and 
monetary policy analysis, growth analysis and other fields of macroeconomics and 
international economics to the point that many central banks have developed their own DSGE 
models for policy analysis. For instance, the US Federal Reserve Board's SIGMA model was 
developed to investigate the effects of a broad variety of shocks on the US economy, 
including shocks due to a change in monetary policy, government spending, capital tax rates, 
productivity growth, risk premiums, foreign demand, consumption demand and the impact of 
fiscal shocks17 on the trade balance (Erceg et al., 2005; 2006). The Central Bank of Chile 
also employed its MAS model to analyse the role of different shocks on the business cycle, 
such as foreign shocks and domestic supply shocks (Medina and Soto, 2007a; b). Advances 
in DSGE modelling since Kydland and Prescott (1982) have been considerable, to the point 
that these models may eventually be the main competitor or even dominate other 
macroeconomic models in quantitative macroeconomic forecasting and policy making 
(Rickman, 2010).  
As explained in Chapter 3 Section 3.3 the contribution of DSGE models in environmental 
economics remains limited, since they have only recently been introduced by Fischer and 
Springborn (2011), although they have the potential to be a key tool for environmental policy 
analysis. This is due to the great number of environmental and economic uncertainties 
relating to environmental issues and policies, as discussed in Chapter 2 Section 2.5, which 
provide support for the use of stochastic models. The literature on environmental policy 
comparison under uncertain conditions began with Weitzman (1974), followed by many other 
researchers (Hoel and Karp, 2002; Pizer, 2002; Newell and Pizer, 2003; Quirion, 2005; Fell 
et al., 2012) who have used a partial equilibrium approach to investigate the role of 
                                                     
17 These shocks are specified as exogenous changes in the demand and/or supply side of the economy which can 
explain the cyclical fluctuations of economic time series.  
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uncertainty, usually about abatement cost, in environmental policy. The focus of these studies 
is usually on the effects of a price-based instrument (i.e. an emissions tax) and a quantity-
based instrument (i.e. an emissions permit) on welfare. They usually specify welfare in terms 
of the costs and benefits of emissions policies where the benefit is shown by less damage 
from emissions.  
A few contributions have also developed general equilibrium models for environmental 
policy analysis. In a static stochastic general equilibrium model, Kelly (2005) investigated the 
effects of productivity shocks on environmental policy in a static framework. Investigating 
environmental economics under conditions of uncertainty and in a dynamic general 
equilibrium model is still in its primary stage, involving limitations that the early DSGE 
models had over three decades ago. Reviewing the existing literature presented in Chapter 3 
Section 3.3, this research finds four limitations of environmental DSGE models which need 
to be overcome in future studies: 
1. The environmental DSGE contributions mostly emphasise real shocks only, ignoring 
other economic and environmental shocks including uncertainties related to climate 
change damage which is the main underlying motivation of environmental policy. 
This issue is also pointed to by Fischer and Heutel (2013) who review the 
environmental RBC and Directed Technical Change models and conclude that other 
types of uncertainties should be added besides productivity to the environmental 
RBC models. 
2. For parameterisation environmental DSGE models mostly rely on calibration rather 
than estimation. This could negatively affect their ability to fit time series data. 
3. As a result of calibration they focus on forecasting deviations from the steady state of 
macroeconomic variables rather than the levels of such variables. 
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4. The complexity of environmental DSGE models is usually limited to one integrated 
sector while an appropriate environmental policy analysis requires a multi-sectoral 
macroeconomics model based on their carbon intensity. Constructing large-scale 
multi-sectoral DSGE models can tailor these models to environmental analysis, since 
the imposed economic costs and the optimal outcome of environmental policies vary 
across sectors.18 
Despite the abovementioned limitations, DSGE models have great potential to be applied for 
environmental policy analysis at the national and international levels due to their dynamic 
and stochastic features. This thesis is the first application of an environmental DSGE model 
to the Australian economy. The model was developed to compare the economic costs and 
environmental outcomes of policies implemented in Australia when economic fluctuations 
due to a TFP shock occurs, and to investigate how to stabilise emissions during business 
cycles using emissions pricing programs to avoid large fluctuations in emissions. Addressing 
these questions requires an RBC model and not a New-Keynesian one since, as explained 
earlier in this section, the New Keynesian models are mostly appropriate when the research 
focuses on the impacts of monetary policies, or the effects of policy changes on the monetary 
side of an economy. The RBC mode applied in this research is presented in the next section.  
4.3. Model Specification 
This section presents the main structure of the DSGE model used in this study and its 
extensions to different scenarios. Generally, developing a DSGE model involves six main 
steps as follows (Flotho, 2009):  
                                                     
18 This research found one study conducted by Bukowski and Kowal (2010) that developed an environmental 
large scale, multi-sectoral DSGE model for the Polish economy. 
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1. First, a DSGE modeller needs to develop the model by specifying the representative 
individual agents including households and firms, and the underlying theoretical 
assumptions relating to optimisation behaviour. 
2. The optimisation behaviour of agents results in first order conditions (FOCs). FOCs, 
together with structural equations including market clearance conditions and shocks, 
facilitate the building of a system of dynamic stochastic equations (i.e. with leads 
and/or lags).  
3. This system is usually nonlinear without a closed analytical solution. In order to make 
the model suitable for empirical analysis the model can be approximated in the 
neighbourhood of a given point which is mostly the non-stochastic steady state of the 
system obtained in Step 2.  
4. The parameters of the system should be calibrated or estimated. 
5. The size and direction of the shock should be specified which is usually set as equal to 
one standard deviation of the shock. The modeller can now run the model to obtain 
the impulse response functions. 
6.  The results obtained from the model are then analysed and evaluated in line with the 
aims of the study. 
This chapter includes the first two steps: specifying the individual sectors and their 
optimisation problems. Steps 3, 4 and 5 are covered in Chapter 5 and Step 6 is explained in 
Chapter 6. As explained in Section 4.1 the structure of the model in this section closely 
follows Heutel (2012) who developed an RBC model to investigate how an emissions pricing 
policy responds to business cycles. He considers a centralised decision-making economy 
where a representative agent’s choices on consumption, investment and emissions match 
those of a social planner. This implies that the polluters are influenced by the costs of 
pollution they produce and all externalities from pollution are internalised. Then he extends 
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the model to a decentralised economy with asymmetric information about total factor 
productivity shocks.  
A centralised economy without an emissions externality is not the focus of this study since it 
cannot include pollution externalities. Here, a decentralised economy model is applied from 
the beginning in which polluters are not automatically concerned about the costs of the 
pollution they produce. The model consists of a representative producer and a representative 
consumer where production generates emissions. The flow of emissions aggregates in the 
atmosphere and forms the pollution stock and imposes damages on the economy. In the 
following subsections the environment, production and consumption sectors are explained in 
Sections 4.3.1, 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 respectively. The functions introduced in these sections are 
used for testing the BAU scenario in Section 4.4, as well as a fixed emissions tax, a variable 
emissions tax and an abatement subsidy policy in Sections 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7 respectively. 
4.3.1. The Environment 
The earlier literature on environmental policy analysis assumed that environmental damage 
would arise from the flow of emissions (Weitzman, 1974; Malcomson, 1978; Watson and 
Ridker, 1984; Costello and Karp, 2004). Although the flow of emissions can contribute to 
several problems such as health problems, major environmental problems including global 
warming are due to cumulative emissions, or the stock of pollution, rather than the flow of 
emissions. Recently, many studies have revised the assumption that problems are caused by 
flows of emissions by including a linkage between the flow of emissions and the stock of 
pollution, and incorporating the pollution stock in their analysis (Falk and Mendelsohn, 1993; 
Hoel and Karp, 2002; Petrosjan and Zaccour, 2003; Heutel, 2012; Nordhaus and Sztorc, 
2013; Benchekroun and Ray Chaudhuri, 2014). This research also assumes that the stock of 
pollution xt in period t imposes negative effects on the economy in terms of damage to output 
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d(xt). This damage function represents the loss of potential output supply due to pollution 
which indicates the role of damage as it slows down the production process, for example by 
its negative effects on land, climate, access to water and forests. Thus, d(xt) is an increasing 
function of pollution stock that takes a value between 0 and 1. 
The stock of pollution decays at the rate of 1-η which is the share of pollution absorbed 
naturally by forest and oceans. Therefore, η represents the rate of pollution which is not 
absorbed naturally and remains in the atmosphere over a period. It is a positive function of 
domestic emissions mt and emissions from the rest of the world rowtm : 
 rowtt1tt mmxx ++= −η  (4-1) 
Emissions arise from production:  
 ( ) ( )ttt yh1m m−=  (4-2) 
where yt is production and h shows the relationship of emissions to output for given 
technology, with abatement held constant. 0≤ µt ≤1 is the fraction of emissions abated in 
period t determined by 
 ( ) ttt y/zg =m  (4-3) 
g(μt) is the marginal abatement cost which is proportional to output. This implies that total 
abatement spending zt is equal to the marginal cost of emissions reduction multiplied by total 
output: 
  ( ) ttt ygz m=  (4-4) 
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Equations (4-1) to (4-4) represent the environment functions of the model. The next sub-
section deals with the production sector. 
4.3.2. The Production Sector 
The model assumes perfect competition with a representative agent who produces a 
commodity using capital from the last period kt-1. Like many other emissions pricing studies  
(Kelly, 2005; Nordhaus, 2008; Schumacher and Zou, 2008; Nordhaus, 2010; Heutel, 2012; 
Angelopoulos et al., 2013), for simplicity labour is not included in this study since 
employment fluctuations are not the focus. The production function is 
 ( )( ) ( )1tttt kfaxd1y −−=  (4-5) 
where at is total factor productivity (TFP) and is the main source of economic fluctuations 
with an expected value of 1. In this situation at evolves according to a stationary, first order 
autoregressive process  
t1tt alnaln ερ += −  (4-6) 
where ρ is the persistence parameter and εt is an i.i.d. normal random variable with a mean of 
zero and standard deviation σ. This random variable may occur in each period which can be 
observed by agents (i.e. households and businesses) at the beginning of that period. The 
damage function d(xt) shows the externality of pollution and pollution is a stock variable that 
can impose damage to the economy in the form of the loss of potential output (Nordhaus, 
2008; 2010; Heutel, 2012). This assumption is plausible in a competitive market in which 
there are many identical small firms, with each choosing the optimal level of abatement while 
they incur damage from the aggregate of pollution. In other words, the firm is sufficiently 
small that it ignores the impact of the emissions it produces on the entire stock of pollution, 
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and thus on damages, and takes the stock of pollution as given when it chooses abatement. 
The firm maximises profit by choosing the appropriate level of abatement and capital. The 
profit function is determined by:  
 t1tttt zkry −−= −π  (4-7) 
where πt is profit and rt is the rate of return on capital. Assuming the price of output is one, 
equation (4-7) shows that profit is equal to net output of production and abatement costs.  
Equations (4-5) to (4-7) represent the production side. The next section deals with the 
consumption sector.  
4.3.3. The Consumption Sector 
It is assumed that the economy is inhabited by rational identical households who derive utility 
from consumption of goods and services u(ct). The household can observe productivity (i.e. 
at) at the beginning of each period and expect future values of at+1 and thus, the household 
maximises expected total discounted utility: 
( )∑∞=0t ttt cuE β  (4-8) 
where the operator Et is the expectation of future values of at+1 at period t. The household 
sector is the owner of the firm sector and receives a rate of return on capital and profit πt, and 
chooses between consumption ct and investment it. The stock of capital depreciates at the rate 
of δ: 
 ( ) t1tt ik1k +−= −δ  (4-9) 
The budget constraint is 
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 tt1ttt ickr +=+ −π  (4-10) 
Equations (4-8) to (4-10) represent the consumption sector. Additionally, there is a 
benevolent government that can envisage the behaviour of the firm and the household and 
chooses the optimal emissions pricing system which maximises total discounted expected 
utility. Under a business-as-usual scenario, in which there is no environmental policy, the role 
of government can be ignored, while under an emissions tax or an emissions cap scenario the 
government’s optimisation problem arises. The business-as-usual scenario is discussed in the 
next section. The results of this scenario will be used in Chapter 6 as a benchmark for policy 
analysis. 
 4.4. Business-As-Usual Scenario 
Under a business-as-usual scenario, or no-policy scenario, the government does not 
implement a specific environmental policy. Thus, there’s no price on pollution and the firm 
can produce pollution at any desired level. The firm’s profit maximisation problem is  
    t1tttt,k zkrymaxt1t
−−= −
−
π
m
  
subject to the production, TFP and abatement cost function  
 ( )( ) ( )1tttt kfaxd1y −−=   
 ( ) ttt ygz m=   
 t1tt alnaln ερ += −   
Without any emissions policy the profit maximising firm is not motivated to engage in 
abatement activity and thus, it does not take into account the effects of the emissions it 
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produces on the pollution stock, since it is free and takes xt as given. Hence, the firm sets the 
costs of abatement as equal to zero, that is, zt=0, by refusing any abatement activities, that is, 
μt=0. Therefore, the firm’s resource constraint is 
 1tttt kry −−=π  (4-11) 
Optimising the profit over capital, however, the marginal value product of capital is set equal 
to the rate of return: 
 ( ) ( )1t1ttt kf/k'fyr −−=  (4-12) 
The consumer chooses between consumption and investment by maximising expected 
discounted utility 
    ( )ttti,c cuEmaxtt β  
 
subject to the budget constraint and capital accumulation functions: 
 t1tttt ikrc −+= −π   
 ( ) 1ttt k1ki −−−= δ   
where β is the discount factor. Both the rate of return to capital and profit are determined by 
the firm and so are exogenous to the household. Optimising the utility function with respect 
to consumption will lead to the first order condition representing the Euler equation as 
follows: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] 01rc'uEc'u 1t1ttt =−++− ++ δβ  (4-13) 
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where –u'(ct) is the marginal benefit of an additional unit of consumption which is equal to 
the marginal cost of an additional unit of investment. Equation (4-13) implies that the total of 
marginal cost and benefit of an additional unit of investment, which is equal to the marginal 
benefit of consumption in the next period, should be equal to zero. 
The system of equations, therefore, under a business-as-usual scenario includes the firm’s and 
household’s choices Equations (4-12) and (4-13) respectively, and the firm’s and household’s 
budget constraints, Equations (4-10) and (4-11) respectively. It also includes capital 
accumulation, the stock of pollution and TFP equations, Equations (4-9), (4-1) and (4-6) 
respectively, which represent the dynamics of the system. This system will be calibrated in 
the next chapter. The numerical results of the calibration will be presented in Chapter 6 as a 
benchmark to be compared with the results of other emissions tax policies. The outcome of 
the comparison will show the effects of emissions policy on the Australian economy which is 
the target of the current study. The model is extended to an emissions tax scenario in the next 
section where a tax is levied on each tonne of emissions produced.  
4.5. Fixed Emissions Tax Policy 
Under an emissions tax policy the government levies a fixed rate p* on each tonne of 
emissions the firm produces. The government is neutral in the way that it collects the tax and 
returns the revenue from the tax to the household simply in lump sum transfers. Thus, the 
firm’s profit function is 
 tt1tttt zmpkry −−−= ∗−π  (4-14) 
subject to production, Equation (4-5), technology, Equation (4-6), abatement, Equation (4-4), 
and emissions, Equation (4-2). The profit maximising firm chooses the optimal path of 
abatement {μt} which maximises its profit. The first order condition for the choice of μt is 
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 ( ) ( ) ∗= p
y
yh'g
t
t
tm  
(4-15) 
Equation (4-15) shows that the firm chooses abatement to the extent that the marginal cost of 
emissions abatement equals the marginal cost of the emissions tax, measured as the emissions 
tax multiplied by the potential emissions per unit of output. Equation (4-15) can be solved for 
μt to obtain the optimal level of abatement: ( )tt y,p∗= mm . This implies that an emissions tax 
can affect abatement and consequently the level of emissions, but the magnitude of such an 
effect depends not only on the tax but also on production. 
Additionally, the firm chooses the optimal level of capital where the marginal value product 
of capital equals the rental rate. Finding the first order condition for capital, shown by 
Equation (4-16), reveals that levying a tax on emissions has a negative effect on the rate of 
return on capital. This is due to the fact that the abatement cost is a function of output, which 
in turn is a function of capital. So levying a tax on emissions decreases the marginal value 
product of capital. 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]ttt1t1ttt gyh1p1kf/k'fyr mm −′−−= ∗−−  (4-16) 
Next, consider the behaviour of the household. The household again maximises expected 
total discounted utility subject to capital accumulation, Equation (4-9), and the budget 
constraint. As explained before, it is assumed that the government transfers the revenue from 
an emissions tax, p*mt, to the household in each period. Thus the household’s budget 
constraint is 
 ttt1ttt icmpkr +=++ ∗−π  (4-17) 
 
126 
 
Optimising utility over consumption under a fixed tax policy results in the same Euler 
equation as the BAU scenario, Equation (4-13), although the budget constraints are different, 
as shown by Equation (4-17). The Euler equation, Equation (4-13), implies that the utility 
from consuming today is equal to the expected discounted utility of consumption in the 
future. 
Therefore, the system of equations under a fixed emissions tax scenario includes the 
outcomes of the firm’s profit optimisation, Equations (4-15) and (4-16), the firm’s resource 
constraint, Equation (4-14), the household’s utility optimisation behaviour, Equation (4-13), 
household’s budget constraint, Equation (4-17), the production function, Equation (4-5), 
technology, Equation (4-6), capital accumulation, Equation (4-9), and other environmental 
functions, Equations (4-1), (4-2) and (4-4). 
Comparing the system of equations under a tax policy with the BAU scenario reveals that 
levying an emissions tax not only persuades the firm to introduce a path of abatement 
Equation (4-15), but also indirectly affects the rate of return to capital, Equation (4-16). This 
system will be calibrated in Chapter 5 and tested in a fixed emissions tax scenario in Chapter 
6. 
4.6. Variable Emissions Tax Scenario  
The optimising of the output of a firm in a variable emissions tax regime is the same as it is in 
a fixed tax system, while the tax rate pt changes over time. So Equations (4-17), (4-14), 
(4-15) and (4-16) can be written as: 
 tttt1ttt icmpkr +=++ −π  (4-18) 
 tt1tttt mpkry −−= −π  (4-19) 
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 ( ) ( ) t
t
t
t py
yh'g =m  (4-20) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]tttt1t1ttt gyh1p1kf/k'fyr mm −′−−= −−  (4-21) 
In this regime the regulator observes the firm’s and household’s optimisation behaviour and 
chooses an optimal emissions tax path {pt} which maximises social welfare in terms of total 
discounted expected utility. The regulator’s optimisation problem can be written as 
 ( )∑∞=0t ttx,y,k,p cEumax tttt β  
(4-22) 
subject to the firm’s and household’s FOCs and budget constraints, Equations (4-18) to 
(4-21) and (4-13), production and TFP functions, Equations (4-5) and (4-6), capital 
accumulation, Equation (4-9), and environmental relationships, Equations (4-1), (4-2) and 
(4-4). Equation (4-20) can be solved to obtain ( )ttt y,pmm = . Substituting this into equation 
(4-4) results in ( )ttt y,pzz = . Substituting these two solutions, the constraints, Equations 
(4-1), (4-2) and (4-20) can be simplified to one constraint as below:  
 ( )ttrowtt1tt y,pmmmxx +++= −η  (4-23) 
Likewise, Equations (4-4), (4-9), (4-13), (4-18), (4-19), (4-20) and (4-21) can also be 
simplified to  
 ( )( ) ( )( )
( )( )δ
δβδ
−+×
−−+−′+−−+−′−
++
++++−
1k,y,pr
y,pzk1kyuEy,pzk1kyu
t1t1t
1t1tt1t1tttt1ttt )()(  
(4-24) 
Using these two simplified constraints the government’s problem can be written as the 
following Lagrangian equation: 
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( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )}][{}{
})(
)({)(
t 1tttttt
row
t1tt
t1t1t1t1tt1t1t
tt1tttttt1tttt
t
0tt
kfxd1yy,pmmxx
1k,y,pry,pzk1kyu
y,pzk1kyuy,pzk1kyuEL
−−
++++++
−−
∞
=
−−+++−+
−+×−−+−′+
−−+−′−+−−+−=∑
wης
δδβ
δλδβ
 
(4-25) 
where λt, ωt, ςt are the Lagrangian multipliers. To find the optimal tax, the government solves 
a Ramsey problem by using a so-called dual approach (Brendemoen and Vennemo, 1994; 
Fankhauser, 1995) and choosing { }tp 0t
∞
=  and also { }ttt y,x,k 0t
∞
= . Optimising the above 
Lagrangian equation over the emissions tax leads to the first order condition with respect to pt 
as below: 
( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ } { } 0y,p'mky,p'rc'u1ry,p'zc"u
y,p'zlc"uy,p'zc'u
ttpt1tttpttttpt1t
ttpttttpt
=−++−+−+
+−
−− )(),()(
)()(
ςδλ
λ
 
(4-26) 
Equation (4-26) is the solution of the government’s problem, showing the optimal path of 
emissions tax {pt}. The government also optimises social welfare over kt, yt and xt as below: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ){ } ( )[ ] ( ) 0'11'
),,('11""
1"1''
11111
11
'
111
11
=−−−+−+
+−+−++
−−+−+−
++++−
+++++
++
ttttttt
tttkttttt
tttt
kfaxdrcu
kyprcurcucu
cucucu
βwδλ
βδδβλ
δβλδβ
 
(4-27) 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ } { } 0),('),,(''1),('1"
),('"),('1'
11 =−++−+−+
+−+−
−− ttyttttyttttytt
tttyttttyt
ypmkyprcurypzcu
ypzcuypzcu
ςδλ
wλ
 
(4-28) 
 ( ) 0)('11 =+− −+ tttttt xdkfawηβςς   (4-29) 
Equations (4-26) to (4-29) show the government’s social welfare maximising outcomes. 
These equations, plus the firm’s resource constraints and profit optimisation outcomes, 
Equations (4-19) to (4-21), the household’s utility optimisation behaviour, Equation (4-13), 
the household’s budget constraint, Equation (4-18), production function, Equation (4-5), 
 
129 
 
technology, Equation (4-6), capital accumulation, Equation (4-9), and other environmental 
functions, Equations (4-1), (4-2) and (4-4) represent the economy under a variable emissions 
tax system. This system will be calibrated in Chapter 5 and its numerical solution will be 
presented in Chapter 6. The results will describe the Australian economy under a variable 
emissions tax policy. In the following section, another emissions control system, an 
abatement subsidy policy, will be specified. 
4.7. Abatement Subsidy Policy 
In an abatement subsidy regime the regulator supports abatement by allocating a subsidy of st 
to a firm for any abatement effort made in each period: µt is the percentage of emissions 
abated in each period, holding output constant. Like a variable tax system, it is assumed that 
the regulator is neutral as they levy a lump-sum tax on consumers and allocate the revenues 
to subsidise abatement efforts. Thus, the household’s budget constraint is  
 ttttttt icskr +=−+ − mπ 1  (4-30) 
The household maximises expected total utility of consumption subject to a budget 
constraint, Equation (4-30), and capital accumulation, Equation (4-9) which results in the 
same Euler equation, Equation (4-13), as the BAU and emissions tax scenarios. 
The firm receives the subsidy and, thus, the firm’s budget constraint is 
 t1tttttt zkrsy −−+= −mπ  (4-31) 
The firm maximises this profit subject to production, Equation (4-5), technology, Equation 
(4-6), abatement, Equation (4-4), and emissions, Equation (4-2). Optimising with respect to 
capital leads to the optimal level of capital in each period as shown by Equation (4-32). The 
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firm also chooses the optimal level of abatement which maximises profit which results in 
Equation (4-33).  
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]t1t1ttt g1kf/k'fyr m−= −−  (4-32) 
 ( )ttt 'gys m=  (4-33) 
Comparing the firm’s choice of capital under a subsidy policy, Equation (4-32), with that of a 
tax policy, Equation (4-21), reveals that the rate of return to capital can be affected by a tax 
but not by a subsidy.  
Observing the behaviour of households and firms, the regulator chooses the optimal path of 
subsidy {st} which maximises social welfare in terms of total discounted expected utility 
 ( )∑∞=0,,,max t t
t
xyks
cEu
tttt
β  (4-34) 
subject to the firm’s and household’s budget constraints and optimisation outcomes, Equation 
(4-13) and Equations (4-30) to (4-33), production and TFP functions, Equations (4-5) and 
(4-6), capital accumulation, Equation (4-9), and environmental relationships, Equations (4-1), 
(4-2) and (4-4). 
Substituting Equation (4-33) into Equation (4-4) leads to ( )ttt y,szz = . Using this function, 
Equations (4-4), (4-10), (4-13), (4-30), (4-31), (4-32) and (4-33) can be summarised into one 
constraint 
 ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )[ ] 01y,kry,szk1kyuE
y,szk1kyu
t1t1t1tt1t1tt
tt1ttt
=−+−−+−′
+−−+−′−
−++++
−
δδβ
δ
 
(4-35) 
Therefore, the government’s problem can be written as a Lagrangian problem as below: 
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(4-36) 
where λt, ωt, ςt are the Lagrangian multipliers. Optimising this Lagrangian problem with 
respect to an abatement subsidy leads to 
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(4-37) 
Additionally, optimising social welfare over xt, kt and yt results in 
( ) 0)('11 =+− −+ tttttt xdkfawηβςς  (4-38) 
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(4-40) 
Using these equations the system of equations describing the economy under a variable 
emissions cap includes the outcomes of the firm’s and household’s optimisation behaviour 
and budget constraints, Equation (4-13) and Equations (4-30) to (4-33), production and TFP 
functions, Equations (4-5) and (4-6), capital accumulation, Equation (4-9), environmental 
relationships, Equations (4-1), (4-2) and (4-4) and government’s social welfare optimisation 
outcomes, Equations (4-37) to (4-40). This system will be calibrated in Chapter 5 and the 
numerical solution of the system will be represented in Chapter 6. The results will be 
compared with those of the BAU scenario to show the effects of an abatement subsidy policy 
on the Australian economy. The results will also be compared with other scenarios, that is, 
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fixed and flexible emissions taxes, in order to find the optimal emissions pricing system in 
Australia.  
4.8. Summary 
 In this chapter a DSGE model of emissions reduction for policy analysis under different 
scenarios was presented. To this end, the evolution of DSGE models and their applications in 
macroeconomics were explained. Additionally, the extension of DSGE modelling into 
environmental areas was also clarified. As clarified in Section 4.2, these models are known as 
modern macroeconomic models specifying macroeconomic relationships based upon micro-
founded assumptions. Partial equilibrium models focus only on one or a few economic 
agents, while the general equilibrium nature of DSGE models makes them suitable for 
representing the relationships between all sectors of an economy. The dynamic feature of 
these models enables modellers to track the transitional effects of policy changes on different 
sectors over various time periods. Additionally, as a result of being stochastic, these models 
provide an appropriate framework to study the effects of uncertainties on the economy. Due 
to such advantages, DSGE models have been recently applied in environmental policy 
analysis since they can facilitate investigating the effects of any economic or environmental 
uncertainty in environmental policy analysis.  
This research is the first attempt to apply DSGE models for emissions pricing policy analysis 
in the case of Australia. This chapter specified the general equations of the model and 
extended them to four scenarios: first, a business-as-usual scenario (i.e. with no emissions 
pricing policy) as a benchmark; second, a fixed emissions tax policy in which a constant 
emissions tax is levied which does not change over time; third, a variable emissions tax 
scenario where the government choses the optimal emissions tax at the beginning of each 
period; and, fourth, an emissions abatement policy in which the government financially 
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supports firms’ abatement efforts in each period. These scenarios are specified in such a way 
that they resemble the emissions reduction policies that have been implemented in Australia. 
The model applied here closely followed the model developed by Heutel (2012). However, it 
deviated from his model in two ways. Firstly, it tested different scenarios: Heutel (2012) 
starts with a centralised economy in which polluters automatically internalised the 
externalities arising from pollution, to investigate the responses of an economy only under a 
variable emissions pricing system to TFP shocks. While the centralised model was the main 
focus of his study, he extended it to a decentralised economy where an emissions pricing 
policy motivates the polluter to reduce their emissions in order to provide a comparison 
between different policies. The current research, however, applied a decentralised model 
from the beginning. The model included emissions externalities and tested not only a variable 
emissions tax, but also a fixed emissions tax and an emissions abatement subsidy since the 
aim of this study is emissions reduction policy analysis in Australia, and these three scenarios 
are the policies which have so far been developed for Australia. This chapter specified the 
relationships between economic and environmental variables under each scenario. These 
relationships are summarised in Table 4.2.  
 The second deviation of the current research is regarding the specification of one of the 
environmental variables, emissions from the rest of the world. This deviation will be 
explained in detail in the next chapter. Finally, the third difference between this study and 
Heutel (2012) is related to analysing the outcomes of the model, as this thesis applies a new 
approach to study the effects of emissions pricing systems. This new approach is explained in 
Chapter 6. These three differences are the technical contributions of the current research. In 
addition, this thesis makes the empirical contribution of applying the model to the Australian 
economy while Heutel (2012) calibrated his model to the US economy and, thus, his 
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numerical results were based on the US. The calibration and parametrisation of the current 
research will be presented in the next chapter.  
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Table 4.2: Systems of equations describing the economy under a business-as-usual, a fixed and a variable emissions tax and an abatement 
subsidy scenario 
Function BAU Fixed Emissions Tax Variable Emissions Tax Abatement Subsidy 
Production ( )( ) )k(faxd1y 1tttt −−=  ( )( ) )k(faxd1y 1tttt −−=  ( )( ) )k(faxd1y 1tttt −−=  ( )( ) )k(faxd1y 1tttt −−=  
Pollution 
stock 
row
tt1tt mmxx ++= −η  rowtt1tt mmxx ++= −η  rowtt1tt mmxx ++= −η  rowtt1tt mmxx ++= −η  
Capital 
accumulation 
( ) t1tt ik1k +−= −δ  ( ) t1tt ik1k +−= −δ  ( ) t1tt ik1k +−= −δ  ( ) t1tt ik1k +−= −δ  
TFP t1tt alnaln ερ += −  t1tt alnaln ερ += −  t1tt alnaln ερ += −  t1tt alnaln ερ += −  
Household’s 
budget 
constraint 
tt1ttt ickr +=+ −π  
tt
t
*
1ttt
ic
mpkr
+=
++ −π  tttt1ttt icmpkr +=++ −π  ttttttt icskr +=−+ − mπ 1  
Household’s 
choice of 
investment 
( ) ( )
( )[ ] 01r
c'uEc'u
1t
1ttt
=−+
+−
+
+
δ
β  ( ) ( )
( )[ ] 01r
c'uEc'u
1t
1ttt
=−+
+−
+
+
δ
β  ( ) ( )
( )[ ] 01r
c'uEc'u
1t
1ttt
=−+
+−
+
+
δ
β  ( ) ( )
( )[ ] 01r
c'uEc'u
1t
1ttt
=−+
+−
+
+
δ
β  
Firm’s 
resource 
constraint 
1tttt kry −−=π  tt*1tttt zmpkry −−−= −π  tt1tttt mpkry −−= −π  t1tttttt zkrsy −−+= −mπ  
Firm’s choice 
of capital 
( ) ( )1t1ttt kf/k'fyr −−=  ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )][ ttt*
1t1ttt
gyh1p1
kf/k'fyr
mm −′−−
= −− ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]tttt
1t1ttt
gyh1p1
kf/k'fyr
mm −′−−
= −−  ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]t1t1ttt g1kf/k'fyr m−= −−  
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Function BAU Fixed Emissions Tax Variable Emissions Tax Abatement Subsidy 
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Function BAU Fixed Emissions Tax Variable Emissions Tax Abatement Subsidy 
Government’s 
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output 
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Source: Author’s configuration. 
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Chapter 5  
Data Collection and Calibration  
5.1. Introduction  
In Chapter 4 the structure of the environmental dynamic general equilibrium model used in 
this study was presented. The model comprises a representative consumer and a 
representative profit maximising producer. Production leads to emissions which accumulate 
in the atmosphere and impose an externality by reducing total output. A scenario in which a 
government attempts to internalise the externality by setting a price on emissions was also 
considered. The optimisation behaviour of each sector, as well as the relationships between 
them, were specified in Chapter 4 and extended to four scenarios: (1) business-as-usual (i.e. 
with no environmental policy), (2) a fixed emissions tax policy in which the emissions tax 
does not change over time, (3) a flexible emissions tax policy where the government chooses 
the optimal rate of emissions tax at the beginning of each period which maximises social 
welfare and (4) an abatement subsidy policy where the government chooses the optimal 
subsidy at the beginning of each period which maximises social welfare. The outcomes for 
each policy were summarised in Chapter 4, Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2 is the outcome of (1) specification and (2) optimisation of different sectors of the 
Australian economy under different emissions reduction scenarios. As explained in Chapter 
4, Section 4.3, these steps are the first two of the six steps required to apply DSGE models. 
This chapter describes the next three steps, Steps 3, 4 and 5: 
3. The parameters of the system are calibrated or estimated.  
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4. The size and direction of the shock are specified. The size of the shock is usually set 
as equal to one standard deviation of the shock. 
5. The model is usually nonlinear without a closed analytical solution. In order to make 
the model suitable for empirical analysis, in this step the model can be approximated 
in the neighbourhood of a given point which is mostly the non-stochastic steady state 
of the system obtained in Step 2.  
Thus, the model developed in Chapter 4 is calibrated here for the purpose of scenario 
analysis. To this end the general relationships, or functions, of the model, such as the utility 
and production functions, are specified. Like Heutel (2012) the current research utilises the 
Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economy (DICE) model (Nordhaus, 2008) to specify the 
functions. However, it deviates from Heutel (2012) in calibrating one of the environmental 
variables, the emissions from the rest of the world. Calibrating his research to the US 
economy, Heutel (2012) assumes that the emissions from the rest of the world are three times 
greater than the domestic emissions produced by the US. However, tying the emissions from 
the rest of the world to domestic emissions at a constant rate under emissions pricing policies 
would not be appropriate since it would provide a channel to transfer the effects of domestic 
emissions pricing policy to the rest of the world’s emissions.  
In other words, according to this assumption, if an emissions pricing policy affects domestic 
emissions its effect multiplied by three will be equal to the emissions produced by the rest of 
the world which is not necessarily true. Instead of making such an assumption, the current 
research calculates the rest of the world’s emissions under a BAU scenario and assumes that 
emissions from the rest of the world under the various emissions pricing policies are equal to 
those under a BAU scenario. This assumption is consistent with the aim of this study which is 
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to analyse the economic effects of emissions pricing policies on Australia, not on the world 
economy.  
After specifying the functions, the model is parameterised to the Australian economy. To this 
end, Australian RBC literature, such as Rees (2013), Gomez-Gonzalez and Rees (2013), and 
Jaaskela and Nimark (2011), is used here since the model of the current research is of the 
RBC type. The calibrated equations are substituted into the model under different emissions 
pricing policy scenarios. As explained in Step 5 the nonlinear model does not have a closed-
form solution, however a numerical solution can be found. The solution is used via three 
approaches to conduct a comparison between different pricing policies in Chapter 6. These 
three approaches are explained below. 
First, the steady state values of economic and environment variables are found and compared 
in order to investigate the non-stochastic effects of each policy. Second, the fluctuations 
occurring in environmental and economic variables due to total factor productivity (TFP) 
shocks are presented and analysed to study the effects of each policy on Australian business 
cycles. Third, the cumulative effect of each policy is calculated to present the cumulative 
changes in each variable over time when a shock happens. But first, the model needs to be 
calibrated and log-linearised around the steady state values in this chapter. The numerical 
results will be presented, compared and discussed in the next chapter. 
This chapter is organised as follows. First, the equations and parameters are calibrated in 
Section 5.2. The calibration of the damage function is explained separately in Section 5.3. In 
Section 5.4 the calibrated equations are substituted into the model. In Section 5.5 the steady 
state of the model is obtained and the model is log-linearised around the steady state. Section 
5.6 summarises the chapter. 
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5.2. Calibration  
In this section the model specified in Chapter 4 Section 4.3 is calibrated to the Australian 
economy. As explained in Section 5.1 the functions are calibrated to the DICE model 
(Nordhaus, 2008) which is the most distinguished integrated assessment model. The DICE 
model is a global integrated model which is disaggregated to the Regional Integrated model 
of Climate and the Economy (RICE) model and applied to different regions to analyse 
different national environmental strategies (Nordhaus and Yang, 1996). In the latest model, 
RICE-2010, 198 countries in the global economy are divided into 12 regions: the United 
States, the European Union, Japan, Russia, Eurasia, China, India, Middle East, Africa, Latin 
America, Other High Income (OHI) countries and Other Asia, where Australia is in the OHI 
group. Hence, the parameters of the OHI group countries will be used here to calibrate the 
environmental coefficients, including the damage and abatement function for Australia.  
As explained in Section 5.1 the macroeconomic variables are parameterised to the Australian 
macroeconomic literature, especially RBC studies (Jaaskela and Nimark, 2011; Gomez-
Gonzalez and Rees, 2013; Rees, 2013), since the model of this thesis is also RBC. These 
studies are used to parameterise the production function, the discount factor, the utility 
function, the capital decay rate and the productivity shock. Also, one of the parameters, the 
coefficient of output, which is not available in the literature, is estimated using Australian 
databases including the Australian National Accounts (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2014) 
and Australia’s National Greenhouse Accounts (Department of the Environment, 2014b).  
To calibrate the model each period of time is set as equal to a quarter. To calibrate the utility 
discount factor β, that is the rate at which the consumer discounts the utility gained from 
future consumption, Jaaskela and Nimark (2011), Gomez-Gonzalez and Rees (2013) and 
Rees (2013) are used, and they estimated it to be equal to 0.99. The capital depreciation rate δ 
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is set at 0.02 (Rees, 2013) which implies that Australian capital depreciates by 2 per cent per 
quarter. The consumer utility function is ( )
ζ
ζ
−
=
−
1
ccu
1
t  where ζ represents the constant 
coefficient of relative risk aversion and is set to 1.6619 based on Hodge et al. (2008).  
Total abatement spending zt is equal to the marginal cost of emissions reduction multiplied by 
total output: 
  ( ) ttt ygz m=  (5-1) 
where g(μt) represents the marginal abatement cost. Nordhaus (2008) assumes that g(μt) is 
highly convex and thus the marginal costs of emissions abatement rises more than linearly 
with the abatement rate. Therefore, he specifies ( ) 2t1tg θmθm = where θ2 = 2.8 and θ1 is a 
function of time with the initial value of 0.05607. These values, however, are related to the 
global economy in the DICE model. In order to calibrate them to the Australian economy the 
current research uses the RICE–2010 model. In RICE–2010, θ2 = 2.8 while θ1 is estimated to 
be 0.07 for the OHI countries. θ1 represents a higher cost of emissions abatement for these 
countries including Australia. This is consistent with the costly abatement structure of 
Australia since its production sector heavily relies on fossil fuels – 86.9% of Australian 
electricity was generated by fossil fuels in 2012-13 (Bureau of Resources and Energy 
Economics, 2014). Thus, the Australian abatement cost function is parametrised to θ1 = 0.07 
and θ2 = 2.8. 
As represented in Chapter 4, Section 4.2 the stock of pollution function is 
 rowtt1tt mmxx ++= −η  (5-2) 
                                                     
19 This can be interpreted as the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption and is set to equal 1.66. 
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in which η represents the persistence of pollution in the atmosphere. This value can be 
estimated from the half-life of atmospheric carbon dioxide, but it is not precisely estimated. 
For instance, Reilly and Anderson (1992) estimate that the half-life of atmospheric carbon 
dioxide is 83 years and is equivalent to 0.9979 quarterly. This value implies that 99.79 per 
cent of emissions produced in each period will remain in the atmosphere in the next period 
(i.e. the next quarter), while 0.21 per cent of emissions are absorbed naturally, via forests and 
oceans for instance (Heutel, 2012). 
Additionally, the emissions arising from production are shown by: 
 ( ) ( )ttt yh1m m−=  (5-3) 
where h(yt) indicates the relationship of emissions with output which can be specified as 
( ) γ−= 1tt yyh . This research assumes that 11 ≤− γ  which implies that the rate of increase in 
emissions is less than or equal to the rate of increase in output, but not greater than it. γ−1  
can be estimated as the coefficient of the log of emissions on the log of output. To find this 
coefficient, this research used quarterly data on emissions for Australia from September 2001 
to December 2013 from Australia’s National Greenhouse Accounts (Department of the 
Environment, 2014b). Quarterly data on Australian GDP for September 2001 to December 
2013 is also collected from the Australian National Accounts (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 
2014). Both emissions and GDP data is in seasonally adjusted terms. The GDP data is in 
millions of dollars and the emissions data is in millions of metric tons of carbon dioxide 
equivalents (Mt CO2-e). To find 1-γ the regression of the log of emissions on the log of 
output is calculated. The regression coefficient is 1-γ which is estimated to be equal to 
0.0975. The collected data and the regression results are presented in the Appendix A.1.  
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Table 5.1: Summary of model parameters 
Parameter Value Description Source 
α 0.33 Output elasticity of capital Rees (2013), Gomez-Gonzalez and 
Rees (2013) 
ζ 1.66 Risk aversion coefficient Hodge et al. (2008) 
β 0.99 Discount factor Jaaskela and Nimark (2011), 
Gomez-Gonzalez and Rees (2013), 
Rees (2013) 
δ 0.02 Capital depreciation rate Rees (2013) 
ρ 0.98 Autocorrelation parameter 
of the productivity shock 
Rees (2013) 
σ 0.007 Standard deviation of tε  Rees (2013) 
η 0.9979 Autocorrelation parameter 
of pollution 
Heutel (2012) 
d0 -0.0011 Intercept of damage 
function  
Estimated by the author for 
Australia from Nordhaus (2010) 
model 
d1 -5.6629e-10 Linear coefficient of the 
damage function  
Estimated by the author for 
Australia from Nordhaus (2010) 
model 
d2 1.2261e-8 Quadratic coefficient of the 
damage function 
Estimated by the author for 
Australia from Nordhaus (2010) 
model 
θ1 0.07 Abatement cost function 
coefficient 
Nordhaus (2010) 
θ2 2.8 Abatement cost function 
exponential coefficient 
Nordhaus (2010) 
1-γ 0.0975 Emissions elasticity of 
output 
Estimated by the author from the 
Australian emissions and GDP data 
over the period Q2, 2001- Q4, 2013 
Source: compiled by the author. 
The output function is: 
 ( )( ) ( )1tttt kfaxd1y −−=  (5-4) 
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where at is a total factor productivity (TFP) shock with an expected value of 1. It is assumed 
that the TFP shock evolves according to a Markov process as t1tt alnaln ερ += − . The 
symbol ρ  represents the persistence of the shock which is equal to 0.98 and tε  is a normally 
distributed i.i.d shock with a mean of 0 and standard deviation, σ, of 0.0069 according to 
Rees (2013).  
The production function is calibrated to be f(k)=kα where 0<α<1 shows the output elasticity 
of capital. Calibrating to Rees (2013) and Gomez-Gonzalez and Rees (2013), α=0.33. The 
damage function d(xt) is set to be a quadratic function: ( ) 2t2t10t xdxddxd ++= . This function 
is calibrated using the DICE and RICE models and leads us to obtain d0=-0.0011, d1=-
5.6629*10-6 and d2=1.2261*10-8. The calibration of the damage function is explained in detail 
in the next section. Table 5.1 summarises all the parameters explained above.  
 
5.3. Damage Function Calibration 
In order to calibrate the environmental damage function due to pollution the current research 
uses from Dynamic Integrated model of Climate and the Economy (DICE) to specify the 
damage function. While the DICE model provides a large, complicated environmental-
economic model, this thesis simplifies the relationships between environmental variables to a 
quadratic damage function. To this end the DICE model is first explained and then a 
simplification process is presented. In both the DICE and RICE models the climate change 
damage function is specified in terms of output lost due to global warming. In the DICE 
model, Nordhaus (2008) specifies three reservoirs for the carbon cycle: carbon in the 
atmosphere MAT(t), in the upper oceans MUP(t) and in the deep oceans MLO(t). Carbon can 
flow between these adjacent reservoirs.  
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Nordhaus (2008) specifies the relationships between these three reservoirs as follows: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1tM1tMtEtM UP21AT11AT −+−+= ϕϕ  (5-5) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1tM1tM1tMtM LO32UP22AT12UP −+−+−= ϕϕϕ  (5-6) 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1tM1tMtM LO33UP23LO −+−= ϕϕ  (5-7) 
where E(t) represents the emissions produced in period t and φij are the parameters between 
the reservoirs. Then the relationships between the reservoirs, or the accumulation of carbon, 
and the resulting climate change are specified. The accumulation of GHGs increases radiative 
forcing20 which leads to warming of the earth’s surface. 
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]{ } ( )tF1750M/tMlogtF EXATAT2 +=η  (5-8) 
where F(t) represents the change in total radiative forcing of GHGs since 1750 (which is 
taken to be the beginning of the industrial period) from anthropogenic sources such as carbon 
dioxide. FEX(t) is the exogenous forcing from other long-lived greenhouse gases. The 
radiative forcing warms the atmosphere, which in turn warms the upper ocean layers and 
then, gradually, the deep oceans.  
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]{ }1tT1tT1tTtF1tTtT LOAT3AT21ATAT −−−−−−+−= ξξξ  (5-9) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }1tT1tT1tTtT LOAT4LOLO −−−+−= ξ  (5-10) 
                                                     
20 Radiative forcing represents the perturbation in the radiative energy of the climate system which results in 
changes in the climate parameters and leads to a new equilibrium state of the climate system (IPCC, 1990; 1992; 
1994).  
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TAT(t) and TLO(t) are respectively the mean surface temperature and the temperature of deep 
oceans. Finally, the economic impact of climate change or damage, Ω, arises from the mean 
surface temperature. 
 ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]2AT2AT1 tTtTt ψψΩ +=  (5-11) 
As Nordhaus (2008) explains, this damage function is estimated for a temperature increase in 
the range of 0-3°C which is related to the pollution stock being equal to between 600 and 
1200 Giga tons of carbon (GtC). Nordhaus (2008) explained that the damage function cannot 
be calculated for warming above 3°C as there is little evidence available about the impacts of 
warming of this magnitude. 
Equations (5-5) to (5-11) represent carbon dioxide contributions to global warming damage. 
In order to obtain the damage as a direct function of the stock of pollution, this research 
summarises the above relationships. To this end the DICE (2008) equations of radiative 
forcing, the atmospheric temperatures, ocean temperatures and damage function, Equations 
(5-8), (5-9), (5-10) and (5-11) respectively, are used to find the damage caused by the 
pollution stock when the pollution stock is between 600 and 1200 GtC. Finally, in order to 
calibrate the parameters ψ1 and ψ2 to Australia, this research uses RICE–2010 in which the 
damage coefficients are ψ1=0 and ψ2=0.1564. 
Plotting such a damage function over the carbon mass of 600 to 1200 GtC leads to obtaining 
the relationship between the damage function and the carbon mass as presented in Figure 5.1. 
As the figure shows, it is assumed that there is a quadratic relationship between the carbon 
mass and output such as that given by ( ) 2t2t10t xdxddxd ++= . This leads to obtaining d0=-
0.0011, d1=-5.6629*10-6 and d2=1.2261*10-8. These parameters represent the fraction of 
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output lost due to a 1GtC increase in the stock of pollution which can be interpreted as the 
effects of pollution on the Australian economy.  
 
Figure 5.1: Economic damage from the stock of pollution in Australia 
 
Source: configured by the author and inspired by Nordhaus (2008), Nordhaus (2010) and 
Heutel (2012) 
 
The equations specified in this section and Section 5.2 are substituted into the model under 
different scenarios in the next section. 
5.4. Calibrating the Model under Different Scenarios  
This section calibrates the model under the four emissions reduction scenarios specified in 
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summarised in Table 4.2. As the table shows, some equations, including production, capital, 
pollution accumulation and technology are assumed to be the same for the four scenarios 
while others, such as the firm’s resource constraints and its choice over capital and abatement 
as well as the household’s budget constraint and choice of investment, are different as result 
of different emissions reduction programs. In this section the calibrated relationships 
specified in Section 5.2 are substituted into the model. The calibrated model based upon these 
relationships is presented in Table 5.2.  
The model is now ready for policy analysis. However, as explained in Section 5.1 in relation 
to the fifth step of DSGE modelling, the model first needs to be log-linearised around the new 
steady state. The next section presents the log-linearised version of the model.  
5.5. Log-Linearising the Model under Different Scenarios 
As the calibrated model in Table 5.2 shows the model consists of several complex nonlinear 
equations, representing production, emissions, abatement cost and the government’s choice 
of tax or subsidy which makes the model too complex to enable an analytical solution. 
Instead, a numerical approximation of the model can be made. To this end, the log-
linearisation method is broadly applied in DSGE models (Fischer and Springborn, 2011; 
Heutel, 2012; Angelopoulos et al., 2013; Iiboshi et al., 2015) in which the model is linearised 
in the neighbourhood of the non-stochastic steady state values of variables. Thus, it is a local 
approximation method in which the approximation point is the steady state value which 
implies that, first, the steady state values should be found. The steady state points are the 
long-term non-stochastic values of variables. In order to meet the non-stochastic condition, 
the random variable in the model of this research tε , is set to be equal to 0 and at is set to be 
equal to its expected value of 1. The steady state of a variable v  is the value that does not 
change over time. That is, vt = vt+1.  
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Table 5.2: Calibrated systems of equations describing the economy under a business-as-usual, a fixed and a variable emissions tax and an 
abatement subsidy scenario 
Function BAU Fixed Emissions Tax Variable Emissions Tax Abatement Subsidy 
Production ( ) α 1tt2t2t10t kaxdxdd1y −−−−=
 
( ) α 1tt2t2t10t kaxdxdd1y −−−−=  ( ) α 1tt2t2t10t kaxdxdd1y −−−−=  ( ) α 1tt2t2t10t kaxdxdd1y −−−−=  
Pollution 
stock 
row
tt1tt mmxx ++= −η  rowtt1tt mmxx ++= −η  rowtt1tt mmxx ++= −η  rowtt1tt mmxx ++= −η  
Capital 
accumulation 
( ) t1tt ik1k +−= −δ  ( ) t1tt ik1k +−= −δ  ( ) t1tt ik1k +−= −δ  ( ) t1tt ik1k +−= −δ  
TFP t1tt alnaln ερ += −  t1tt alnaln ερ += −  t1tt alnaln ερ += −  t1tt alnaln ερ += −  
Household’s 
budget 
constraint 
tt1ttt ickr +=+ −π  
tt
t
*
1ttt
ic
mpkr
+=
++ −π  tttt1ttt icmpkr +=++ −π  ttttttt icskr +=−+ − mπ 1  
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cEc
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+
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+
−
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Firm’s 
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tt1tttt mpkry −−= −π  t1tttttt zkrsy −−+= −mπ  
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Function BAU Fixed Emissions Tax Variable Emissions Tax Abatement Subsidy 
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Function BAU Fixed Emissions Tax Variable Emissions Tax Abatement Subsidy 
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Additionally, as explained in Section 5.1, this research provides a contribution to the 
calibration approach provided by Heutel (2012) by assuming that the variable for emissions 
from the rest of the world, rowtm , is exogenous and is not affected by Australian emissions 
reduction policies. Instead of making this assumption the current research calculates rowtm  
under the BAU scenario first and then this calculated value is used as a constant for all the 
other emissions reduction policies. In order to calculate rowtm  under the BAU scenario, the 
current research collects the global and Australian carbon dioxide equivalent emissions data 
from the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Centre (CDIAC) over the period 1950–2010. 
This period is before the implementation of a carbon pricing policy in Australia began in 
2012, and is, therefore suitable for the BAU scenario. The data reveals that emissions from 
the rest of the world are about 30 times greater than Australia’s. Thus, the rest of the world’s 
emissions are set as equal to 30 times the steady state value of m: mw  where ω is equal to 30. 
This value is calculated and used as a constant under all the emissions reduction policies. 
Thus, rowm under all scenarios, including emissions reduction policies and BAU, is the same. 
The steady state of variables v  is given by v , and the steady state equations of the model are 
presented in Table 5.4. After finding the steady state values of the variables the model can 
then be log-linearised around those non-stochastic steady state values to show how different 
variables will react to a shock. This can be done by displaying the deviations of variables 
from their steady state points when a shock occurs. The log-linearisation approach is 
explained in detail in Appendix 5.A.2. Using v~  to show the proportional deviation from the 
steady state of variable v, the model can be log-linearised as shown in Table 5.5. To reduce 
clutter the expectation operator is suppressed in the log-linearisation model, but the expected 
value of that variable in period t+1 is taken into account. 
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Table 5.3: Steady state of the system of equations describing the economy under the business-as-usual, fixed emissions tax, variable emissions 
tax and abatement subsidy scenarios  
Function BAU Fixed Emissions Tax Variable Emissions Tax Abatement Subsidy 
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Function BAU Fixed Emissions Tax Variable Emissions Tax Abatement Subsidy 
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Table 5.4: Log-linearised system of equations describing the economy under the business-as-usual, fixed emissions tax, variable emissions tax 
and abatement subsidy scenarios 
Function BAU Fixed Emissions Tax Variable Emissions Tax Abatement Subsidy 
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Function BAU Fixed Emissions Tax Variable Emissions Tax Abatement Subsidy 
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Function BAU Fixed Emissions Tax Variable Emissions Tax Abatement Subsidy 
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Function BAU Fixed Emissions Tax Variable Emissions Tax Abatement Subsidy 
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Function BAU Fixed Emissions Tax Variable Emissions Tax Abatement Subsidy 
Government’s 
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stock 
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Table 5.4 presents the non-stochastic values of the economic and environmental variables, v , 
under different emissions reduction scenarios. This system of equations is coded and then 
solved in Matlab to obtain the numerical steady state values of each variable. Using the 
results of the BAU scenario and comparing the values under different emission reduction 
policies makes it possible to show the long-term effects of each policy on the Australian 
economy.  
Table 5.5 displays the linearised version of the model in the neighbourhood of steady state 
values. Therefore, any changes in the log-linearised variables, v~ , due to a technology shock 
will resemble exactly the changes that will occur due to long-term values of variables. In 
order to obtain such changes the system contained in Table 5.5 is coded in Matlab and the 
results will show how the Australian economic and environmental variables will respond to a 
technology shock. These results, as well as the stochastic results, are presented in the next 
chapter. 
5.6. Summary  
To investigate the effects of emissions pricing policies on the Australian economy a dynamic 
general equilibrium model was developed in Chapter 4 and extended to four different 
scenarios: business-as-usual, a fixed emissions tax policy, a flexible emissions tax policy and 
an abatement subsidy policy. The model under these scenarios was calibrated in this chapter. 
The economic parameters, including the discount factor, the production function, the utility 
function, the capital decay rate and the productivity shock were calibrated using Australian 
RBC studies (Jaaskela and Nimark, 2011; Gomez-Gonzalez and Rees, 2013; Rees, 2013). 
The damage function was calibrated using the DICE and RICE models. Additionally, this 
thesis collected quarterly and seasonally adjusted data for Australian emissions and GDP to 
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calculate the coefficient of output in the emissions function. The emissions abatement cost 
function was calibrated to the RICE model. Finally, the decay rate of pollution in the 
atmosphere was assumed to be identical around the world and calibrated using Heutel (2012). 
This research modified the calibration method specified by Heutel (2012) for emissions from 
the rest of the world. This alteration, in addition to differences related to the scenarios to be 
tested, and the analysis approach, are the technical contributions of this thesis into the model. 
Moreover, this research is the first attempt at DSGE modelling for environmental policy 
analysis in Australia and this can be considered to be a practical contribution. In order to 
provide the policy analysis the steady state and log-linearised model presented in this chapter 
will be coded into Matlab and solved, and the results will be presented and compared in the 
next chapter. This process can be conducted via three approaches: first, by finding and 
comparing the steady state values of economic and environment variables which will present 
the non-stochastic outcomes of policies; second, by presenting and comparing the short-term 
response paths of variables to technology shocks under different policies; and third, by 
finding and comparing the cumulative changes in each variable which will display the 
cumulative gain or loss of variables under each policy over time. These results are presented 
and discussed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6  
Numerical Results and Scenario Analysis 
6.1. Introduction  
This chapter presents simulation results derived from the dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium model developed in Chapter 4 and calibrated in Chapter 5. As explained in 
Chapter 4, Section 4.1, the model was developed for four scenarios including: business-as-
usual scenario without any environmental policy, a fixed emissions tax system in which a 
constant emissions tax is levied on each tonne of emissions where the tax rate does not 
change over time, a variable emissions tax policy in which the regulator chooses a tax rate on 
each tonne of emissions at the beginning of each period, and an abatement subsidy policy in 
which the regulator pays polluters for each unit of emissions reduction they achieve. The 
BAU scenario with no environmental policy is also developed and is used as a benchmark 
case to compare with the results of emissions reduction policies. These policies were 
designed to be similar to the emissions pricing programs implemented in Australia including 
fixed emissions tax and abatement subsidy programs, while a variable emissions tax is used 
as a proxy for the cap-and-trade scheme which was planned to be applied in Australia. 
Additionally, as explained in Chapter 4 Section 4.1, this thesis is also interested in 
investigating the environmental and economic impacts of an augmenting fixed tax program, 
similar to the Australian Carbon Tax program which was originally designed to increase by 
2.5 per cent per year. To this end the fixed tax scenario developed in Chapter 4 Section 4.5 is 
used where the tax rate increases by 2.5 per cent every four periods, equivalent to a year. This 
increase in emissions tax is pre-announced at the beginning of the program, so that both 
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production and consumption sectors expect the changes and take them into account in their 
optimisation behaviour.  
In order to obtain the results from the various emissions pricing scenarios and the augmenting 
scenario, the model was calibrated to the Australian economy in Chapter 5. The current 
chapter presents the numerical results from each scenario. As explained in Chapter 5 Section 
5.5 the model presented in this research consists of several nonlinear equations which make it 
too complex to derive analytically unambiguous solutions. Therefore, instead, a numerical 
solution is presented. This use of a numerical approach for DSGE models with nonlinear 
equations has been widely used since Kydland and Prescott (1982) first applied it. For 
instance, it has been used by Fischer and Springborn (2011), Heutel (2012) and 
Annicchiarico and Di Dio (2015).  
After the calibration described in Chapter 5, a policy analysis consisting of three stages is 
conducted. First, a numerical solution of the non-stochastic steady-state values (when the 
values of variables do not change over time and no shocks occur) is provided. The solutions 
of the different emissions reduction scenarios are then compared to the benchmark BAU 
scenario. Second, results from a stochastic shock, specifically a TFP shock, are presented 
graphically to show the response paths of different economic and environmental variables to 
such a shock. Third, the cumulative effects of a TFP shock under each emissions policy for 
different economic and environmental variables are derived numerically. To the best of the 
author’s knowledge, this method has not been applied in any other environmental DSGE 
model before, and is another contribution of the current research. The numerical cumulative 
analysis enables a better understanding of the effects of the three specified emissions 
reduction policies over time on the Australian economy, while the steady state and the 
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graphic results indicate the non-stochastic and the short run dynamics of each policy 
respectively.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 6.2 presents the numerical results from the model 
under all scenarios and provides a comparison between the steady state values of 
environmental and economic variables. In Section 6.2 the graphical results of the model 
under different policies are presented and compared to investigate the impacts of emissions 
control policies on business cycles. The cumulative effects are provided in Section 6.3 to 
identify the gain or loss in economic and environmental variables over time. Section 6.4 
presents the results of an increasing emissions tax system, and Section 6.5 concludes the 
chapter.  
6.2. Steady State Numerical Results  
This section presents the steady state solution of the model under different scenarios. Results 
from the BAU scenario are used as the benchmark case with which to evaluate and compare 
outcomes from the implementation of various emissions pricing policies. The steady state 
value of a variable v  is the value that does not change over time, that is, vt = vt+1. This 
requires the model to be deterministic. To meet this condition the value for TFP should be set 
to a constant. For simplicity, it is assumed in this analysis that the TFP is equal to 1. A 
stability test is also conducted to ensure that the dynamics of the model are stable.  
First, the steady state solutions of selected economic and environmental variables under a 
variable emissions tax system are calculated. The results include the steady state emissions 
tax rate. As explained in Chapter 4 Section 4.6 the government chooses an optimal emissions 
tax path {pt} which maximises social welfare in terms of total discounted expected utility. 
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Thus, the tax rate represents the optimal emissions tax which maximises social welfare 
constrained to the behaviour of consumers and firms.21 
Thus, the tax rate takes account of all the benefits it would provide, and all the costs it would 
impose, for all sectors when there is no asymmetric information in the economy. This 
calculated tax is then used as a constant tax rate in the fixed tax regime. This approach can 
facilitate a comparison of fixed vs. variable tax policies since it imposes the same steady state 
tax rate on both fixed and variable emissions tax system scenarios, excluding any effects of a 
higher or lower fixed tax on the results, and, thereby, just shows the effects of a more rigid 
tax policy. 
Table 6.1 summarises the steady state levels of economic and environmental variables when 
the TFP is set equal to 1 under various policy scenarios. In order to conduct a comparison 
between various emissions pricing policies, BAU is considered as the baseline scenario and 
the others show deviations (in percentages) from this baseline scenario.22 Thus, the table 
shows the percentage differences of variables under various emissions tax and abatement 
subsidy policies relative to BAU. For example, the steady state of emissions under a fixed tax 
scenario (1.0357) is 6.48% less than that for the steady state of emissions under a BAU 
scenario (1.1075). The simulation results indicate that both of the flexible policies (i.e. a 
variable emissions tax and abatement subsidy) result in the same steady state outcomes. This 
finding is in line with existing theories when considering subsidies as negative taxes (Perman 
                                                     
21  As explained in Chapter 4 Section 4.6, the regulator observes the firm’s and household’s optimisation 
behaviour and chooses an optimal emissions tax path which maximises social welfare in terms of total 
discounted expected utility. This implies perfect foresight and complete information which are the underlying 
assumptions of this model. 
22 The numbers are just the solution and cannot be interpreted directly. This is why in DSGE modelling they 
calculate the percentage of deviation and interpret them. This helps to remove the effects of a large or small 
unit. 
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et al., 2003; Arimura and Iwata, 2015; Perman, 2015). Table 6.1 shows that while all 
emissions reduction policies can result in emissions reductions, emissions decline by more 
under a fixed emissions tax scenario. Emissions decrease by 6.45 per cent under the variable 
emissions tax (and subsidy policies) compared with the emissions steady state under a BAU 
scenario, and 6.48 per cent under the fixed tax policy in steady state compared with the 
emissions steady state under a BAU scenario.  
Thus, a rigid tax policy can result in better environmental outcomes in the new steady state. 
From this finding it can be concluded that a fixed tax policy can provide higher motivation to 
undertake emissions abatement, for example by shifting to renewable energies. A possible 
explanation for this is that in a variable tax (subsidy) regime the government sets an optimal 
tax (subsidy) based on the behaviour of the household and firm at the beginning of each 
period. Thus, the optimal tax (subsidy) internalises not only the damage cost but also the 
abatement cost that the firm will encounter in that period. This can provide a cost saving 
motivation for the firm to decrease abatement costs by decreasing the abatement level, and, 
instead, focus on production. The numerical results also confirm that the abatement level is 
lower under the variable tax (subsidy) scenario: the percentage of emissions abated by the 
firm is 6.25 compared with 6.28 in a fixed emissions tax policy.  
The desired outcome of such policies, emissions reduction, comes at an economic cost. For 
example, the better environmental outcome under a fixed tax policy is achieved at a higher 
economic cost (lower output, capital and consumption). The steady state outcomes reveal that 
under a fixed tax policy, capital has the highest reduction relative to the BAU scenario, 
decreasing by 4.77 per cent compared to a decreases of 4.70 per cent under a variable 
emissions tax (subsidy) program. As explained above, the values in brackets in Table 6.1 
 
170 
 
present the deviations (in percentages) of each economic and environmental variable from 
those of the BAU scenario. 
The larger reduction of capital under the fixed tax scenario is due to higher abatement, μ, 
which imposes higher abatement costs on the firm. As a result the firm has less resources to 
allocate to capital. The higher level of capital, as an input, in the flexible programs results in 
higher output. As the table shows, output experiences the lowest reduction relative to the 
BAU scenario under the variable tax (subsidy) policy, reducing by 1.53 per cent, while it 
drops by 1.55 per cent under the fixed tax policy. The lower GDP reduction in the variable 
tax (subsidy) regime results in higher income for households, and therefore the highest 
consumption, as GDP decreases by 0.61 compared to a 0.62 per cent reduction for the fixed 
tax regime.  
This research is also interested in finding the welfare costs of the three emissions reduction 
systems. To this end it follows the DSGE literature (Stockman, 2001; Lucas, 2003; Fischer 
and Springborn, 2011; Dissou and Karnizova, 2012; Annicchiarico and Di Dio, 2015) by 
calculating welfare costs as the percentage reduction in consumption which is needed under a 
given policy to make the consumer indifferent between a BAU scenario and that policy 
scenario. This definition is similar to the percentage change in consumption from the steady 
state value here, since utility is only a function of consumption. This leads us to obtain the 
highest welfare costs of 0.62 per cent under the fixed tax system, followed by 0.61 per cent 
for the variable tax (subsidy) policy.  
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Table 6.1: Steady-state levels when TFP equals 1 
Variable BAU Fixed Tax 
(% change 
from BAU) 
Variable Tax 
(% change from 
BAU) 
Emissions Reduction 
Subsidy 
(% change from BAU) 
Emissions (m) 1.1075 1.0357 
(-6.48%) 
1.0361 
(-6.45%) 
1.0361 
(-6.45%) 
 
Abatement (μ) 0 0.0628 0.0625 0.0625 
 
Output (y) 2.8335 2.7895 
(-1.55%) 
2.7902 
(-1.53%) 
2.7902 
(-1.53%) 
 
Capital (k) 32.0936 30.562 
(-4.77%) 
30.585 
(-4.70%) 
30.585 
(-4.70 %) 
 
Consumption (c) 2.1917 2.1782 
(-0.62%) 
2.1784 
(-0.61%) 
2.1784 
(-0.61%) 
 
Welfare Cost 0 0.62% 0.61% 0.61% 
Notes: The values in brackets present the deviations (in percentages) of each economic and 
environmental variable from those of the BAU scenario. 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Overall, the difference in results seems very minor in percentage terms. Such differences, 
however, are significant in terms of levels. For instance, the difference between the steady 
state solution of output in a fixed tax and a subsidy policy is 0.02 per cent. Converting this 
 
172 
 
small percentage into Australia’s GDP in 2015 sets it equal to about $325.8 million based on 
data published by Jegou and Rubini (2011). 
The above results can be summarised as follows: from an environmental point of view a fixed 
emissions tax should be chosen, while from a welfare and economic point of view a flexible 
system, such as a variable tax which is a proxy for a cap-and-trade scheme or an abatement 
policy, is a preferred instrument. Such a ranking is for the deterministic case when TFP is 
equal to 1 and no shock occurs. In order to obtain a solution in the presence of TFP shocks 
the model is log-linearised around the steady state values and the solutions are presented in 
the next section. The log-linearised model will be a good approximation of the original model 
which facilitates showing small fluctuations around steady state caused by a shock. 
6.3. Results with a Stochastic Shock  
In this section the model is solved by log-linearising around its steady state and the system of 
linear equations is solved analytically. To this end the Anderson-Moore Algorithm (AMA) is 
used which is a method for solving complex problems, including models that assume agents 
have perfect foresight and for asymptotic constraints on nonlinear models. The models used 
in the current study have these features. The AMA was developed at the Federal Reserve 
Board by Anderson and Moore (1985) and evaluated by Anderson (2008) and Anderson 
(2010). It is verified by them as an accurate and fast method of obtaining solutions. The log-
linearised model is coded to Matlab which is widely used in empirical studies in economics.  
The solution results can be shown graphically via two approaches: first, by using impulse 
response functions (IRFs) which show the response paths of economic and environmental 
variables over a period of time when a TFP shock occurs in the first period; second, by 
simulating business cycles in the economy by introducing a series of TFP shocks over a 
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period of time and analysing the responses of variables to those shocks. Both approaches are 
presented in this research. 
6.4. Impulse Response Function Simulation Results 
Figure 6.1 displays the response paths of four economic variables: TFP, the stock of 
productive capital for production purposes, output and consumption after a one-time 
transitory shock to TFP under all emissions reduction policies. As explained in Chapter 5, 
Section 5.2 the shock occurs exogenously in period one at the size of one standard deviation 
of εt, 0.0069, and decays at the rate of 0.98. As shown by Figure 6.1 such a positive shock 
results in a positive deviation of economic variables from their steady state values. The path 
of TFP is exogenous since the assumed innovation shock occurs exogenously. The simulation 
is run for 200 periods, equal to 50 years23 to investigate the effects of the shock on variables. 
The simulation results demonstrate that the responses of economic variables to a one period 
shock overlap under the variable emissions tax and subsidy scenarios and so are exactly the 
same.  The figure also shows that the responses of economic variables to a TFP shock are 
pro-cyclical; that is, they follow the same direction as the shock. 
The shock occurs in the first period and increases the productivity of capital which results in 
higher output at the same level of input. Thus, the peak of output happens in the same period 
as the TFP – the first period. The increase in the productivity of capital raises the firm’s 
demand for capital. However, the peak of capital does not occur during the first period since 
TFP is a flow variable while capital is a stock variable and, thus, it takes more time to adjust, 
about 45 periods which is equal to 11 years to reach its peak. The resource constraint 
                                                     
23 As explained in Chapter 5 Section 5.2 each time period is equivalent to a quarter of a year. 
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tttt zicy ++=  and capital accumulation ( ) t1tt ik1k +−= −δ  result in consumption being 
highly affected by output, capital and abatement costs: ( ) t1tttt zk1kyc −−+−= −δ .  
Figure 6.1: Impulse responses of economic variables to a TFP shock under a fixed emissions 
tax (FixedTax), variable emissions tax (VarTax) and abatement subsidy scenarios 
  
  
As shown by Figure 6.1 a positive TFP shock leads to an increase in consumption which 
highlights the key role of income in influencing consumption: an increase in income will 
increase consumption regardless of the direction of changes in other expenses (i.e. investment 
and abatement costs). Unlike output, however, the peak of consumption does not occur in the 
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first period but around period 30, equivalent to year 7, which shows that the dynamics of 
consumption change is affected by the adjustment path of capital stock. The results for the 
fixed tax scenario are a bit different from those of the variable emissions tax or subsidy due 
to a different response of the environmental variables. This is explained further below. 
The environmental effects of a positive TFP shock are presented in Figure 6.2. The figure 
shows the response path of abatement, emissions, abatement costs, variable emissions tax rate 
and abatement subsidy rate when the same TFP shock occurs. Like the economic effects, the 
environmental effects of a shock are the same under both the variable tax and subsidy 
programs but different under the fixed emissions pricing policy. The figure also shows that 
the impulse response function of abatement is pro-cyclical under the variable tax system and 
the subsidy system; that is, they follow the same direction as the shock, while it is counter-
cyclical under a fixed tax policy; that is, it follows the opposite direction to the shock. This is 
because under a fixed emissions tax scenario the only variable that affects the firm’s choice 
of abatement is the level of output in each period as the tax is a constant, γθmθθ −− = t
1
t21 py2 . In 
such a nonlinear function the signs of γ, θ1 and θ2 specify the direction of the relationship 
since the tax rate p is always positive. As explained in Chapter 5, Section 5.2, 1-γ represents 
the emissions elasticity of output, and thus, it is strongly positive and, calculated as 0.0975. 
Also, θ1 and θ2 determine the relationship between abatement and abatement cost and both 
are positive, calibrated to be 0.007 and 2.8 respectively. These positive parameters result in a 
negative relationship between abatement and output which means that a positive TFP shock, 
which increases output, leads to a decrease in abatement.  
Under a variable emissions tax scenario, however, the firm’s choice of abatement is affected 
not only by output but also by the emissions tax, as γθmθθ −= ttt21 yp2 . As is the case for the 
fixed tax, the relationship between abatement and output is negative. That is, abatement 
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decreases when output increases, while the abatement and tax relationship is positive. To 
investigate how the variable tax would be affected by a shock, the IRF of tax is simulated and 
also displayed in Figure 6.2. As shown by the figure, the response path of tax is pro-cyclical. 
Also, since the tax is a function of current and expected future consumption, it follows the 
consumption path and peaks in period 30, year 7. Therefore, an increase in TFP leads to an 
increase in output and tax. The tax increase motivates firms to decrease emissions by 
increasing abatement while the increase in productivity, and consequently output, signals 
firms to allocate resources to production rather than abatement. Thus, analytically, the change 
in abatement is ambiguous but the simulation result is remarkable: the output stimulus is 
more significant as soon as the shock occurs and the abatement decreases. As time passes the 
increase of the tax motivates firms to reduce their emissions and abatement increases to a 
positive deviation from steady state and peaks in period 60, year 15. 
Likewise, in a subsidy system, the relationship between abatement and output is negative 
while there is a positive relationship between abatement and the subsidy rate as ttt21 sy2 =
θmθθ
(see Figure 6.2). This simulation result reveals that the response path of abatement to a 
positive TFP shock is the same as it is in the case of a subsidy and a variable emissions tax 
system. Additionally, the response path to a subsidy is similar to that of a variable tax. That 
is, when a positive TFP shock occurs, the subsidy increases and peaks in period 30, in year 7, 
as it depends on consumption. The only difference is that the subsidy rate increases to a 
higher level than that of the tax rate. Also, like a variable tax regime, abatement drops sharply 
in period 1 as a result of the increase in output, but the increase in subsidy motivates firms to 
increase abatement and the rise in abatement continues to period 60, year 15, when it peaks. 
The response paths of abatement costs are also different for the three policies. In a fixed 
emissions tax system a positive TFP shock increases capital productivity which motivates the 
 
177 
 
firm to apply more units of capital. This implies that spending on abatement is more costly 
after the shock than before, though the tax rate has not been changed, and thus, the profit 
maximising firm would be motivated to spend more on capital and less on abatement. So 
abatement and, consequently, abatement costs, decrease. The simulation results show that 
under a variable emissions tax policy, the tax increases when a positive shock occurs.  
The higher tax rate motivates firms to decrease tax costs by reducing emissions, which can be 
done by increasing abatement at the same level of output, ( ) γm −−= 1ttt y1m . Also, the 
abatement response path follows the tax path peaks in period 30, year 7. The response of 
abatement costs under a subsidy policy is the same as it is under the variable emissions tax 
policy. A positive TFP shock increases the subsidy which motivates the firm to increase 
revenue from the abatement subsidy by increasing the abatement level. Thus, the abatement 
costs increase and peaks in period 30.  
The response of emissions in all regimes is determined by the responses of output and 
abatement. As explained above, while output increases under all scenarios, abatement 
decreases under the fixed emissions tax but increases under the variable emissions tax and 
subsidy scenarios. The simulation results show that emissions increase under all scenarios. 
This finding points to the important role of output in emissions. The higher abatement effort 
in the variable emissions tax and subsidy policies, however, results in a smaller emissions 
increase than under the fixed emissions tax policy. Emissions rise to a 0.07 per cent deviation 
from steady state in the variable emissions tax and subsidy policies compared with 0.09 per 
cent in the fixed emissions tax policy.  
Therefore, it can be concluded that a positive TFP shock highly motivates firms to increase 
production. A fixed emissions tax system loses its motivation as firms increase production 
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regardless of the environmental consequences, while a variable emissions tax or abatement 
subsidy system can significantly provide environmental incentives for firms to implement 
abatement efforts besides increasing production. This is due to the fact that in a fixed tax 
system the marginal cost of emissions remains unchanged, thus firms can increase pollution 
at the same cost while in a variable tax system a positive TFP shock increases the tax rate 
which persuades firms to decrease emissions. 
In summary, the outcomes in a stochastic framework and in the presence of a TFP shock 
provided significant results. The response paths of environmental variables under different 
emissions reduction scenarios were different in such a way that in a flexible system, such as 
for an emissions subsidy or variable tax policy, higher abatement efforts and, consequently, 
higher abatement costs and lower emissions can result. Higher abatement costs led to lower 
outputs under the flexible scenarios compared with those under a fixed tax policy. The 
difference between the IRF of output under a fixed tax scenario and under a variable tax 
(subsidy) was small which points to a minor role of abatement cost in total output, 
tttt zicy ++= , so that different abatement levels under different policies do not lead to 
noticeable changes in total outputs. 
6.5. Real Business Cycle Simulation Results 
Section 6.4 presented IRFs which indicated the responses of the economy under emissions 
tax and abatement subsidy policies when an exogenous and transitory shock occurs to TFP. 
In this section real business cycles are presented in which a series of exogenous shocks 
happen to TFP that produces output business cycles (i.e. expansions and recessions). Figure 
6.3 presents the simulation time paths of outputs in response to a series of TFP shocks. The 
simulation results include an expansion from period 20 to period 50 followed by a recession 
from period 50 to period 80 to cover both boom and recessionary periods in a business cycle. 
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In Figure 6.3 output levels in all scenarios are normalised to the BAU steady state level of 
output in order to facilitate policy comparison. As Figure 6.3 shows, implementing an 
emissions tax or an abatement subsidy policy affects the steady state level of output but not 
the path of its fluctuation. As shown previously in Figure 6.1 the output IRFs under a variable 
tax and subsidy overlap and is only marginally different from that under a fixed tax scenario.  
 
180 
 
Figure 6.2: Impulse responses of environmental variables to a TFP shock under fixed emissions tax (Fixed Tax), a variable emissions tax 
(FlexTax) and abatement subsidy scenarios 
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Likewise, the differences between the output business cycle simulations under a variable tax 
(and subsidy) and under a fixed tax scenario are very small as they overlap in Figure 6.3. 
Figure 6.3: Business cycle simulation of output under business-as-usual (BAU), fixed 
emissions tax (FixedTax), variable emissions tax (VarTax) and abatement subsidy (Sub) 
scenarios when levels are normalised to the BAU steady state level of output 
 
Figure 6.4 displays the cyclical simulation results for emissions. Again, the levels are 
normalised using the BAU steady state level of emissions. Three remarkable findings can be 
observed in the figure. First, the emissions path follows output under all scenarios. That is, 
emissions increase during expansion and decrease during recession. This is due to the fact 
that emissions are a by-product of production, and thus they follow output fluctuations. 
Second, all emissions reduction policies result in levels of emissions that are lower than those 
for BAU. Third: the path of emissions under emissions policies varies more than under BAU. 
To make the fluctuations easy to observe, for all scenarios, the emissions paths in terms of the 
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percentage deviations from steady state levels, rather than their actual levels, are shown in 
Figure 6.5.  
Figure 6.4: Business cycle simulation of emissions under BAU, fixed emissions tax 
(FixedTax), variable emissions tax (VarTax) and abatement subsidy (Sub) scenarios when 
levels are normalised to the BAU steady state level of emissions 
 
Note that the fluctuations of emissions are the same in Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.5. The scale of 
the vertical axis in the former is much wider, from 0.92 to 1.01, compared to the latter which 
range from -1% to 1%, making emissions fluctuations in Figure 6.4 look flatter. As Figure 
6.5 shows, emissions cyclical paths are exactly the same in both the variable emissions tax 
and abatement subsidy systems. However, the emissions path fluctuates more in a fixed tax 
system. This is due to the fact that during an output expansion, under a fixed tax policy, the 
marginal cost of producing emissions does not change, and firms would not be motivated to 
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make abatement efforts. In a variable emissions tax (or abatement subsidy) system, however, 
the tax (subsidy), or the cost of producing emissions (the benefit of making abatement), 
increases during an expansion. This motivates firms to decrease costs (increase benefits) by 
making abatement efforts. Therefore, emissions increase to a smaller extent in a variable tax 
or subsidy system than they do in the case of a fixed emissions tax system.  
The policy implications of such findings are significant: first, a variable emissions tax policy 
should be adjusted pro-cyclically to business cycles: the tax rate increases during expansions 
and decreases during recessions. This finding is consistent with Heutel (2012). A similar 
pattern is apparent for the abatement subsidy policy: the authority should adjust the subsidy 
to increase during expansions and decrease during recessions. Second, in order to achieve a 
lower emissions outcome the regulator can implement a variable emissions tax or abatement 
subsidy policy during periods of expansion and a fixed emissions tax during periods of 
recession.  
This section has indicated the response path of different environmental and economic 
variables to a one-time TFP shock. It has also shown how different emissions policies would 
affect Australia’s real business cycles and its emissions fluctuations. This research is also 
interested in calculating the cumulative effect of a TFP shock on economic and 
environmental variables under each emissions policy. Section 6.2 provided steady state 
values for each variable and this section described the responses of variables to the shock in 
terms of deviations from these steady state values. The next section provides a new approach 
to emissions pricing policy analysis when TFP shocks happen, by bringing Sections 6.2 and 
6.3 together and numerically calculating the cumulative gain or loss of each variable under 
different emissions pricing systems.  
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Figure 6.5: Business cycle simulation of emissions under BAU, fixed emissions tax 
(FixedTax), variable emissions tax (VarTax) and abatement subsidy (Sub) scenarios 
 
6.6. Numerical Results for Cumulative Effects  
This section attempts to calculate the total effects on key economic and environmental 
variables (in a dynamic context) of each emissions policy when a TFP shock happens. After 
presenting the IRFs of variables under the different emissions reduction programs, this 
section numerically calculates and compares graphically the changes shown by the IRFs. This 
is an issue not previously modelled or evaluated in other studies, and evaluating it is another 
major contribution of this study. To this end the cumulative effects of a positive TFP shock 
(i.e. the cumulative percentage deviation from steady state) on the economic and 
environmental variables are calculated. Such a cumulative effect is equal to the area under the 
IRF of a variable. Multiplying the cumulative effect by the steady state of that variable can 
express the total effects of the shock under an emissions reduction program.  
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This approach can capture not only the effects of emissions reduction programs on the steady 
state values of key variables, but also on the cumulative percentage deviation of those 
variables from their initial steady state values. As explained in Section 6.1, comparing the 
steady state values of variables under emissions reduction policies with those of BAU can 
reveal the long-term, deterministic impact of the policies. However, under uncertainty there is 
an adjustment process in which economic sectors adjust their decisions to the uncertainty and 
the cumulative impact of such an adjustment cannot be captured by just comparing the steady 
states. 
Table 6.2 shows the total, or cumulative, effects of various emissions reduction programs on 
economic and environmental variables when a positive, but temporary, TFP shock occurs. 
Using the BAU scenario as the benchmark, the difference between the cumulative effect of a 
TFP shock on a variable under various emissions reduction policies and the effect under BAU 
is displayed in brackets and shows the entire impact of the emissions reduction policy, not 
only in the steady state situation but also throughout the entire adjustment process. As Table 
6.2 shows, the cumulative effects under various emissions reduction policies over the entire 
adjustment period are significantly different from their steady state values, as presented in 
Table 6.1. To facilitate ease of comparison the steady state and cumulative results are jointly 
presented in Table 6.2. 
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Table 6.2: Cumulative effect of a positive TFP shock 
Variable BAU Fixed tax 
(% change 
from BAU) 
Variable tax 
(% change from 
BAU) 
Abatement subsidy 
(% change from BAU) 
Emissions (m) 
Steady state 
 
 
Cumulative 
 
1.1075 
 
 
0.0259 
 
1.0357 
(-6.48%) 
 
0.0214 
(-17.37%) 
 
1.0361 
(-6.45%) 
 
0.0184 
(-28.96%) 
 
1.0361 
(-6.45%) 
 
0.0184 
(-28.96%) 
Output (y) 
Steady state 
 
 
Cumulative 
 
2.8335 
 
 
0.6795 
 
2.7895 
(-1.55%) 
 
0.6529 
(-3.91%) 
 
2.7902 
(-1.53%) 
 
0.6469 
(-4.80%) 
 
2.7902 
(-1.53%) 
 
0.6469 
(-4.80%) 
Consumption (c) 
Steady state 
 
 
Cumulative 
 
2.1917 
 
 
0.5599 
 
2.1782 
(-0.62%) 
 
0.5503 
(-1.71%) 
 
2.1784 
(-0.61%) 
 
0.5457 
(-2.54%) 
 
2.1784 
(-0.61%) 
 
0.5457 
(-2.54%) 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
As discussed in Section 6.4 and shown in Figure 6.2, when a positive TFP shock happens the 
variable tax (subsidy) policy results in the highest abatement and thus the lowest emissions 
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compared to those under the fixed tax policy. This makes the accumulated changes in 
emissions (i.e. the area under the IRFs multiplied by the steady state of emissions) under the 
variable tax (subsidy) scenario smaller than the fixed tax scenario: -28.96% under a variable 
tax (subsidy) compared with -17.37% under a fixed tax. Therefore, although the variable tax 
(subsidy) leads to higher long-term steady state emissions, this policy can help the economy 
have the greatest cumulative emissions reduction when a positive TFP shock happens (i.e. 
during an output boom). 
The increase in abatement under a variable tax (subsidy) scenario results in an increase in 
abatement cost, zt, and, based on the resource constraint, tttt zicy ++= , results in a reduction 
in output. Thus, the cumulative decrease in output is highest under the variable tax (subsidy) 
policy, -4.80%, compared with that of the fixed tax policy of -3.91%. The higher cumulative 
output loss under the variable tax (subsidy) policy leads to a higher cumulative consumption 
loss of  -2.54% compared to that of the fixed tax policy of -1.71%.  
Comparing the cumulative and steady state results provides a significant result: a fixed tax 
policy can result in the largest emissions reduction but this occurs at a higher cost in terms of 
output loss when the economy is in a steady state situation. Allowing for economic 
fluctuations in the presence of TFP shocks, however, the flexible emissions pricing options, 
(a variable emissions tax or subsidy program), can result in a larger cumulative emissions 
reduction during an output expansion period This finding confirms the importance of 
considering the relationship between emissions and output business cycles in emissions 
reduction policy analysis, since the results for the deterministic steady state, which showed 
that a fixed emissions tax program results in the highest output loss, is different when one 
takes such a relationship into account. This is also consistent with Angelopoulos et al. (2010) 
who emphasised the importance of considering uncertainty in environmental policy analysis, 
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and that the choice of an environmental policy can be affected by the size as well as the 
sources of uncertainty.24 Having now provided a comparison between the emissions pricing 
programs applied in Australia the next section simulates the model under a fixed emissions 
tax policy when the tax increases incrementally each year.  
6.7. Increasing Fixed Tax Scenario Results 
The aim of this section is to simulate impacts arising from the Australian carbon tax program 
under which the previous Labor government planned to increase the tax rate by 2.5 per cent 
per year (Australian Government, 2011). The results can show the effects of a gradual and 
foreshadowed change in the tax rate in a fixed tax policy. The tax rate starts at the same rate 
as that for the fixed emissions tax policy used in the above section, which is equal to the 
steady state tax in a variable system as explained in Section 6.2. Since each period is set to a 
quarter the tax will rise by 2.5 per cent every four periods, or one year. The main difference 
between the fixed emissions tax model of the above sections and the model described here is 
that in the above model the source of variation was an unanticipated change in TFP, while 
here it is an anticipated change in the tax rate. It is anticipated since, as with the Australian 
carbon tax program, such changes were planned and publicly announced in the first period. 
This type of DSGE model is usually called a deterministic DSGE model in which the system 
is in an equilibrium state when agents learn about a change that is announced by the 
government, and they respond to such changes (Adjemian et al., 2014).  
In this section the model under a fixed tax scenario is used in which the tax is not constant 
over time and increases as a step function by 2.5 per cent every four periods, or one year. The 
simulation results arising from such an increase in the tax rate are presented in Figure 6.6 
                                                     
24 In this thesis uncertainty is specified as economic uncertainty in terms of TFP shocks which are the main 
source of economic fluctuations. 
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covering 16 periods, where each period is three months (i.e. a quarter of a year). Figure 6.6 
shows the path of three economic variables including emissions tax, capital and output, and 
the two environmental variables of abatement and emissions. The periods are shown on the 
horizontal axis and solution level of the variables is shown on the vertical axis. In order to 
display the responses of economic and environmental variables to such changes the levels are 
normalised by the first period value for each variable. 
The tax rate is normalised to 1 in the first period and increases by 2.5 per cent every four 
periods thereafter. This will increase the tax rate from 1 in the first period to about 1.09 at the 
end of period 16, in year 4, as shown by the figure. The rise in tax increases emissions costs 
which motivate the producer to decrease emissions by decreasing output and/or increasing 
abatement effort, since emissions are a function of output and abatement effort and therefore, 
the higher are tax rates the higher is the output reduction. Consequently, the demand for 
capital as a production input decreases and, thus, the capital response to the increase in the 
emissions tax follows the same pattern of output. The tax increase also results in abatement 
rising in the form of a step function like that of the tax, in which each step takes four periods 
or one year. This means that the increase in the tax rate can provide a greater incentive for 
firms to increase their abatement effort. The higher abatement results in a reduction in 
emissions.  
While a pre-announced increase in the emissions tax rate results in lower emissions and lower 
output, the size of reductions in output and emissions are notable: the reduction in output over 
four years is negligible from 1 to 0.9999992, which equals -8*10-5 of one per cent. Similarly, 
the decrease in capital is also very small from 1 to 0.9999962 or -3.8*10-4 of one per cent. 
The increase in abatement, however, is 4.75 per cent from 1 to 1.0475. This significant 
increase in abatement leads to a remarkable emissions decrease of -0.33 per cent, from 1 to 
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0.9967, in four years. From the negligible reduction in economic variables and the 
remarkable changes in environmental variables, it can be concluded that an increase in the 
emissions tax rate can significantly motivate polluters to decrease emissions and increase 
their abatement efforts, such as shifting to cleaner technologies and renewable energies, with 
very low additional costs for the economy in terms of output reduction. This is a significant 
finding of this thesis which implies that an increasing tax rate system can be considered as an 
effective instrument to meet international pledges. 
6.8. Summary 
This chapter has compared the impact of three emissions reduction policies: a fixed emissions 
tax, a variable emissions tax and an abatement subsidy, on the steady state values of selected 
economic and environmental variables using a numerical approach. The results for a 
stochastic case, when a TFP shock occurs, were also presented. In addition, this chapter used 
a new technique for policy analysis by numerically estimating the cumulative change in each 
variable under the different emissions pricing programs when a TFP shock happens. This 
technique has not previously been applied in any environmental DSGE study before and 
represents an important contribution of this thesis. Using this technique, the current research 
can provide a more accurate estimate of the costs of different emissions policies by capturing 
the dynamic nature of the adjustment process. Ignoring the impacts of economic shocks and 
simply focusing upon steady state results gives a limited and perhaps inaccurate indication of 
the impact of alternative emissions policies. 
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Figure 6.6: Path of variables when the tax rate is increased by 2.5% every four periods 
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The steady state results showed that a fixed emissions tax policy leads to larger emissions 
reduction but at the cost of greater output reduction and welfare cost than a variable 
emissions tax or abatement subsidy. In a stochastic situation, and in the presence of a TFP 
shock, the results are different. When a positive TFP shock occurs, the variable tax or subsidy 
policies can indeed encourage polluters to move to cleaner technologies such as renewable 
energies, while a fixed emissions tax system loses its motivating power as firms increase 
production regardless of the environmental consequences. This means that a variable tax or 
subsidy results in the highest cumulative emissions reduction during output expansion 
periods. This highlights the importance of considering the impacts of uncertainty in terms of 
TFP shocks in policy analysis. Therefore, the policy choice depends on the regulator’s 
perspective and priorities. If the regulator’s priority is to gain emissions reduction over a 
boom period, a flexible system such as an emissions subsidy or a variable emissions tax, a 
proxy for a cap-and-trade scheme, is the better option.  
The real business cycle results also showed that implementing an emissions tax or an 
abatement subsidy policy only affects the steady state level of output and not the path of 
output fluctuation, since all policies result in almost the same real business cycles. From an 
environmental point of view, however, they impact emissions fluctuations differently. 
Emissions fluctuate by more in a fixed tax regime than they do under a variable tax or 
subsidy regime. This implies that the regulator should set the variable emissions tax or 
subsidy to be pro-cyclical to business cycles: they increase during expansionary periods and 
decrease during recessionary periods. Also, in order to achieve the lowest emissions, the 
regulator can implement a variable emissions tax or abatement subsidy during expansion and 
a fixed tax during recessions.  
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This chapter also investigated the impact of an increasing emissions tax regime in which the 
tax increases by 2.5 per cent each year. This scenario was specified as being similar to the 
Australian carbon tax program under which the tax which was to increase by 2.5 per cent 
each year. The results indicated that the increase in the tax rate would lead to a decrease in 
output and higher tax rate levels would result in a sharper reduction in output. The size of 
reduction, however, is very low and almost equals zero. On the other hand, an increase in tax 
results in an increase in abatement and a reduction in emissions. Thus, a step function 
increasing the fixed tax can encourage producers to decrease emissions by increasing 
abatement effort, for example by shifting to cleaner energies, at negligible economic costs in 
terms of output reduction.  
The results presented in this chapter were based on the calibrated parameters specified in 
Chapter 5. The next chapter will conduct a sensitivity analysis to investigate the dependence 
of the findings on the values one of the key parameter, the emissions elasticity of output, 
which was the only parameter analysed by this research. Additionally, the policy implications 
of the findings from this chapter will be further elaborated in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 7  
Sensitivity Analysis and Policy Implications    
7.1. Introduction  
This research has indicated that emissions pricing programs can result in lower emissions by 
changing the abatement attitudes of firms. Without such a program, a profit maximising firm 
only considers the economic aspects of its activities and ignores the environmental side 
arising from emissions produced during production. With an emissions pricing policy, 
however, the government internalises the externality cost from emissions within the firm. In 
fact, with an emissions price policy the government can motivate the firm to take the 
environmental effects of their actions into account. The incentive is created by the cost that 
polluters must pay for each tonne of emissions they produce in an emissions tax system or the 
benefit the firm receives for reducing its emissions under an emissions reduction subsidy 
system. Thus, the cost effect of the emissions price can provide an incentive for polluters to 
reduce emissions. 
Additionally, this research discussed that the correlation between emissions and output, 
presented in Chapter 2 Section 2.6.2, transfers the economic fluctuations to emissions and 
results in emissions variation. Ignoring the fluctuations in emissions that inevitably occur as a 
consequence of economic fluctuations, and setting emissions reduction policies based only on 
the currently observed economic and environmental situation, the government may face 
undesired levels of emissions, and increase the risk of failing to reach emissions targets. To 
avoid this possibility the government should take emissions variations into consideration 
when setting policies and attempting to control and stabilise emissions.  
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The main purpose of this study has been to take cognisance of Australian emissions 
fluctuations due to economic changes and to examine the impact of different emissions taxes 
and subsidies. To this end a Real Business Cycle (RBC) model was applied under different 
emissions reduction scenarios in Chapter 6, focusing on the Australian economy. These 
scenarios were specified to imitate Australian emissions reduction programs over the past 
five years including: a business-as-usual (BAU) or no policy change scenario, a fixed 
emissions tax, a flexible emissions tax and abatement subsidy. Additionally, the impact of 
changes in the tax rate in a fixed tax policy were presented in Chapter 6 which resembled the 
former Australian carbon tax system, in which the carbon tax rate was designed to increase 
by 2.5 per cent per year.  
 This chapter discusses further how the results presented in Chapter 6 can be practically 
applied to stabilise emissions and obtain lower emission levels. Additionally, since the 
relationship between emissions and output strongly depends on the carbon intensity of 
production, it is expected that besides the emissions pricing policies, moving to less polluting, 
green production technologies can also help the government achieve its emissions reduction 
targets. In order to investigate how changes in the carbon intensity of production can assist in 
controlling and stabilising emissions, this chapter presents a sensitivity analysis relating to 
one of the model parameters, the elasticity of emissions to output (the γ parameter in the 
model presented in Chapter 6). A lower value of this elasticity indicates the adoption of 
production technology which is less polluting – that is, it produces the same level of output 
but at a lower emissions level. 
The numerical solution of the model presented in Chapter 6 Section 6.2 is represented here in 
Table 7.1, including the steady state solutions and cumulative changes in each variable. In 
order to conduct a comparison between emissions pricing policies, BAU is considered as the 
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baseline scenario and the others show deviations (in percentage terms) from this baseline 
scenario. As the table indicates, under all emissions pricing scenarios in the steady state 
situation abatement 25  increases, output decreases and, as a result, the emissions level 
decreases. The findings in the table indicate that the outcomes of a deterministic emissions 
policy analysis are completely different from the outcomes when the effects of business 
cycles are taken into account. Based on the deterministic steady state solution, a fixed 
emissions tax system can result in a lower emissions level than a flexible system. This applies 
to both variable taxes and an abatement subsidy programs. During a boom period as a result 
of a positive and transitory TFP shock, however, a flexible system can result in the highest 
cumulative emissions reduction. 
This is due to the fact that when economic variations as a result of a TFP shock occur, the 
responses from a variable tax or abatement subsidy follow the same direction as the shock. 
This issue is also shown in Figure 6.2. That is, a variable tax or subsidy rate increases 
(decreases) when a positive (negative) shock occurs. This implies that the regulator should set 
the variable emissions tax or subsidy to be pro-cyclical to business cycles, so that they 
increase during expansions and decrease during recessions. When a positive shock occurs, 
output and consequently emissions, tend to increase, and if the government increases the tax 
or subsidy it can provide an incentive for a firm to get involved in emissions reduction 
activities. On the other hand, under the fixed tax program, the tax rate, or the marginal cost of 
emissions, remains unchanged when a TFP shock happens which means that the firm can 
increase its emissions without incurring greater costs. Therefore, the firm does not have an 
incentive to increase abatement efforts and emissions increase to a higher level than they 
would under a variable tax or subsidy policy. In other words, as shown by Table 7.1, although 
                                                     
25 Recall that emissions are a function of output and abatement, ( ) ( )ttt yh1m m−= , in which 0≤ µt ≤1 is the 
fraction of emissions abated in period t. 
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a fixed tax system leads to the lowest steady state level of emissions, in the presence of a 
positive TFP shock it results in the highest cumulative emissions over boom periods.  
Table 7.1: Cumulative effect of a positive TFP shock 
Variable BAU Fixed tax 
(% change 
from BAU) 
Variable tax 
(% change from 
BAU) 
Abatement subsidy 
(% change from 
BAU) 
Emissions (m) 
Steady state 
 
 
Cumulative 
 
1.1075 
 
 
0.0259 
 
1.0357 
(-6.48%) 
 
0.0214 
(-17.37%) 
 
1.0361 
(-6.45%) 
 
0.0184 
(-28.96%) 
 
1.0361 
(-6.45%) 
 
0.0184 
(-28.96%) 
Output (y) 
Steady state 
 
 
Cumulative 
 
2.8335 
 
 
0.6795 
 
2.7895 
(-1.55%) 
 
0.6529 
(-3.91%) 
 
2.7902 
(-1.53%) 
 
0.6469 
(-4.80%) 
 
2.7902 
(-1.53%) 
 
0.6469 
(-4.80%) 
Consumption (c) 
Steady state 
 
 
Cumulative 
 
2.1917 
 
 
0.5599 
 
2.1782 
(-0.62%) 
 
0.5503 
(-1.71%) 
 
2.1784 
(-0.61%) 
 
0.5457 
(-2.54%) 
 
2.1784 
(-0.61%) 
 
0.5457 
(-2.54%) 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
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The simulation of emissions in real business cycles26 was shown in Chapter 6 Section 6.2 and 
is displayed here again in Figure 7.1. The figure reveals that emissions fluctuate more in a 
fixed tax regime than they do under a variable tax or subsidy. As explained above, this is 
because under a variable emissions tax or subsidy program the change in the tax and subsidy 
rate will provide more of an incentive for firms to control emissions than a fixed tax program, 
and so emissions fluctuate less under a variable tax or subsidy scenario. Thus, during 
expansion (recession), emissions would increase (decrease) to the highest (lowest) value 
under a fixed emissions tax scenario. This implies that in order to stabilise emissions a 
variable emissions tax or an abatement subsidy can help. Additionally, if the government’s 
target is to achieve the lowest emissions the regulator should implement a variable emissions 
tax or abatement subsidy during periods of expansion and a fixed tax during periods of 
recession. How can this approach be implemented in practice by the government to stabilise 
emissions? This question is addressed in this chapter.  
The remainder of chapter is structured as follows. Section 7.2 provides a sensitivity analysis 
of the results presented in Chapter 6 relating to the emissions intensity parameter. Section 7.3 
discusses the main policy implications of the current study, including an explanation of the 
difference between environmental policy rules and discretion. Section 7.4 summarises the 
chapter.  
 
                                                     
26 Real business cycles are generated by a series of exogenous TFP shocks which result in economic expansions 
and recessions. 
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Figure 7.1: Emissions during expansion and recession periods under BAU, fixed emissions 
tax (FixedTax), variable emissions tax (VarTax) and abatement subsidy (Subsidy) scenarios 
 
7.2. Sensitivity Analysis  
As explained in Section 7.1 this chapter provides a sensitivity analysis relating to the 
elasticity of emissions to output in order to investigate whether changes to this parameter can 
help in emissions stabilisation. This section presents a sensitivity analysis only for the 
elasticity of emissions to output, since only this parameter can capture the effects of moving 
to less polluting technologies, such as renewable energies and green technologies, and 
emissions stabilisation. Recall that the elasticity of emissions to output is shown by γ−1  in 
the emissions function ( ) ( )ttt yh1m m−=  where ( ) γ−= 1tt yyh . This research assumes that 
11 ≤− γ  which implies that the rate of increase in emissions is less than or equal to the rate 
of increase in output, but not greater than it (Heutel, 2012). The result of this sensitivity 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Period (Quarter)
D
ev
at
io
n 
fro
m
 S
te
ad
y 
S
ta
te
 (%
)
 
 
BAU(m)
FixedTax(m)
VarTax(Subsidy)(m)
 
201 
 
analysis reveals how progress in developing and applying environmentally friendly 
technologies, such as shifting to renewable energies which result in lower emissions for the 
same level of output and abatement, can influence the effectiveness of emissions reduction 
policies in the presence of shocks. 
As explained in Chapter 5 Section 5.2, this thesis calibrated the parameters to the existing 
literature except for the elasticity of emissions to output which was not calculated in previous 
studies. Hence, it is the only parameter estimated by the current research. To this end data on 
Australia’s emissions and output was collected 27  and 1-γ was estimated to be equal to 
0.0975.28 A lower value of this elasticity indicates moving to cleaner production technology, 
and producing the same level of production at a lower emissions level. Thus, in this section, 
this elasticity is reduced to two lower coefficients 0.07 and 0.04 in order to capture the effects 
of moving to less polluting production technologies.  
The sensitivity simulation results of emissions during expansionary and recessionary periods 
under a variable emissions tax (or abatement subsidy) scenario are displayed in Figure 7.2.29 
Figure 7.3 also shows emissions during expansionary and recessionary periods under a fixed 
emissions tax scenario. As both figures show, a lower elasticity, which represents lowering 
the carbon intensity of production, can reduce emissions fluctuations. This is because with a 
lower carbon intensity, the connection between emissions and output decreases and, thus, an 
increase in output still results in an increase in emissions but the increase is smaller. The 
sensitivity of the model to the emissions intensity parameter is nonlinear in a way that the 
                                                     
27 As was explained in Chapter 5 Section 5.2 and shown by Appendix A.1, this coefficient is calculated as the 
regression of the log of emissions on the log of output. 
28 This implies that a one unit increase in log (y) will result in an increase in log (e) of 0.0975 units.  
29 As discussed in Chapter 6, Section 6.2, based on theory and under a full information situation, both a variable 
emissions tax and subsidy policy result in the same outcome which was also obtained in the results presented in 
Chapter 6 Sections 6.1 and 6.2, as well as in the sensitivity analysis here. 
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effects of moving to green technologies (i.e. a lower emissions intensity parameter) is more 
when emissions variation is greater.30 Therefore, moving to cleaner production technologies 
can significantly help the government to stabilise emissions.  
Figure 7.2: A sensitivity analysis of emissions during output expansion and recession under a 
variable emissions tax/subsidy policy to the emissions elasticity of output 
 
 
                                                     
30 This is due to the fact that the emissions intensity parameter is specified as an exponent in the model. 
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Figure 7.3: A sensitivity analysis of emissions during output expansion and recession under a 
fixed emissions tax policy to emissions elasticity of output
 
A comparison between these policies is also conducted and the results are presented in Figure 
7.4. As the figure indicates, although a lower emissions elasticity (i.e. 0.04) reduces the 
magnitude of variations in emissions it is still the case that under a fixed tax scenario 
emissions are higher (lower) during output expansion (recession) than they are under a 
variable emissions tax or subsidy. This implies that the main finding of Chapter 6 is not 
sensitive to the elasticity of emissions: a variable tax or subsidy program can assist in 
stabilising emissions, and in order to achieve the lowest emissions the regulator should 
implement a variable emissions tax or abatement subsidy during periods of output expansion 
and a fixed tax during recessions. 
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Figure 7.4: Emissions impulse during output expansion and recession under a fixed emissions 
tax and a variable emissions tax/abatement subsidy policy when the emissions elasticity of 
output is reduced to 0.04 
 
 
The response path of output and consumption, however, is not sensitive to the parameter 1-γ 
which means that by moving to cleaner technologies, the Australian economy can maintain 
business cycles while experiencing smaller fluctuations in emissions. This implies that in 
order to achieve emissions reduction targets the government should apply not only an 
emissions pricing program but should also attempt to influence the emissions elasticity of 
output. To this end, Australian policy makers should pay more attention to structural changes 
in the production sector by encouraging the adoption of available cleaner technology and 
supporting innovation and creativity by increasing investment in new technologies. In order 
to progress technology, Australia can benefit from international collaboration to accelerate 
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movement towards the adoption of lower carbon intensity technologies (Department of the 
Environment, 2015a).  
Upgrading current technology and implementing structural changes could significantly affect 
the Australian environment, since current production technology is heavily dependent on 
burning fossil fuels. Electricity generation technology, for example, is responsible for about 
one-third of emissions produced in Australia, as shown in Figure 2.1 and represented here in 
Figure 7.5. This is due to the heavy reliance of electricity generation on fossil fuels. Key 
sources of electricity generation are displayed in Table 7.2. As the table shows, more than 85 
per cent of Australia’s electricity was generated by fossil fuels in 2013-14 while 42.6 per cent 
was generated from burning black coal Department of Industry and Science (2015). These 
numbers highlight that the Australian production sector, especially electricity, needs more 
support to improve and accelerate the transformation to renewable energy technologies. 
Many other countries, however, are seriously pursuing changes in energy systems towards 
“zero pollution”, especially in the electricity sector. Denmark is a good example. It has had a 
carbon tax since 1992 (Sumner et al., 2011) and has been successfully shifting to renewable 
resources. Breaking a world record for wind power in 2015, Denmark now generates 42 per 
cent of its electricity requirements from wind turbines (Neslen, 2016). This is a significant 
step towards achieving the government’s aim of having fossil fuel independent electricity and 
heating by 2035 and a fossil fuel independent energy system by 2050 (Danish Goverenment, 
2011). The industrial park in the Kalundborg district of Denmark is also another example of 
moving towards zero pollution. Not only developed countries such as Denmark, but also 
developing countries including China and India have been accelerating their movement 
towards renewable energy. China and India increased their investment in energy efficiency 
and renewable energy by 17 and 23 per cent respectively in 2015 (Buckley, 2016).  
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Figure 7.5: A Comparison of emissions sources in Australia in 2014 
 
Note: “LULUCF” and “Fugitive” refer to “land use, land use change and forestry” and 
“industrial fugitive activities including extraction and production of oil and natural gas” 
respectively. 
Source: Australia’s emissions projections 2014–15, p. 9. 
Table 7.2: Australian electricity generation by fuel type 
 
Source: Department of Industry and Science (2015), Australian Energy Update, p.21  
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To sum up, the policy implications of the sensitivity analysis is that the government needs to 
influence the elasticity of emissions to output to decrease emissions fluctuations. 
Encouragement of greener technology can help the government to achieve emissions 
reduction targets without adversely impacting output and jobs. By stabilising emissions the 
government can avoid undesired variations in emissions as a result of economic fluctuations. 
This requires both national and international collaboration strategies to decrease the 
dependence of production technologies on fossil fuels, and it also requires finding new, 
cleaner technologies. This finding is in line with Stern (2007) who suggests that the 
government must consider three elements, which should be applied simultaneously, when 
designing such policies: a carbon price, a technology policy and the removal of barriers to 
behavioural change, as explained in Section 2.2. In the next section the main policy 
implications of the findings of this thesis, which were presented in Chapter 6 and summarised 
in Section 7.1, are discussed. 
7.3. Policy Implications 
This research has provided a policy analysis of Australian emissions reduction programs. To 
this end three policies were specified in a way that resembles the programs designed/ 
implemented in Australia, including a carbon tax and Emissions Reduction Fund. However, 
there are several differences between the scenarios in this research and the Australian 
programs. These differences make it difficult to ascribe the results from an abatement subsidy 
scenario to the Emissions Reduction Fund program. Therefore, before discussing the policy 
implications from the findings of the current research, these differences are clarified first. The 
discussions of the differences, as well as the policy implication of the thesis are backed up by 
related studies. 
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One of the biggest differences relates to the time frame of this policy, which is currently 
designed to continue for only five years starting from 2015. Its aim is to reduce Australia’s 
emissions by 5 per cent below the 2000 level by 2020 (Roson, 2013). This implies that even 
if the program achieves the 2020 emissions reduction goal it will not be able to address the 
long-term global warming problems of Australia. Chapter 2 Section 2.6.1 pointed to such 
problems including droughts, floods, tropical cyclones, heatwaves, bleaching of the Great 
Barrier Reef and bushfires across Australia. Moreover, this would be contrary to the claim 
made by Stern (2007) that a successful emissions scheme requires that society believe that the 
government reflects its wishes when setting a policy, and that the policy will continue into the 
long run and not be reversed with a change of government or policymakers.  
Not only is the long-term impact of the Emissions Reduction Program questionable, but its 
short-term effectiveness is also uncertain. For instance, Roson and van der Mensbrugghe 
(2012) applied a Computable General Equilibrium model and showed that the budget 
allocated to the Emissions Reduction Fund scheme is half the amount required to meet the 
target of reducing emissions by 5 per cent below the 2000 level by 2020. Moreover, there are 
several criticisms relating to the adoption of a subsidy policy, including the fact that the cost 
of the program is directly imposed on tax payers while polluters receive the benefits 
(Maddison and Rehdanz, 2011).  
Comparing the carbon tax and Emissions Reduction Fund programs Roson and van der 
Mensbrugghe (2012) argue that the emissions tax system is straightforward to implement as 
polluters pay for the actual emissions they produce while with an abatement system the 
government may pay for abatements some of which will occur anyway. For instance, a 
decrease in electricity demand can result in a reduction in emissions from coal fired 
electricity generators while the firm makes no abatement effort.  
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Not only the distribution cost of the program but also the motivation that the program is 
supposed to provide to polluters can be questioned, as the outcome of the second auction in 
4-5 November 2015 showed. About 129 contracts were signed to reduce emissions by about 
45.5 million tonnes of CO2 equivalents. Figure 7.6 shows the outcomes. The figure classifies 
the emissions reduction projects based on the method of abatement into seven categories as 
explained below (Australian Government, 2015b). 
The first is the vegetation category which includes reforestation, revegetation and the 
protection of native forest or vegetation that is at imminent risk of clearing. The second is 
programs which reduce savannah burning in fire management across savannah regions in the 
north of Australia. The third is the agriculture category which includes management to reduce 
methane emissions from agricultural products including cattle, pigs, fertilising irrigated 
cotton and soil carbon. The fourth category is energy efficiency. This covers projects that 
reduce the consumption of electricity and natural gas. The fifth category is landfill and waste 
management. This refers to projects that decrease emissions through the operation of landfill 
and/or alternative waste treatment facilities. The sixth category is transport measures and it 
includes schemes which reduce emissions from air, land and sea transport. The seventh 
category consists of projects that reduce fugitive emissions from industrial activities 
including extraction and the production of oil and natural gas.  
Figure 7.6 reveals that 25.6 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent emissions reduction, equal to 
more than 56 per cent of abatement which is committed under contracts, is going to be 
obtained by means of the vegetation category including reforestation, revegetation and the 
protection of native forest or vegetation that is at imminent risk of clearing (Australian 
Government, 2015c). These activities are classified as “land use, land use change and 
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forestry” (LULUCF) in the classification of the sources of emissions and is responsible for 
only three per cent of Australian emissions as shown in Figure 7.5.  
Figure 7.6: Outcomes of the second auction of the Emissions Reduction Fund held in 
November 2015, by method 
 
Source: Clean Energy Regulator website, Australian Government (2015a) 
Comparing other abatement contracts signed under the second auction in November 2015 
also reveals that more than 87 per cent of abatement will be achieved in the vegetation, 
savannah burning, agriculture, and landfill and waste categories. These activities are 
categorised into three sources of emissions including agriculture, LULUCF and waste in 
Figure 7.5 and produce only 20 per cent of Australian emissions. This means that the 
contributions of major Australian polluters, including electricity, transport and industrial 
processes to the Emissions Reduction Fund program is only 13 per cent while they together 
produce 80 per cent of emissions. This implies that the motivation provided by the Australian 
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Emissions Reduction Fund program may not be strong enough for major polluters to be 
involved in emissions reduction activities.  
After discussing the basic differences between the Australian Emissions Reduction Fund 
program and the abatement subsidy scenario applied in the current research, the implications 
of the results of this study are then reviewed. This thesis has addressed how Australia’s 
emissions reduction policy should be adjusted to the country’s business cycle in order to 
achieve lower levels of emissions, and to stabilise emissions. This question has not been 
previously addressed in the literature, and it is the main focus and contribution of the current 
study.  
The results of adopting an emissions pricing policy to business cycles showed that an 
abatement subsidy, or a variable emissions tax, can assist in stabilising emissions. However, 
in order to achieve a lower overall emissions outcome, the regulator should choose a variable 
emissions tax or abatement subsidy policy during the expansionary phase of the business 
cycle and a fixed emissions tax during the recessionary phase of the business cycle. But how 
can this be applied in practice by policy makers? To answer this question the difference 
between policy ‘rules’ and ‘discretion’ must first be clarified. These concepts can play a 
critical role in the implementation of environmental policies, so this thesis devotes a 
subsection to a discussion of them. 
7.3.1. Rules and Discretion in Emissions Reduction Policies  
The difference between policy rules and discretion was first discussed by Kydland and 
Prescott (1977). They pioneered the discussion of differences between policy rules and 
discretion and how government should implement both of them to obtain its targets. Focusing 
on monetary policy they discuss how government should evaluate alternative policies and 
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select the one which matches its targets the best. There are inherent imperfections in the 
ability of governments to implement desirable economic policies since different sectors of the 
economy make optimisation decisions based on both current policies and expected future 
policies, but their expectations about future policies may be different from the government’s 
plans, or they may be affected by uncertainties. This can be due to the fact that even a 
benevolent government may have an incentive to diverge from its stated intentions. 
To obtain credibility and influence the private sector’s expectations, policy makers must be 
committed to their policies to ensure that the private sector firms believe that the policies will 
continue into the future, and that they will therefore take the policies into account when 
shaping their expectations. In other words, an optimal policy rule should be time-consistent to 
be credible. But even with consistent policies the perceptions of the private sector may not be 
the same as the government’s, since the private sector sets its expectations based on the 
government’s incentives and polices but may not believe that the government will implement 
policies and retain them over a significant period of time (a situation of relevance in the 
context of Australia).  
A policy maker can also use discretion. Tabellini (2005) defines discretion as making policies 
sequentially over time. Goulder et al. (1999) provides another definition for it as being when 
a monetary authority is free to act based on its own judgments. Discretionary behaviour 
would suffer from inconsistency and thus a lack of credibility. To obtain credibility policy 
makers should be committed to policy rules and avoid inconsistency. Following simple fixed 
rules, however, may not always be useful. In the case of monetary policy, for example, 
Tabellini (2005) argues that an international agreement made in regard to monetary policy, 
such as fixing the exchange rate, could increase the credibility of such a policy. On the other 
hand, non-contingent rules, such as a fixed exchange rate or inflation rate, would not be 
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desirable since such rules would result in larger fluctuations in output (Bouman et al., 2000). 
Additionally, and in reality, policy makers have an incentive to deviate from the rule, or they 
may learn new information which necessitates updating policy rules. Thus, policy rules 
should be flexible. But how can governments convince the private sector to believe in its 
policies if they are flexible?  
Clean Energy Regulator (2016) provides a possible answer to this question by showing that 
monetary policy should be delegated to a conservative and independent institution (i.e. a 
central bank) that would make it possible to obtain both credibility and flexibility. This idea 
became the fundamental motivation for a number of countries to implement institutional 
reform of monetary policy frameworks including Sweden, New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom. The reforms have focused mostly on increasing the independence of central banks 
in implementing policies in order to achieve objectives including desired inflation rates. 
These objectives were also specified more clearly and in more detail by these countries 
(Bouman et al., 2000). Another solution is provided by Kydland and Prescott (1977) who 
suggest that the policy maker should clearly specify its policy rules, but also take into account 
the circumstances that may result in a modification in policies and specify possible deviations 
from policy rules under defined circumstances. 
In the case of environmental policies a flexible and credible policy system is also required. 
One of the main reasons for this are the different types of uncertainty related to the cost and 
benefits of environmental policies which were discussed in detail in Chapter 2 Section 2.5. A 
similar issue is also highlighted by Dissou (2005). Providing a policy analysis regarding rules 
and discretion, they discuss policy rules that may not even result in the best solution in 
environmental policies due to uncertainty relating to the actual costs and benefits of 
abatement. If the government sets the policy and remains committed to it in future even when 
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it gains new information on abatement costs and benefits, then the policy may not reflect the 
actual costs and benefits and thus, it may lose its effectiveness.  
Tarui and Polasky (2005) also show that when uncertainty about climate change damage is 
large, discretion is preferred to rules. The idea of having flexible environmental policies 
which change over time has come to be of significant interest to researchers. Several studies 
have analysed emissions reduction policies which change when new technologies are adopted 
(Kennedy and Laplante, 2000; Tarui and Polasky, 2005). Others bring uncertainty into 
account and develop systems in which policy makers change their policies when they learn 
about abatement costs and damages (Dwyer Jr, 1993; Thampapillai and Sinden, 2013; Fusion 
Media Limited, 2016; Thampapillai, 2016).  
Incorporating these concepts into the findings of the current research requires that the 
difference between a ‘policy’ and an ‘instrument’ be clarified first. Goulder et al. (1999) 
argues that a “policy means a plan of action or a strategy. A policy may either be the outcome 
of some process or it may be a plan designed specifically to further some goals.” To 
implement a policy, an instrument is required. Dwyer also defines policy instruments as “the 
tools manipulated to produce the desired outcomes.” Applying these definitions to 
environmental policies, reducing emissions is a policy while a tax or subsidy is an instrument. 
In the environmental literature, similar definitions have also been used. For instance, both 
emissions taxes and abatement subsidies are classified as market-based instruments (Perman 
et al., 2003; Bouzaher et al., 2015). Therefore, a key finding of this research is to show which 
instruments should be applied during different stages of a business cycle in order to obtain 
the best outcome in terms of lower emissions.  
This research suggests that governments should develop emissions reduction programs based 
on where the economy is on the current business cycle, so if the government sets an 
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emissions reduction policy during a boom (recession), it should implement a subsidy policy 
or a variable emissions tax (fixed tax). In order to observe the current position in the business 
cycle the government needs to review recent and current fluctuations in economic variables 
and concurrent or leading indicators such as employment.  
This conclusion might raise the question of how the government, in the real world, can 
change abatement policies instantly due to changes in business cycles. There are three points 
to answer this question: 1. as the impulse responses in Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2 show, the 
effect of a shock remains in the economy for a long period and it takes about 50 years for the 
effect of a TFP shock to completely disappear. 2. Some variables, such as output, change and 
reach their peak as soon as the shock happens while for the others it takes several periods to 
reach their peak. For example, it takes about 15 years after the shock happens for abatement 
under a variable tax or subsidy policy to reach their maximum. 3. In the real world, the 
government can learn about a TFP shock by observing the changes in output which implies 
that the time of learning about the shock might be a few periods after it has happened. But the 
government can still have enough time to make the right decision since the effect of the shock 
remains in the economy for several years and, based on the impulse response function of the 
key variable of abatement, polluters will be motivated to do abatement for more than a 
decade after a shock occurs. Therefore, the government should make the right policy as soon 
as it observes the shock, and not as soon as the shock happens, and keep the policy for about 
15 years, or until it learns about another shock. 
These sources can also be used to predict, roughly, the future position of the economy in the 
business cycle, and, consequently, the changes that may need to be made to emissions 
reduction policies. Then the government should clearly state the current program as well as 
the potential changes that may happen to the program in the future due to variations in the 
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business cycle. Such an announcement can form the basis of the private sector’s expectations 
based on the current program, situations which would result in modifications of the program, 
and, consequently, continuation of the current program if those specified situations do not 
occur. In other words, in order to gain credibility, policy makers need to convince the private 
sector that they are committed to obtaining their policy targets and make their policies a part 
of an international agreement such as the Kyoto Protocol to lock the government into an 
international agreement that cannot be changed unilaterally.  
While sticking to one instrument may increase the chance of convincing the private sector, it 
does not necessarily mean that using different instruments will undermine credibility of a 
policy. The government only needs to reassure the private sector, by being committed to the 
current program and announcing changes in advance, that it is committed to reducing 
emissions with the current program, for example a fixed tax policy, or a planned future 
program. The prior announcement of future changes to programs can provide the private 
sector with the opportunity to modify their expectations about emissions policies and make 
abatement decisions.  
Australian policy makers can learn more from the rules and discretion concepts as explained 
in this section regarding the credibility of emissions reduction policies. To gain credibility, 
there needs to be cross-party consensus on the issue, otherwise a new government could 
change direction completely. As reviewed in Chapter 2 Section 2.7 the implemented 
emissions reduction programs in Australia have fluctuated significantly over the last four 
years. These changes are due to the different attitudes of policy makers regarding the 
importance, costs and benefits of emissions control policies in Australia. This lack of 
consensus between the major political parties has exerted a negative effect on the credibility 
of emissions reduction policies in such a way that the Australian people cannot readily 
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anticipate the future impact of such policies, and many do not even believe in the current 
programs. This is due to the fact that the arguments for emissions policies have not been well 
articulated in Australia. For instance, Jotzo et al. (2012) conducted a survey in 2012 when the 
carbon tax program was in operation and found that 40% of Australian-based carbon pricing 
experts working for large emitters, the finance industry and other organisations expected that 
the tax program would be repealed and 80% of respondents expected that the tax system 
would be re-introduced in 2020.  
Such disbelief is due to the diverse and conflicting information that has been broadcast to 
Australians by the major Parties, which has resulted in uncertainty as there appears to be no 
consensus on this issue between them. In fact, environmental issues in Australia seem to have 
become a politically-driven rather than a science-driven issue. For example, the Gillard Labor 
government introduced a carbon tax in 2012 but the subsequent Tony Abbott-led Liberal-
National Coalition government severely criticised it, referring to it as “toxic” to the 
Australian economy (Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering, 
2014). The Liberal Party also argued that Australia could enjoy a better economy by 
repealing the carbon tax and replacing it with the Emissions Reduction Fund program which 
can provide “a better way to reduce emissions than by imposing a tax that increases 
energy costs for businesses and households” (Roson, 2013).  
As Jotzo et al. (2012) also explained, such uncertainty is likely to negatively affect the 
private sector’s behaviour, including their investment decisions. This highlights the necessity 
of reducing uncertainty and, consequently, increasing the credibility of emissions reduction 
policies. To this end a meeting should be held in which all parties discuss their points of 
view, review Australia’s emissions structure and commitment, set the targets, choose the 
programs and make themselves committed to them regardless of their position in each 
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election. This consensus does not look possible right now in Australia. Perhaps it is important 
to convince voters of this need and then, through the electoral system, force the parties to 
respond. This can reduce consistency problems, convincing the private sector that 
government is committed to its policies and this will increase the credibility of emissions 
reduction policy. 
A similar idea has been recently highlighted by the Business Council Chief Executive 
Jennifer Westacott, who called for consensus on emissions reduction programs. She believes 
that Australia needs national and bipartisan energy and climate change policies, whenever 
possible, and stated that “Australia needs durable, national, integrated climate change and 
energy policies capable of delivering Australia’s 2030 emissions reduction target, at lowest 
possible cost, while maintaining competitiveness and growing Australia’s future economy” 
(Business Council of Australia, 2016). Recently, as explained in Chapter 1 Section 1.1, the 
Australian government specified new emissions reduction goals and pledged itself to reduce 
per capita emissions by 50 to 52 per cent and by 54–56 per cent in terms of emissions 
intensity between 2005 and 2030 (Department of the Environment, 2015a). 
7.4. Summary  
This chapter has complemented the results presented in Chapter 6 by conducting a sensitivity 
analysis and elaborating upon policy implications. The sensitivity analysis indicated that the 
elasticity of emissions to output can affect emissions and a reduction in this parameter, which 
captures moving to cleaner technologies, decreases emissions fluctuations without a loss of 
output. This implies that the government can target this parameter by lowering the 
dependence of Australian production technology on fossil fuels, as has been done by 
Denmark through its programs and achievements which were explained in Section 7.2, and 
also by supporting innovation and creativity in terms of financial support of projects with the 
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aim of improving accessibility to green technologies and reducing their price. These changes 
require international collaboration. They are likely to be more successful when Australia 
commits itself to an international agreement which exerts more pressure to conform. If 
Australia acts unilaterally it is more likely to change its policy later on. 
Furthermore, the policy implications of the results presented in Chapter 6 imply that a 
flexible emissions pricing system such as a variable tax or an abatement subsidy program can 
help the government to stabilise emissions. Moreover, in order to achieve the lowest 
emissions the government can get the benefit of a fixed tax during periods of recession and a 
variable emissions tax or abatement subsidy policy should be implemented during periods of 
expansion. To investigate the credibility of such findings, the differences between a policy 
rule and discretion, as discussed by Kydland and Prescott (1977), were clarified here. It was 
explained that credibility means that the private sector believes in the policy maker’s program 
and takes the current and future impact of such programs into account when making 
decisions.  
Setting consistent policies can increase credibility but, in reality, policy makers may need to 
deviate from them especially in uncertain economic environments. This issue is highlighted 
in the literature, as several studies suggest that environmental policies should be modified 
when cleaner technologies arrive, or when the government learns new information about the 
costs and benefits of emissions reduction policies and uncertainties decrease.  
Additionally, the difference between a policy and an instrument should be clarified when it 
comes to environmental policies. Reducing emissions is a policy while a tax or subsidy is an 
instrument. Adopting these concepts in this research implies that the government should set 
an emissions reduction policy, apply a tax or subsidy as an instrument to achieve the policy 
targets and announce any potential changes that may happen to the program under specified 
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situations. This will make the private sector more likely to believe the government and take 
the program and possible future changes into account when making economic and 
environmental decisions.  
Finally, there is a significant fundamental difference between the abatement subsidy scenario 
specified in this research and current Australian policy, the Emissions Reduction Fund. The 
scenario specified here assumes that the policy will continue indefinitely, while the actual 
emissions subsidy policy is set to run only for five years and no program has been announced 
for the period afterwards. This can influence the effectiveness of the policy by introducing 
uncertainty and thus reducing its credibility. To achieve Australia’s environmental targets, 
policy makers should clearly specify their policies and continue with them. This requires 
political consensus. Instead of climate change being seen as a political issue it needs to be 
seen in economic, and also perhaps survival terms, and it needs to be understood that the cost 
of not addressing it increases all the time. 
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Chapter 8  
Summary and Conclusions 
8.1. Introduction 
This research has presented the first application of a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
(DSGE) model to emissions reduction policy analysis in Australia. The focus of the research 
was on policies designed and/or implemented in Australia. As explained in Chapter 1 Section 
1.1, climate change issues have become of significant concern to scientists and governments. 
For instance, World Meteorological Organisation statistics show that the years 2011–2015 
were the warmest years on record (World Meteorological Organization, 2015). This issue has 
encouraged researchers to estimate the effects of global warming. For instance, Nordhaus 
(2010) estimated that a 3.4oC increase in average global temperatures would cause global 
damage equal to US$12 trillion, and a 2.8 per cent decrease in global output if GHG 
emissions are not controlled (Nordhaus, 2010). 
In Australia the evidence of an increase in average temperatures and of the associated 
environmental and economic costs if no emissions reduction program is adopted are 
significant (IPCC, 2014). The costs can include damage to ecosystems, problematic changes 
in rainfall, and increases in the frequency and intensity of extreme events such as heatwaves, 
droughts and floods. Climate change can also directly affect the Australian agriculture sector 
and this sector has already been adversely affected by extreme climate events. For instance, 
during the 2005–2007 drought food prices increased at more than twice the rate of the 
increase to the Consumer Price Index (CPI), with the price of fresh fruit and vegetables 
increasing by 43% and 33% respectively (Climate Council of Australia Limited, 2015).  
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The role of human activities, especially the burning of fossil fuels, in global warming is 
significant. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has been studying 
climate change since 1990 through investigating climate systems, global warming, 
atmospheric GHGs concentrations, and radioactive forcing and it has found that it is 
extremely likely (i.e. there is a 95-100 per cent probability) that humans are responsible for 
more than half of global warming (IPCC, 2013, p. TS-25). The estimated threats of climate 
change and the contribution of human activity in accelerating it require policies and programs 
to control human-caused global warming to avoid future problems (IPCC, 2014). To this end, 
several international meetings and conferences including the meetings in Kyoto in 1997, in 
Copenhagen in 2009 and most recently in Paris from 30 November to 12 December 2015 
have been held. Countries debated programs to control global warming and set agreed and 
binding emissions targets.  
The Paris meeting presented a historic opportunity for the 196 attending countries to agree to 
keep the average global temperature increase to within 2°C of the pre-industrial level. The 
agreement is designed to come into force when at least 55 countries, which together are 
responsible for 55 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions, ratify it between April 2016 
and 2017 (Taylor, 2016). The agreement was signed by 170 countries including Australia on 
22 April 2016. 
Before the meeting countries including Australia submitted their emissions targets, or their 
intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs). Australia submitted its INDC which 
aimed to decrease emissions economy-wide by 26 to 28 per cent below the 2005 level by 
2030 (Center for Climate and Energy Solution, 2015). Additionally, the Australian 
government set new targets of reducing emissions by 50-52 per cent in terms of per capita 
and by 54-56 per cent in terms of emissions intensity between 2005 and 2030 (Department of 
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the Environment, 2015a). Achieving all these targets required Australia to have strong 
emission reduction programs.  
The current target of Australia is to meet its Copenhagen Accord pledges of reducing its 
emissions by 5 per cent relative to 2000 by the year 2020 unconditionally (Borrello, 2016). 
To achieve this target several programs have been designed. The programs have experienced 
several changes due to different policy makers’ attitudes about the economic costs and 
environmental outcomes of such policies. The first program was the Clean Energy Program 
introduced in 2011 which included two phases: first, a fixed price, or a carbon tax, which 
commenced on 1 July 2012 and was originally planned to continue until 30 July 2015 when 
the second phase, with a flexible price system under an emissions trading scheme, would 
begin. The tax phase began in July 2012 as planned. However, it was abolished with effect 
from 1 July 2014 (Australian Government, 2014a). As an alternative an Emissions Reduction 
Fund program was introduced which came into effect on 13 December 2014 in which the 
government funded emissions reduction projects (Department of the Environment, 2014a).  
This thesis attempted to provide an analysis of the abovementioned emissions reduction 
policies. To this end, four scenarios were specified: first, business-as-usual (BAU) or no 
policy which was used as the benchmark case; second, a fixed emissions tax scenario 
resembling a carbon tax program; third, a variable emissions tax system as a proxy to the 
emissions trading scheme and fourth, an abatement subsidy scenario similar to the Emissions 
Reduction program. Additionally, since Australia’s carbon tax program was designed to 
increase by 2.5 per cent per year, the economic and environmental impacts of such an 
increase in a fixed tax emissions program when all sectors of the economy are aware of such 
changes beforehand was studied. The model was specified under these four scenarios in 
Chapter 4 and was calibrated to the Australian economy in Chapter 5. 
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The results were presented in Chapter 6. The simulation results showed that the variable 
emissions tax or subsidy should be set to be pro-cyclical to business cycles so as to be able to 
provide motivation for firms to make abatement efforts in situations where a fixed emissions 
tax system would lose its power to motivate. This is due to the fact that the marginal cost of 
emissions does not change over time. The simulation results also indicate that a variable tax 
or an abatement subsidy policy can help the government to stabilise emissions.  
Additionally, a numerical derivation of the steady state solution of the model showed that a 
fixed emissions tax policy results in the highest emissions reduction but it does so at a greater 
output reduction and welfare cost, followed by a flexible emissions tax and abatement 
subsidy. Under conditions of uncertainty, however, there is an adjustment process in which 
economic sectors adjust their decisions to the uncertainty and the cumulative impact of such 
an adjustment cannot be captured by just comparing the steady states. Finding the cumulative 
impact of various emissions reduction policies over the entire adjustment period revealed that 
the cumulative effects are significantly different from their impacts under steady state 
conditions as the fixed tax program has the lowest cumulative effects on emissions and 
output. This finding is a significant contribution of the current research from which the 
following implications can be derived: 
• The policy choice depends on the regulator’s perspective and priorities. If the 
regulator’s priority is emissions reduction during a boom period a flexible system, 
such as a variable emissions tax which is the proxy for a cap-and-trade scheme, is the 
appropriate solution while if the regulator’s main concern is to minimise the impact 
on output, a fixed emissions tax is best. 
• This finding confirms that for the real business cycle simulation a variable emissions 
tax or abatement subsidy program can help to decrease the effects of economic 
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fluctuations on emissions and reduce variations to emissions. However, in order to 
achieve the lowest emissions the government can get the benefit of a fixed tax during 
periods of recession and a variable emissions tax or abatement subsidy policy should 
be implemented during periods of expansion.  
• This shows the significance of taking uncertainties into account when analysing 
emissions reduction policies. Ignoring the correlation between economic fluctuations 
and emissions, and only focusing on the deterministic situation in which the firm’s 
decision over production and reducing emissions does not change over time and is not 
affected by exogenous factors, such as changes in productivity, can result in a 
misunderstanding of the costs and benefits of policies and, thus, may increase the risk 
of encountering undesired changes in emissions over a period of time. 
The simulation results for a fixed emissions tax policy which increased by 2.5 per cent per 
year indicated that such an increase in the tax rate leads to an increase in abatement, and a 
decrease in output and emissions. However, the reduction in output is almost negligible, 
while the increase in abatement is significant. These findings provided the answers to the 
research questions specified in Chapter 1 Section 1.3. These questions and their answers are 
explained in the next section. 
8.2. Answers to Research Questions 
The following research questions were specified in Chapter 1 Section 1.3. This section 
provides the answer to them. 
1. What would be the effect of emissions reduction programs, including a fixed 
emissions tax, a variable emissions tax and an abatement subsidy, on Australian 
emissions and welfare? 
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In a deterministic situation, a fixed emissions tax policy results in the lowest level of 
emissions and the highest output and welfare costs. During a boom period, however, the 
variable emissions tax or subsidy can lead to a better emissions outcome in terms of the 
highest cumulative emissions reduction.  
2. Which one of these emissions reduction programs is likely to be the most efficient in 
terms of having less negative impacts on Australian GDP and welfare? 
The impacts of a variable emissions tax and a subsidy policy are the same. The fixed 
emissions tax system results in the lowest output and welfare lost and, thus, can have less 
negative impacts on Australian GDP and welfare under deterministic situations. 
3. What would be the effect of TFP shocks on the Australian economy under each of 
these emissions reduction programs? 
When a positive transitory TFP shock happens, output, capital, consumption and emissions 
increase under all programs while the increase in emissions under a fixed emissions tax 
program is higher than it is under a variable tax or subsidy program. 
4. What would be the effect of these programs on Australia’s business cycles? 
These programs can only affect the level of the fluctuations but not their frequency and 
direction of Australia’s business cycles. They decrease the steady state of output. 
1. How can these emissions pricing programs be adjusted to business cycles in order to 
stabilise emissions?  
A variable emissions tax or subsidy can help the Australian government to decrease the 
influence of output fluctuations on emissions and, thus, stabilise emissions. To this end the 
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variable tax or subsidy should be adjusted pro-cyclically; that is, the subsidy should increase 
during booms and decrease during recessions.  
The policy implications of these findings are summarised in the next section. 
8.3. Summary of Policy Implications 
As explained in Chapter 7, Section 7.3, in order to interpret the policy implications of the 
steady state and stochastic results, the differences between policy ‘rules’ and ‘discretion’ 
must be clarified first. These two concepts were highlighted by Kydland and Prescott (1977) 
who argued that the government must set long-term policy rules by evaluating alternative 
policies and selecting the one with the best opportunity characteristics. However, the 
government should be aware that there are inherent imperfections in its ability to implement 
desirable economic policies. This is because different sectors of the economy make 
optimisation decisions based on current and expected future policies, but their expectations of 
future policies may be different to the government’s plans and they can be affected by 
uncertainties. Thus, the government can get benefits from discretionary action; that is, from 
changes to the rules in an uncertain environment and under defined circumstances.  
The implication of such concepts for the findings of the current research is that the 
government should develop its emissions reduction programs based on the current business 
cycle. That is, if the government is formulating an emissions reduction policy during a boom, 
a subsidy or a variable emissions tax policy should be implemented and if it is doing so in a 
recession, a fixed tax policy should be applied. However, the government should clearly 
announce ahead of time the changes that may happen to the program due to variations in the 
business cycle. This can provide different sectors with the opportunity to modify their 
expectations regarding future policies and avoid potential policy uncertainty.  
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Additionally, there is a difference between the subsidy policy tested in this thesis and the 
Australian Emissions Reduction Fund program. The scenario developed here assumes that the 
policy continues into the future while the Australian program is designed to continue for only 
five years in order to reduce Australia’s emissions by 5 per cent below the 2000 level by 
2020 (Roson, 2013). This implies that even if the program succeeds in achieving the 2020 
emissions reduction goal, it would not be able to address the long-term global warming 
problems of Australia such as predicted droughts, floods, tropical cyclones, heatwaves and 
bushfires that Australia is likely to face as discussed in Chapter 2 Section 2.6.1. To avoid 
such problems the government should develop a long-term program by choosing a policy or 
even a group of policies, assure the economy that such programs will continue into the future, 
and be committed to following the programs unconditionally regardless of political changes.  
Based on these concerns relating to the Emissions Reduction Fund program and the findings 
of this thesis, the current research provides several suggestions to policy makers which are 
summarised in Table 8.1.  
Table 8.1: Adjustments that can improve Australia’s emissions reduction programs 
Implemented emissions reduction 
programs 
Improvement in the implemented emissions 
reduction programs 
The current Emissions Reduction Fund 
program has been designed to continue for 
only five years and no program to replace it 
after that time has as yet been announced. 
Australia needs a long-term program to be 
able to obtain the desired environmental 
outcomes including meeting international 
commitments and reducing the environmental 
consequences of human-caused emissions.  
The number of major polluters, such as The program should target the main sources of 
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Implemented emissions reduction 
programs 
Improvement in the implemented emissions 
reduction programs 
electricity and transportation firms, that are 
involved in the current Emissions Reduction 
Fund program is low. 
emissions and through legislation is should be 
able to motivate firms to make abatement 
efforts and shift to cleaner technologies.  
Different programs have been developed by 
various governments and have been 
changed several times due to a lack of 
political consensus on the issue. Climate 
change has become a political rather than an 
economic and social issue with many 
important aspects not adequately discussed. 
The major political parties need to come to a 
consensus through discussing their opinions, 
setting targets, choosing programs and 
remaining committed to programs regardless 
of changes in government. Policies need to be 
consistent in order to be effective. 
The credibility of emissions reduction 
policies has been adversely affected by 
uncertainty caused by changes of programs. 
A lack of credibility can reduce the 
environmental efforts of the private sector 
in the Australian economy. 
Policy makers should set and commit to 
consistent policy rules, should be prepared to 
change them to meet changing situations. 
These situations should be pre-announced to 
the private sector. 
The Australian production sectors, 
especially the electricity sector, are very 
carbon intensive since they rely heavily on 
fossil fuels which are the main sources of 
emissions. 
The government should support a move to less 
polluting green technology which can help the 
economy to address emissions reduction 
without adversely impacting output and jobs. 
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Implemented emissions reduction 
programs 
Improvement in the implemented emissions 
reduction programs 
International emissions agreements. 
Australia is a signatory to the Paris 
agreement. 
The Australian government should take a 
leading and exemplary role in the 
implementation of international climate 
change agreements. Participating in 
international agreements is likely to be more 
effective than individual country action. By 
signing up to international agreements 
domestic policy on the issue is likely to have 
greater credibility and to impact economic 
agents’ expectations in the desired direction. 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
8.4. Contributions of the Study 
This research has involved the first application of DSGE models in environmental policy 
analysis in Australia. As explained in Chapter 2, Section 2.6.2, there is a correlation between 
the fluctuations of emissions and business cycles and this has motivated the current research 
to investigate the impacts of emissions reduction policies on the responses of emissions to 
real business cycles. To this end a real business cycle (RBC) model was applied. The main 
structure of the model benefitted from the work of Heutel (2012). However, the model 
applied in this study is different to his model in three ways: the scenarios tested, the 
parameterisation used and the analysis techniques.  
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The first difference is related to the scenarios. Heutel (2012) tested a variable emissions 
pricing scenario in which the policy is not constant over time and can be chosen at the 
beginning of each period. He starts with a centralised decision-making economy in which the 
sectors’ optimisation behaviours match those of a social planner, which implies that polluters 
face the costs of pollution they produce and all externalities from pollution are internalised. 
Then he extended the model to a decentralised economy with asymmetric information about 
total factor productivity shocks. The present study, however, began with a decentralised 
economy where polluters do not internalise the costs of the emissions they produce unless the 
government sets policies which force them to do so. Moreover, while Heutel (2012) tests only 
a variable emissions pricing system the current research has extended this to include fixed tax 
and abatement subsidy scenarios which were specified in line with programs that have been 
implemented in Australia. 
The second deviation of this research from Heutel (2012) was in calibrating one of the 
environmental variables, emissions from the rest of the world. Heutel (2012) calibrated his 
research to the US economy and assumed that emissions from the rest of the world were three 
times greater than domestic emissions produced by the US. This assumption, however, would 
provide a channel to transfer the effects of domestic emissions pricing policy to the rest of the 
world emissions. That is, it assumes that any changes in domestic emissions due to the 
implementation of a policy would result in a change in emissions produced by the rest of the 
world which is not necessarily true for a small economy such as Australia’s. To avoid this, 
the current research calculated the rest of the world’s emissions under a BAU scenario and 
kept this figure constant under the various emissions pricing policies. This approach is 
consistent with the aim of this study which is to analyse the economic effects of emissions 
pricing policies on Australia, not on the world economy. Therefore, this study delivered 
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theoretical contributions by extending the scenarios and presenting a different calibration 
approach, in addition to a practical contribution in terms of applying the model to Australia.  
The third contribution of the current research is about the technique used for analysis. Heutel 
(2012) presented and discussed the outcomes of his model graphically through IRFs which is 
a common approach in DSGE modelling. Besides this some researchers, such as Fischer and 
Springborn (2011), present their results not only via IRFs but also by numerically calculating 
and comparing steady state solution levels. This thesis has provided a new technique by 
combining these two approaches in order to find the effects of each policy when a shock 
happens. To this end this thesis calculated the area under the IRFs which shows the 
cumulative changes in a variable over the adjustment period (i.e. the time period over which 
the effects of shock are observed). Multiplying the figure for the area under the IRF by the 
steady state value of that variable can numerically show the total changes in a variable. 
Comparing the total changes of variables under the different scenarios makes it possible to 
compare the entire effects of the programs, not only in regard to steady state values, but also 
in regard to the cumulative gain or loss that each program can cause on a variable for the 
entire adjustment process. 
This research, however, has several limitations which need to be addressed in future studies. 
These limitations and the potential extension of this thesis are explained in the next section.  
8.5. Limitations and Future Study Directions 
Despite the progress made in DSGE modelling since Kydland and Prescott (1982), 
developing and applying these models still requires strenuous effort due to their complexity. 
This research, in particular, involved up to 14 equations under each scenario, including 
several complex and nonlinear equations. This made the model too complicated to derive an 
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analytical solution. To obtain a numerical solution, a DSGE modeller also needs to have 
strong mathematical and programming skills.  
Another limitation of the study is in regard to data availability and accuracy. This limitation 
occurred in estimating the elasticity of emissions to output in Chapter 5. As explained in 
Section 5.2, this research used quarterly data of emissions for Australia collected from 
September 2001 to December 2013 from Australia’s National Greenhouse Accounts 
(Department of the Environment, 2014b). This is currently the longest time span for which 
data on Australia’s emissions is available. Accessing emissions data over a longer period in 
future would increase the accuracy of the coefficients estimated.  
Future studies could also discard some of the assumptions made in this research for the sake 
of simplicity. One of the assumptions made in the model was that there was only one 
integrated producer. Relaxing this assumption will enable researchers to address the 
distributional costs of policies for different sectors with different carbon intensities, or answer 
the question of which sector will be more motivated to make abatement effort and shift to 
cleaner technologies under a particular policy. Another assumption was about the allocation 
of tax revenue. This research assumed that the government recycles the revenue to 
households in the form of a lump sum, since the aim of this research was not to investigate 
the effectiveness of revenue allocation approaches. Future studies, however, can address this 
issue by specifying different transfer approaches and investigating the efficiency of each one 
in a real business model. For instance, the government can use the revenue from the tax to 
reduce the distorting effect of taxes on other factors such as labour and capital, or to reduce 
the budget deficit. The government can also allocate the tax revenue directly towards a less 
polluting economy by updating current technologies, or even moving to zero pollution by 
investing in R&D. 
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The specification of the economic and environmental relationships in the literature is broad 
and future studies can use alternative specifications and functions. For instance, Thampapillai 
and Sinden (2013) consider nature as capital and Hence their distinct equilibrium is Y=GDP-
DKN where DKN is the depreciation of natural capital. In another study, Thampapillai (2016) 
estimates the size of the air shed utilized in Australia. These studies can be used to extend the 
estimation results of the current research. Another factor that can be investigated in future of 
research is the role of science in determining the level and relevance of intervention since 
scientific information can, and should, guide the regulator’s preferences. 
Additionally, this research abstracted from productivity growth and focused on business cycle 
implementation of emissions reduction policies. Future studies could extend the model to turn 
it into a growth model which includes productivity growth, population growth and abatement 
technology growth. Furthermore, as a small open economy, Australia’s real business cycles 
are affected not only by domestic shocks such as TFP, but also by foreign shocks. In future 
research the model used could be tailored to the Australian economy even more by extending 
the analysis to the performance of emissions reduction policies in the presence of foreign 
shocks.  
Finally, as explained in Chapter 4, Section 4.2 the existing literature on environmental DSGE 
modelling has four limitations which need to be overcome in future studies: first, their 
emphasis on real shocks rather than other types of economic and environmental uncertainties; 
second, the application of calibration for parameterisation rather than estimation; third, as a 
result of calibration, the models in these studies focus on forecasting deviations from the 
steady state of macroeconomic variables rather than the level of such variables; and fourth, 
environmental DSGE models are usually simplified to one integrated sector. Overcoming 
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these four limitations in future studies can improve the application of these models for 
environmental analysis and provide more straightforward conclusions for policy makers.  
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Appendix 
A.1. Estimation of output in the emission equation 
The emissions for each period are a function of output, h(yt), which is specified as 
( ) γ−= 1tt yyh . In order to obtain the exponential coefficient 1-γ, quarterly data for Australian 
emissions and GDP are used from Australia’s National Greenhouse Accounts (Department of 
the Environment, 2014b) and the Australian National Accounts (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 2014) respectively, for the period of September 2001 to December 2013. Using this 
data, the exponential coefficient can be found by regressing the log of emissions on the log of 
output. The regression result is presented in Table A.1. As the table shows the coefficient 1-γ, 
is equal to 0.0975. 
Table A.1: Regression of log CO2e emissions on log output 
Regression Statistics 
       Multiple R 0.8789 
       R Square 0.7725 
       Adjusted R 
Square 0.7678 
       Standard 
Error 0.0056 
       Observations 50 
       
         ANOVA 
        
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F 
   Regression 1 0.0051 0.0051 163.0349 0.0000 
   Residual 48 0.0015 0.0000 
     Total 49 0.0066     
   
         
  Coefficients 
Standard 
Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% 
Upper 
95% 
Lower 
95% 
Upper 
95% 
Intercept 1.5923 0.0416 38.2942 0.0000 1.5087 1.6759 1.5087 1.67592 
LOG(GDP) 0.0975 0.0076 12.7685 0.0000 0.0821 0.1128 0.0821 0.11282 
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A.2. Log-Linearisation  
A nonlinear system of equations does not usually have a closed-form solution. Instead, a 
numerical solution can be found. To this end the model needs to be log-linearised around the 
steady state values of variables. The log-linearised model will be used to show fluctuations 
occurring for variables arising from exogenous shocks. The main idea behind such an 
approximation is that a nonlinear system of equations, including optimal conditions and 
resource constraints, can be converted to a linear system if the linear approximation happens 
in the neighbourhood of a non-stochastic steady state. Thus, the solution near stationary 
points is a good approximation to the solution for a derived linear system which helps in 
understanding the behaviour of the underlying nonlinear system. This approximation is called 
a linear approximation which is a standard approach and can be done through log-
linearisation (King et al., 2002). In this method the approximation is a Taylor expansion 
around a steady state. To be clear, consider a nonlinear model which can be shown by a set of 
equations such as these: 
 
 ( ) ( )( )t
t
t xH
xGxF =  (A-1) 
where xt is a vector of variables which can include expectational variables, lag or lead 
variables. To conduct log-linearisation, first the logarithm of the functions F, G and H must 
be found and then a first-order Taylor expansion is conducted. Taking the logarithms leads 
to:  
 ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )ttt xHlnxGlnxFln −=  (A-2) 
Taking the first-order Taylor series approximation around the steady state, x , gives: 
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 ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )xxxH
x'HxHln
xx
xG
x'GxGlnxx
xF
x'FxFln
t
tt
−−−
−+≈−+
 
(A-3) 
where the notation ( )x'X  shows the derivative of X at the steady state of x. The model 
presented by equation (A-3) is now linear in xt since ( )( )xGln , ( )( )xG
x'G  , ( )( )xHln  and ( )
( )xH
x'H  
are all constants. Given the steady state of equation (A-2)  
 ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )xHlnxGlnxFln −=  (A-4) 
Now, the three ( )( )xXln  can be excluded and equation (14) can be simplified to: 
 ( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )xxxH
x'Hxx
xG
x'Gxx
xF
x'F
ttt −−−≈−  
(A-5) 
The implicit assumption is that conditions stay in the neighbourhood of the steady state, so 
that second-order or higher terms of the Taylor expansion are small enough to be irrelevant 
and can thus be left out. 
(Uhlig (1999)) provides a simpler method, called Uhlig’s toolkit, for finding a log-linear 
approximation of a function. His method does not require taking derivatives, yet leads to the 
same result as the Taylor expansion method. The only difference is that in Uhlig’s method, 
the linear model is expressed in terms of log differences of variables. Below, Uhlig’s method 
is explained. 
Consider an equation of a set of variables tX . Define ( ) ( )XlnXlnX~ tt −= . The tilde variable is 
the log difference of the original variable from the steady state value X . Thus, the original 
variable can be written as 
 
239 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
tt
Xln/XlnXlnXlnX~ XX/X.XeXeXeX ttt ==== −  (A-6) 
Thus, Uhlig’s definitions are 
 ( ) ( )XlnXlnX~ tt −=  (A-7) 
 tX~
t eXX =  (A-8) 
Also, Uhlig’s rules are 
 
tt
Y~aX~ Y~aX~1e tt ++≈+  (A-9) 
 0Y~X~ tt ≈  (A-10) 
 [ ] [ ]1ttX~t X~aEaaeE 1t ++≈+  (A-11) 
Using the abovementioned rules and definition simplifies the process of log-linearisation 
which has been applied in this study.  
 
 
240 
 
References 
ABARE (1996). The MEGABARE Model: Interim Documentation. Canberra, Australian 
Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics. 
Adams, P., Dixon, J., Giesecke, J. and Horridge, M. (2010). "MMRF: Monash Multi-
Regional Forecasting Model: A Dynamic Multi-Regional Model of the Australian Economy." 
Centre of Policy Studies General Paper No. G-223, Melbourne, Accessed September 2014, 
http://www.copsmodels.com/ftp/workpapr/g-223.pdf. 
Adams, P., Horridge, M. and Wittwer, G. (2003). "MMRF-GREEN: A Dynamic Multi-
Regional Applied General Equilibrium Model of the Australian Economy, Based on the 
MMR and MONASH Models." The Centre of Policy Studies General Working Paper No. G-
140, Monash University. 
Adams, P. D. (2007). "Insurance against Catastrophic Climate Change: How Much Will an 
Emissions Trading Scheme Cost Australia?" Australian Economic Review 40(4): pp. 432-
452. 
Adams, P. D., Horridge, J. M. and Parmenter, B. R. (2000). "MMRF-GREEN: A Dynamic, 
Multi-Sectoral, Multi-Regional Model of Australia." Centre of Policy Studies and the Impact 
Project Centre Accessed April 2015, http://www.copsmodels.com/ftp/workpapr/op-94.pdf. 
Adams, P. D., Parmenter, B. R. and Verikios, G. (2014). "An Emissions Trading Scheme for 
Australia: National and Regional Impacts." Economic Record 90(290): pp. 316-344. 
Adjemian, S. e., Bastani, H., Karam´e, F. e. e., Juillard, M., Maih, J., Mihoubi, F., Perendia, 
G., Pfeifer, J., Ratto, M. and Villemot, S. e. (2014). "Dynare Reference Manual, version 
4.4.1." Dynare Team, Accessed July 2014, www.dynare.org/wp-repo/dynarewp001.pdf. 
Ahammad, H., Curtotti, R. and Gurney, A. (2004). A Possible Japanese Carbon Tax: 
Implications for the Australian Energy Sector. A. Australian Bureau of, E. Resource, T. 
Australia. Dept. of Industry and Resources. Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource 
Economics, Canberra. 
Alexandratos, N. and Bruinsma, J. (2012). "World Agriculture towards 2030/2050: the 2012 
Revision." ESA Working Paper, FAO, Rome. 
Allen Consulting Group (2000). "Greenhouse Emissions Trading." Report to the Victorian 
Department of Premier and Cabinet, Melbourne. 
Anderson, G. and Moore, G. (1985). "A Linear Algebraic Procedure for Solving Linear 
Perfect Foresight Models." Economics Letters 17(3): pp. 247-252. 
Anderson, G. S. (2008). "Solving Linear Rational Expectations Models: A Horse Race." 
Computational Economics 31(2): pp. 95-113. 
 
241 
 
Anderson, G. S. (2010). "A Reliable and Computationally Efficient Algorithm for Imposing 
the Saddle Point Property in Dynamic Models." Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 
34: pp. 472-489. 
Angelopoulos, K., Economides, G. and Philippopoulos, A. (2010). "What Is the Best 
Environmental Policy? Taxes, Permits and Rules under Economic and Environmental 
Uncertainty." CESifo Working Paper Series No. 2980, Accessed January 2013, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1571058. 
Angelopoulos, K., Economides, G. and Philippopoulos, A. (2013). "First-and Second-Best 
Allocations under Economic and Environmental Uncertainty." International Tax and Public 
Finance 20(3): pp. 360-380. 
Annicchiarico, B. and Di Dio, F. (2015). "Environmental Policy and Macroeconomic 
Dynamics in a New Keynesian Model." Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management 69: pp. 1-21. 
Arimura, T. H. and Iwata, K. (2015). An Evaluation of Japanese Environmental Regulations : 
Quantitative Approaches from Environmental Economics. Springer, New York. 
Asafu-Adjaye, J. (2004). "A Dynamic CGE Model of the Australian Economy: A Simulation 
of the Impacts of Environmental Policies." International Journal of Applied Economics and 
Econometrics 12(3): pp. 317-336. 
Asafu-Adjaye, J. and Mahadevan, R. (2013). "Implications of CO2 Reduction Policies for a 
High Carbon Emitting Economy." Energy Economics 38: pp. 32-41. 
Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering (2014). "Food and Fibre 
Australia’s Opportunities." Australian Research Council, Accessed May 2016, 
http://www.atse.org.au/Documents/Publications/Reports/Agriculture/atse-food-and-fibre-full-
report.pdf. 
Australian Bureau of Agriculture and Resource Economics and Science (2011). "Global Food 
Security: Facts, Issues and Implications." Australian Government, Accessed May 2016, 
http://data.daff.gov.au/data/warehouse/pe_abares99010538/SEI1_2011GlobalFoodSecurityR
eport.pdf. 
Australian Bureau of Agriculture and Resource Economics and Science (2014). "Agricultural 
Commodity Statistics 2014." Australian Government,, Accessed May 2016, 
http://data.daff.gov.au/data/warehouse/agcstd9abcc002/agcstd9abcc0022014/ACS_2014_1.0.
0.pdf. 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2014). "Australian National Accounts: National Income, 
Expenditure and Product, Catalogue Number 5206.0." Accessed December 2014, 
http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/5206.0Jun%202014?OpenDocum
ent. 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2015). "Agricultural commodities Australia 2013-14." 
Accessed MAy 2016, http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/7121.0. 
 
242 
 
Australian Bureau of Statistics (2016). "Key National Accounts Aggregates." 5206.0 - 
Australian National Accounts: National Income, Expenditure and Product. 
Australian Government (2011). "Securing a Clean Energy Future: the Australian 
Government's Climate Change Plan." Commonwealth of Australia. 
Australian Government. (2013). "Moving to Emissions Trading from 1 July 2014."   
Accessed September 2013, from http://www.climatechange.gov.au/reducing-carbon/news-
article/moving-emissions-trading-1-july-2014. 
Australian Government (2014a). "Carbon Tax Abolished from 1 July 2014." Canberra, 
Accessed January 2015, http://www.climatechange.gov.au/. 
Australian Government (2014b). "Emissions Reduction Fund White Paper ", Accessed May 
2016, https://www.environment.gov.au/system/files/resources/1f98a924-5946-404c-9510-
d440304280f1/files/emissions-reduction-fund-white-paper_0.pdf. 
Australian Government (2015a). "Emissions Reduction Fund Auction Results Fact Sheet." 
Clean Energy Regulator, Accessed April 2016, 
http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/ERF/Auctions-results/November-2015. 
Australian Government (2015b). "Emissions Reduction Fund Methods." Department of 
Environment, Accessed April 2016, https://www.environment.gov.au/climate-
change/emissions-reduction-fund/methods. 
Australian Government (2015c). "Vegetation Methods." Clean Energy Regulator, Accessed 
April 2016, http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/ERF/Choosing-a-project-
type/Opportunities-for-the-land-sector/Vegetation-methods. 
Batt, P. J. (2015). "Australia’s ‘Five Strong Pillar Economy’: Agriculture " The Conversation, 
Accessed May 2016, https://theconversation.com/australias-five-strong-pillar-economy-
agriculture-40388. 
Benchekroun, H. and Ray Chaudhuri, A. (2014). "Transboundary Pollution and Clean 
Technologies." Resource and Energy Economics 36(2): pp. 601-619. 
BNP Paribas (2014). Global Carbon Atlas, BNP Paribas. 
Bohringer, C., Rutherford, T. F. and Springmann, M. (2015). "Clean-Development 
Investments: An Incentive-Compatible CGE Modelling Framework." Environmental and 
Resource Economics 60(4): pp. 633-651. 
Borrello, E. (2016). "Labor's Climate plan: Two Emissions Trading Schemes, New Car 
Standards and a 'Climate Trigger' for Land Clearing." ABC News, Accessed May 2016, 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-04-27/labor-reveals-climate-plan-for-twin-emissions-
trading-schemes/7362980. 
Bosello, F., Eboli, F. and Pierfederici, R. (2012). "Assessing the Economic Impacts of 
Climate Change." Review of Environment Energy and Economics: pp. 1-9. 
 
243 
 
Bouman, M., Gautier, P. A. and Hofkes, M. W. (2000). "Do Firms Time Their Pollution 
Abatement Investments Optimally?" De Economist 148(1): pp. 71-86. 
Bouzaher, A., Sahin, S. and Yeldan, E. (2015). "How to Go Green: A General Equilibrium 
Investigation of Environmental Policies for Sustained Growth with an Application to 
Turkey's Economy." Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences 8(1): pp. 49-76. 
Brendemoen, A. and Vennemo, H. (1994). A Climate Treaty and the Norwegian Economy: A 
CGE Assessment, Energy Economics Education Foundation, Inc.: 77. 
Buckley, T. (2016). "Wind and Solar Records Tumble as China and India Accelerate Energy 
Transition." Renewable Economy, Tracking the Next Industerial Revolution, Accessed April 
2016, http://reneweconomy.com.au/2016/69425. 
Bukowski, M. and Kowal, P. (2010). "Large Scale, Multi-Sector DSGE Model as a Climate 
Policy Assessment Tool." Institute for Structural Research IBS Working Paper Number 
03/2010. 
Bureau of Meteorology (2014). "Annual Climate Statement 2013." Australian Government, 
Accessed February 2016, http://www.bom.gov.au/climate/current/annual/aus/2013/. 
Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics (2014). "Australian Energy Statistics." 
Canberra, Accessed August 2015, http://www.industry.gov.au/Office-of-the-Chief-
Economist/Publications/Pages/Australian-energy-statistics.aspx#. 
Burker, J. (2010). "Ireland’s Carbon Tax." Department of Finance Ireland, Accessed October 
2012, http://www.comharsdc.ie/_files/JohnBurke.pdf. 
Business Council of Australia (2016). "BCA Statement on Federal Opposition Climate 
Action Plan." Accessed May 2016, http://www.bca.com.au/media/bca-statement-on-federal-
opposition-climate-action-plan. 
Caldara, D., Harrison, R. and Lipinska, A. (2014). "Practical Tools for Policy Analysis in 
DSGE Models with Missing Shocks." Journal of Applied Econometrics 29(7): pp. 1145-
1163. 
Canova, F. (2007). "How Much Structure in Empirical Models?", Accessed April 2015, 
http://crei.cat/people/canova/hmuchstructure.pdf. 
Cantore, N., Calì, M. and Velde, D. W. t. (2016). "Does Energy Efficiency Improve 
Technological Change and Economic Growth in Developing Countries?" Energy Policy 92: 
pp. 279-285. 
Carbon Tax Centre (2011). "Where Carbon is Taxed." Accessed October 2012, 
http://www.carbontax.org/progress/where-carbon-is-taxed/. 
CDIAC (2013). "Global, Regional, and National Fossil-Fuel CO2 Emissions." Accessed 
December 2014, http://cdiac.ornl.gov/trends/emis/overview_2010.html. 
 
244 
 
Center for Climate and Energy Solution (2015). "Submitted Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions (INDCs)." Accessed May 2016, http://www.c2es.org/international/2015-
agreement/indcs. 
Charney, A. H. (2003). Modeling Practices and Their Ability to Assess Tax/ Expenditure 
Economic Impacts Paper presented at the AUBER Conference. New Orleans. 
Chen, S.-H. (2015). "Macroeconomic (In)stability of Interest Rate Rules in a Model with 
Banking System and Reserve Markets." Macroeconomic Dynamics 19(7): pp. 1476-1508. 
Citizens Information Board (2012). "Carbon Tax." Public Service Information, Accessed 
October 2012, 
http://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/money_and_tax/tax/motor_carbon_other_taxes/carbon_
tax.html. 
Clark, D. (2012). "Has the Kyoto protocol made any Difference to Carbon Emissions? ." The 
Guardian, Accessed April 2016, 
http://www.theguardian.com/environment/blog/2012/nov/26/kyoto-protocol-carbon-
emissions. 
Clean Energy Regulator (2016). "Cumulative Auction Results – April 2015, November 2015 
and April 2016." Australian Government, Accessed July 2016, 
http://www.cleanenergyregulator.gov.au/DocumentAssets/Documents/Emissions%20Reducti
on%20Fund%20-%20Cumulative%20auction%20results.pdf. 
Climate Council of Australia (2014). "Counting the Coast: Climate Change and Coastal 
Flooding." Accessed May 2016, 
http://www.climatecouncil.org.au/uploads/56812f1261b168e02032126342619dad.pdf. 
Climate Council of Australia Limited (2015). "Feeding a Hungry Nation: Climate Change, 
Food and Farming in Australia." Accessed May 2016, 
https://www.climatecouncil.org.au/uploads/7579c324216d1e76e8a50095aac45d66.pdf. 
Committee on Climate Change (2008). "Carbon Markets and Carbon Prices." Building a 
Low-Carbon Economy – the UK’s Contribution to Tackling Climate Change: pp. 145-172. 
Committee on Climate Change (2009). "Meeting Carbon Budgets – the Need for a Step 
Change." Accessed January 2013, http://www.official-
documents.gov.uk/document/other/9789999100076/9789999100076.pdf. 
Congressional Budget Office (2013). "Effects of a Carbon Tax on the Economy and the 
Environment." Congress of the United States, No. 4532 Accessed November 2013, 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/44223_Carbon_0.pdf. 
Costello, C. and Karp, L. (2004). "Dynamic Taxes and Quotas with Learning." Journal of 
Economic Dynamics and Control 28(8): pp. 1661-1680. 
 
245 
 
Crimp, S., Howden, M., Stokes, C., Schroeter, S. and Keating, B. (2014). Climate Change 
Challenges for Low-Input Cropping and Grazing Systems - Australia. J. Fuhrer and P. 
Gregory. CABI International, University of Reading, UK, 47-68. 
Crimp, S. J., Howden, S. M., Brown, P. R., Kokic, P., Stokes, C. J., Moore, A. D., Jacobs, B., 
Ash, A. J. and Leith, P. (2010). "Managing Murray-Darling Basin Livestock Systems in a 
Variable and Changing Climate: Challenges and Opportunities." Rangeland Journal 32(3): 
pp. 293-304. 
CSIRO and Bureau of Meteorology (2012). "State of the Climate 2012." Commonwealth 
Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), Accessed June 2013, 
http://www.csiro.au/Outcomes/Climate/Understanding/State-of-the-Climate-2012.aspx. 
CSIRO and Bureau of Meteorology (2014). "The State of the Climate Report." Accessed 
April 2016, http://www.bom.gov.au/state-of-the-climate/documents/state-of-the-climate-
2014_low-res.pdf?ref=button. 
CSIRO and the Australian Bureau of Meteorology (2015). "Climate Change of Australia 
Technical Report." CSIRO, Accessed August 2015, 
http://www.climatechangeinaustralia.gov.au/en/publications-library/technical-report/. 
Danish Goverenment (2011). "Our Future Energy." Danish Energy Agency, Accessed April 
2016, http://www.ens.dk/sites/ens.dk/files/policy/danish-climate-energy-
policy/our_future_energy.pdf. 
DeJong, D. N. and Dave, C. (2011). Structural Macroeconometrics, Second Edition, 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey. 
Department of Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry (2011). "Issues Paper to Inform 
Development of a National Food Plan." Australian Government,, Accessed May 2016, 
http://www.agriculture.gov.au/SiteCollectionDocuments/agfood/food/national-food-
plan/nfp_-_final.pdf. 
Department of Industry and Science (2015). "Australian Energy Update." Australian 
Government, Canberra, Accessed April 2016, http://www.industry.gov.au/Office-of-the-
Chief-Economist/Publications/Documents/aes/2015-australian-energy-statistics.pdf. 
Department of the Environment (2014a). "Emissions Reduction Fund." Australian 
Government, Accessed August 2015, http://www.environment.gov.au/climate-
change/emissions-reduction-fund. 
Department of the Environment (2014b). "Quarterly Update of Australia’s National 
Greenhouse Gas Inventory: December 2013." Australian Government, Accessed November 
2014, http://www.environment.gov.au/system/files/resources/d616342d-775f-4115-bcfa-
2816a1da77bf/files/nggi-quarterly-update-dec13.pdf. 
Department of the Environment (2015a). "Australia's 2030 Cimate Change Target." 
Australian Government, Accessed May 2016, http://www.environment.gov.au/climate-
change/publications/factsheet-australias-2030-climate-change-target. 
 
246 
 
Department of the Environment (2015b). "Quarterly Update of Australia’s National 
Greenhouse Gas Inventory: September 2014." Australian Government. 
Dissou, Y. (2005). "Cost-Effectiveness of the Performance Standard System to Reduce CO2 
Emissions in Canada: a General Equilibrium Analysis." Resource and Energy Economics 
27(3): pp. 187-207. 
Dissou, Y. and Karnizova, L. (2012). "Emissions Cap or Emissions Tax? A Multi-sector 
Business Cycle Analysis." University of Ottawa, Department of Economics, Working Papers: 
1210E. 
Dixon, P. B., Parmenter, B. R., Ryland, G. J. and Sutton, J. M. (1977). "ORANI, A General 
Equilibrium Model of the Australian Economy : Current Specification and Illustrations of 
Use for Policy Analysis." First progress report of the IMPACT Project, Australian 
Government Publishing Service, Canberra, Accessed December 2014, 
http://trove.nla.gov.au/work/9535005?q&versionId=11062695. 
Dwyer Jr, G. P. (1993). "Rules and Discretion in Monetary Policy." Review (00149187) 
75(3): pp. 3. 
Ekins, P. and Barker, T. (2001). "Carbon Taxes and Carbon Emissions Trading." Journal of 
Economic Surveys 15(3): pp. 325-376. 
Ellerman, A. D. and Buchner, B. K. (2007a). "The European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme: Origins, Allocation, and Early Results." Review of Environmental Economics & 
Policy 1(1): pp. 66-87. 
Ellerman, A. D. and Buchner, B. K. (2007b). "The European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme: Origins, Allocation, and Early Results." Review of Environmental Economics and 
Policy 1(1): pp. 66-87. 
Environmental Defence Fund, Cdc Climate Research, Caisse des Depots Group and 
International Emissions Trading Association (2015). "Norway: an Emissions Trading Case 
Study." Accessed May 2016, 
http://www.ieta.org/resources/Resources/Case_Studies_Worlds_Carbon_Markets/norway_ca
se_study_may2015.pdf. 
Erceg, C. J., Guerrieri, L. and Gust, C. (2005). "Expansionary Fiscal Shocks and the Trade 
Deficit." International Finance Discussion Papers, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, Accessed April 2015, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2005/825/ifdp825.pdf. 
Erceg, C. J., Guerrieri, L. and Gust, C. (2006). "SIGMA: A New Open Economy Model for 
Policy Analysis." International Journal of Central Banking 2(1): pp. 1-50. 
European Commission. (2013a). "The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS)."   Accessed 
16/10/2013, from http://ec.europa.eu/clima/publications/docs/factsheet_ets_2013_en.pdf. 
 
247 
 
European Commission (2013b). "The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) Factsheet." 
Accessed January 2013, 
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/publications/docs/factsheet_ets_2013_en.pdf. 
Fagiolo, G. and Roventini, A. (2012). "Macroeconomic Policy in DSGE and Agent-Based 
Models." Revue de L'OFCE(124): pp. 67-116. 
Falk, I. and Mendelsohn, R. (1993). "The Economics of Controlling Stock Pollutants: An 
Efficient Strategy for Greenhouse Gases." Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management 25(1): pp. 76-88. 
Fankhauser, S. (1995). Valuing Climate Change: Economics of the Greenhouse. London: 
Earthscan. 
Fell, H., MacKenzie, I. A. and Pizer, W. A. (2012). "Prices versus Quantities versus 
Bankable Quantities." Resource and Energy Economics 34(4): pp. 607-623. 
Fernández-Villaverde, J. (2009). "The Econometrics of DSGE Models." National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 14677: pp. 
Fernández-Villaverde, J. (2010). "The Econometrics of DSGE Models." SERIEs (2010)(1: 3. 
doi:10.1007/s13209-009-0014-7 ): pp. 3-49. 
Fischer, C. and Heutel, G. (2013). "Environmental Macroeconomics: Environmental Policy, 
Business Cycles, and Directed Technical Change." Annual Review of Resource Economics 
5(1): pp. 197-210. 
Fischer, C. and Springborn, M. (2011). "Emissions Targets and the Real Business Cycle: 
Intensity Targets versus Caps or Taxes." Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management 62(3): pp. 352-366. 
Flotho, S. (2009). "DSGE Models - Solution Strategies." IFAW-WT, Albert-Ludwigs-
University Freiburg, Accessed March 2015, https://www.macro.uni-
freiburg.de/publications/research_flotho/dsge_models. 
Fueki, T., Fukunaga, I., Ichiue, H. and Shirota, T. (2016). "Measuring Potential Growth with 
an Estimated DSGE Model of Japan's Economy." International Journal of Central Banking 
12(1): pp. 1-32. 
Fusion Media Limited (2016). "Carbon Emissions Historical Data." Accessed September 
2016, http://www.investing.com/commodities/carbon-emissions-historical-data. 
Gardiner, H. (2014). "Borrowed Time on Disappearing Land: Facing Rising Seas, 
Bangladesh Confronts the Consequences of Climate Change." the New York Times,, 
Accessed June 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/29/world/asia/facing-rising-seas-
bangladesh-confronts-the-consequences-of-climate-change.html?_r=2. 
Garnaut, R. (2011). The Garnaut Climate Change Review 2011. Cambridge University Press. 
 
248 
 
Ghosh, M., Luo, D., Siddiqui, M. S. and Zhu, Y. (2012). "Border Tax Adjustments in the 
Climate Policy Context: CO2 versus Broad-Based GHG Emission Targeting." Energy 
Economics 34: pp. S154-167. 
Golosov, M., Hassler, J., Krusell, P. and Tsyvinski, A. (2014). "Optimal Taxes on Fossil Fuel 
in General Equilibrium." Econometrica 82(1): pp. 41-88. 
Gomez-Gonzalez, P. and Rees, D. (2013). "Stochastic Terms of Trade Volatility in Small 
Open Economies." Reserve Bank of Australia, RBA Research Discussion Papers, 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ecn&AN=1396231&site=ehost-live 
http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/rdp/2013/pdf/rdp2013-10.pdf. 
Goulder, L. H. (1995). "Environmental Taxation and the Double Dividend: A Reader's 
Guide." International Tax and Public Finance 2(2): pp. 157-183. 
Goulder, L. H., Hafstead, M. A. C. and Dworsky, M. (2010). "Impacts of alternative 
emissions allowance allocation methods under a federal cap-and-trade program." Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 60(3): pp. 161-181. 
Goulder, L. H., Parry, I. W. H., Williams Iii, R. C. and Burtraw, D. (1999). "The Cost-
Effectiveness of Alternative Instruments for Environmental Protection in a Second-Best 
Setting." Journal of Public Economics 72(3): pp. 329-360. 
Grattan, M. (2016). "Labor Unveils Phased Emissions Trading Scheme " The Conversation, 
Accessed May 2016, http://theconversation.com/labor-unveils-phased-emissions-trading-
scheme-58458. 
Grubb, M., Azar, C. and Persson, U. M. (2005). "Allowance Allocation in the European 
Emissions Trading System: A Commentary." Climate Policy 5(1): pp. 127-136. 
Hamilton, C. and Quiggin, J. (1997). "Economic Analysis of Greenhouse Policy: A 
Layperson’s Guide to the Perils of Economic Modelling " Discussion Paper number 15, 
Australian Institute pp. 
Hanna, E., Bell, E., King, D. and Woodruff, R. (2011). "Climate Change and Australian 
Agriculture: a Review of the Threats Facing Rural Communities and the Healthy Policy 
Landscape." Asia Pacific Journal of Public Health 105S-18: pp. 
Hasselknippe, H. and Roine, K. (2006). "Carbon 2006: Towards a Truly Global Market." 
Point Carbon, Copenhagen, Accessed January 2013, 
http://www.pointcarbon.com/wimages/Carbon_2006_final_print.pdf. 
Hassler, J. and Krusell, P. (2012). "Economics and Climate Change: Integrated Assessment in 
a Multi-region World." Journal of the European Economic Association 10(5): pp. 974-1000. 
Hassol, S. J. (2007). "Questions and Answers Regarding Emissions reductions Needed to 
Stabilize Climate." Presidential Climate Action Project Accessed October 2015, 
https://www.climatecommunication.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/presidentialaction.pdf. 
 
249 
 
Heutel, G. (2012). "How Should Environmental Policy Respond to Business Cycles? Optimal 
Policy under Persistent Productivity Shocks." Review of Economic Dynamics 15(2): pp. 244-
264. 
Ho, M. S., Morgenstern, R. and Shih, J.-S. (2008). "Impact of Carbon Price Policies on U.S. 
Industry." Resources For the Future, Discussion Papers, Accessed October 2015, 
http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-08-37.pdf. 
Hodge, A., Robinson, T. and Stuart, R. (2008). "A Small BVAR-DSGE Model for 
Forecasting the Australian Economy." Reserve Bank of Australia, RBA Research Discussion 
Papers, Accessed November 2014, http://www.rba.gov.au/rdp/RDP2008-04.pdf. 
Hoel, M. and Karp, L. (2002). "Taxes versus Quotas for a Stock Pollutant." Resource and 
Energy Economics 24(4): pp. 367-384. 
Hope, C. (2006). "The Marginal Impact of CO2 from PAGE2002: An Integrated Assessment 
Model Incorporating the IPCC's Five Reasons for Concern." Integrated Assessment Journal 
6(1): pp. 19-56. 
Humphreys, J. (2007). "Exploring a Carbon Tax for Australia." CIS Policy Monographs 80, 
The Centre for Independent Studies, Sydney. 
Iiboshi, H., Matsumae, T., Namba, R. and Nishiyama, S.-I. (2015). "Estimating a DSGE 
model for Japan in a data-Rich Environment." Journal of the Japanese and International 
Economies 36: pp. 25-55. 
IPCC (1990). "Climate Change 1990:  The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
Scientific Assessment." Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Great Britain, New York, 
NY, USA and Melbourne, Australia  
IPCC (1992). "Climate Change 1992: The Supplementary Report to the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change Scientific Assessment." Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
Great Britain, New York, NY, USA, and Victoria , Australia. 
IPCC (1994). "Climate Change 1994:  Radiative Forcing of Climate Change and an 
Evaluation of the IPCC 1992 IS92 Emission Scenarios." Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA. 
IPCC (2013). "Working Group I Contribution to the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report Climate 
Change 2013: the Physical Science Basis." IPCC, Stockholm, 
http://www.climatechange2013.org/images/uploads/WGIAR5_WGI-
12Doc2b_FinalDraft_All.pdf. 
IPCC (2014). "Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability." Contribution 
of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, 
NY, USA, Accessed September 2014, http://ipcc-
wg2.gov/AR5/images/uploads/WG2AR5_SPM_FINAL.pdf. 
 
250 
 
Jaaskela, J. P. and Nimark, K. (2011). "A Medium-Scale New Keynesian Open Economy 
Model of Australia." Economic Record 87(276): pp. 11-36. 
Jaffe, A. B., Peterson, S. R., Portney, P. R. and Stavins, R. N. (1995). "Environmental 
Regulation and the Competitiveness of U.S. Manufacturing: What Does the Evidence Tell 
Us?" American Economic Association(1): pp. 132-163. 
Janke, K. (2014). "Air Pollution, Avoidance Behaviour and Children's Respiratory Health: 
Evidence from England." Journal of Health Economics 38: pp. 23-42. 
Jegou, I. and Rubini, L. (2011). "The Allocation of Emission Allowances Free of Charge: 
Legal and Economic Considerations." Transition to a Low Carbon Future Series, 
International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, Geneva, Switzerland. 
Jotzo, F., Jordan, T. and Fabian, N. (2012). "Policy Uncertainty about Australia's Carbon 
Price: Expert Survey Results and Implications for Investment." Australian Economic Review 
45(4): pp. 395-409. 
Jouvet, P.-A., Pestieau, P. and Ponthiere, G. (2010). "Longevity and Environmental Quality 
in an OLG Model." Journal of Economics (Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie) 100(3): pp. 
191-216. 
Karplus, V. J., Kishimoto, P. N. and Paltsev, S. (2015). "The Global Energy, CO2 Emissions, 
and Economic Impact of Vehicle Fuel Economy Standards." Journal of Transport Economics 
and Policy 49(4): pp. 517-538. 
Kelly, D. L. (2005). "Price and Quantity Regulation in General Equilibrium." Journal of 
Economic Theory 125(1): pp. 36-60. 
Kennedy, D. (1998). "Impacts of the Kyoto Protocol on the Australian Mining and 
Metallurgy Industries." Volume 98 of ABARE Conference Paper, Australian Bureau of 
Agricultural Resource Economics (ABARE), Accessed September 2014, 
http://books.google.com.au/books?id=8I2NNAAACAAJ. 
Kennedy, P. W. and Laplante, B. (2000). "Environmental Policy and Time Consistency- 
Emissions Taxes and Emissions Trading." The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 
Series. 
Kerr, S. and Cramton, P. (2005). "Tradable Carbon Permit Auctions: How and Why to 
Auction Not Grandfather." Resources For the Future, Discussion Papers, Accessed October 
2015, http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP-98-34.pdf. 
Khanna, M. and Zilberman, D. (1999). "Freer Markets and the Abatement of Carbon 
Emissions: The Electricity-Generating Sector in India." Resource and Energy Economics 
21(2): pp. 125-152. 
King, R. G., Plosser, C. I. and Rebelo, S. T. (2002). "Production, Growth and Business 
Cycles: Technical Appendix." Computational Economics 20(1-2): pp. 87-116. 
 
251 
 
Kydland, F. E. and Prescott, E. C. (1977). "Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency 
of Optimal Plans." The Journal of Political Economy 85(3): pp. 473-492. 
Kydland, F. E. and Prescott, E. C. (1982). "Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations." 
Econometrica 50(6): pp. 1345-1370. 
Lehmann, P. (2013). "Supplementing an Emissions Tax by a Feed-In Tariff for Renewable 
Electricity to Address Learning Spillovers." Energy Policy 61: pp. 635-641. 
Li, S. (2014). "Dynamic Optimal Control of Pollution Abatement under Emissions Permit 
Banking." Economic Modelling 36: pp. 363-369. 
Lim, J.-S. and Kim, Y.-G. (2012). "Combining Carbon Tax and R&D Subsidy for Climate 
Change Mitigation." Energy Economics 34: pp. S496-502. 
Lloyd, G. (2013). "Science Solid on Global Warming, IPCC Declares." The Australian, 
Accessed May 2016, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/climate/science-solid-
on-global-warming-ipcc-declares/story-e6frg6xf-1226728912605. 
Lohmann, L. (2006). "'Made in the USA': A Short History of Carbon Trading." Development 
dialogue(48): pp. 31-69. 
Lohmann, L. (2008). "Carbon Trading, Climate Justice and the Production of Ignorance: Ten 
Examples." Development 51(3): pp. 359-365. 
Long, J. B., Jr. and Plosser, C. I. (1983). "Real Business Cycles." Journal of Political 
Economy 91(1): pp. 39-69. 
Lu, C., Tong, Q. and Liu, X. (2010). "The Impacts of Carbon Tax and Complementary 
Policies on Chinese Economy." Energy Policy 38(11): pp. 7278-7285. 
Lucas, R. E. (2003). "Macroeconomic Priorities."  93(1): pp. 1-14. 
Lucas, R. E., Jr. (1976). "Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique." Carnegie-Rochester 
Conference Series on Public Policy 1: pp. 19-46. 
Maddison, D. (2003). "The Amenity Value of the Climate: the Household Production 
Function Approach." Resource and Energy Economics 25(2): pp. 155-175. 
Maddison, D. and Rehdanz, K. (2011). "The Impact of Climate on Life Satisfaction." 
Ecological Economics 70: pp. 2437-2445. 
Malcomson, J. M. (1978). "Prices vs. Quantities: A Critical Note on the Use of 
Approximations." Review of Economic Studies 45(1): pp. 203. 
Malina, C. and Scheffler, F. (2015). "The Impact of Low Emission Zones on Particulate 
Matter Concentration and Public Health." Transportation Research: Part A: Policy and 
Practice 77: pp. 372-385. 
 
252 
 
Mariani, F., Perez-Barahona, A. and Raffin, N. (2010). "Life Expectancy and the 
Environment." Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 34(4): pp. 798-815. 
McDougall, R. A. (1993a). "Short-Run Effects of A Carbon Tax." Centre of Policy Studies 
General Paper No. G-100. 
McDougall, R. A. (1993b). "Energy taxes and greenhouse gas emissions in Australia." Centre 
of Policy Studies General Paper No. G-104, Monash University, Accessed September 2014, 
http://www.copsmodels.com/ftp/workpapr/g-104.pdf. 
McKibbin, W. J. (1998). "Greenhouse Abatement Policy: Insights from the G-cubed Multi-
country Model." Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 42(1): pp. 99-
113. 
McKibbin, W. J., Morris, A. and Wilcoxen, P. J. (2010). "Comparing Climate Commitments: 
A Model-Based Analysis of the Copenhagen Accord." Discussion Paper, Harvard Project on 
International Climate Agreements, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 
Harvard Kennedy School. 
Medina, J. P. and Soto, C. (2007a). "The Chilean Business Cycles Through the Lens of a 
Stochastic General Equilibrium Model." Central Bank of Chile Accessed April 2015, 
http://www.bcentral.cl/estudios/documentos-trabajo/pdf/dtbc457.pdf. 
Medina, J. P. and Soto, C. (2007b). "Copper Price, Fiscal Policu and Business Cycle in 
Chile." Central Bank of Chile, Accessed April 2015, 
http://www.bcentral.cl/estudios/documentos-trabajo/pdf/dtbc458.pdf. 
Mendelsohn, R., Morrison, W., Schlesinger, M. E. and Andronova, N. G. (2000). "Country-
Specific Market Impacts of Climate Change." Climatic Change 45(3): pp. 553-569. 
Meng, S. (2014). "How May a Carbon Tax Transform Australian Electricity Industry? A 
CGE Analysis." Applied Economics 46(7-9): pp. 796-812. 
Meng, S., Siriwardana, M. and McNeill, J. (2011). "Australian Carbon Tax – Winners and 
Losers." Business, Economics and Public Policy Working Papers Number: 2011 - 3, 
University of New England. 
Meng, S., Siriwardana, M. and McNeill, J. (2013). "The Environmental and Economic 
Impact of the Carbon Tax in Australia." Environmental and Resource Economics 54(3): pp. 
313-332. 
Mongelli, I., Tassielli, G. and Notarnicola, B. (2009). "Carbon Tax and Its Short-Term 
Effects in Italy: An Evaluation through the Input-Output Model". Handbook of Input-Output 
Economics in Industrial Ecology. S. Suh, Eco-Efficiency in Industry and Science, vol. 23. 
Dordrecht and New York: Springer: pp. 357-377. 
Morgenstern, R. D., Ho, M., Shih, J.-S. and Zhang, X. (2004). "The near-term impacts of 
carbon mitigation policies on manufacturing industries." Energy Policy 32(16): pp. 1825-
1841. 
 
253 
 
Muller-Furstenberger, G. and Stephan, G. (2002). "'Where-to-Abate' and 'Where-to-Invest' 
Flexibility--An Integrated Assessment Analysis of Climate Change." Schweizerische 
Zeitschrift fur Volkswirtschaft und Statistik/Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics 138(2): 
pp. 191-213. 
NASA (2013). "NASA Scientists React to 400 ppm Carbon Milestone ", Accessed June 2016, 
http://climate.nasa.gov/400ppmquotes/. 
Neslen, A. (2016). "Denmark Broke World Record for Wind Power in 2015 " The Guardian, 
Accessed April 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/jan/18/denmark-broke-
world-record-for-wind-power-in-2015. 
Newell, R. G. and Pizer, W. A. (2003). "Regulating Stock Externalities under Uncertainty." 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 45(2, Supplement): pp. 416-432. 
Nordhaus, W. D. (1994a). "Expert Opinion on Climate Change." American Scientist 82: pp. 
45-51. 
Nordhaus, W. D. (1994b). Managing the Global Commons: The Economics of Climate 
Change. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
Nordhaus, W. D. (2008). A Question of Balance: Weighing the Options on Global Warming 
Policies. Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn. 
Nordhaus, W. D. (2010). "Economic Aspects of Global Warming in a Post-Copenhagen 
Environment." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 
America 107(26): pp. 11721-11726. 
Nordhaus, W. D. and Boyer, J. (2000). Warming the World: Economic Models of Global 
Warming. Cambridge and London: MIT Press, xii. 
Nordhaus, W. D. and Sztorc, P. (2013). "DICE 2013R: Introduction and User’s Manual." 
Accessed August 2014, 
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~nordhaus/homepage/documents/DICE_Manual_103113r2.pdf. 
Nordhaus, W. D. and Yang, Z. (1996). "A Regional Dynamic General-Equilibrium Model of 
Alternative Climate-Change Strategies." American Economic Review 86(4): pp. 741-765. 
Oates, W. E. (1995). "Green Taxes: Can We Protect the Environment and Improve the Tax 
System at the Same Time?" Southern Economic Journal 61(4): pp. 915-922. 
Odior, E. S. O. (2014). "Government Expenditure on Education and Poverty Reduction: 
Implications for Achieving the MDGs in Nigeria: A Computable General Equilibrium Micro-
simulation Analysis." Asian Economic and Financial Review 4(2): pp. 150-172. 
Parker, L. and Blodgett, J. (2008). "Carbon Leakage and Trade: Issues and Approaches." 
Congressional Research Services, Accessed May 2013, 
http://ezproxy.uow.edu.au/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db
=edshol&AN=hein.crs.crsabfq0001.2&site=eds-live. 
 
254 
 
Parliament of Australia. (2010). "The Kyoto Protocol."   Accessed March 2013, from 
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Librar
y/Browse_by_Topic/ClimateChange/Governance/International/theKyoto. 
Parry, M. L., Canziani, O. F., Palutikof, J. P., van der Linden, P. J. and Hanson, C. E. (2007). 
Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working 
Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change. Cambridge, UK,, Cambridge University Press: 976. 
Partridge, M. D. and Rickman, D. S. (1998). "Regional Computable General Equilibrium 
Modeling: A Survey and Critical Appraisal." International Regional Science Review 21(3): 
pp. 205-248. 
Perman, R. (2015). Environmental Economics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK. 
Perman, R., Ma, Y., Common, M., Maddison, D. and Mcgilvray, J. (2003). Natural Resource 
and Environmental Economics. Third edition, Pearson Education, Addison-Wesley, Harlow, 
UK. 
Petrosjan, L. and Zaccour, G. (2003). "Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution 
cost reduction." Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 27(3): pp. 381-398. 
Pigou, A. C. (1920). The Economics of Welfare. Macmillan, London. 
Pizer, W. A. (2002). "Combining Price and Quantity Controls to Mitigate Global Climate 
Change." Journal of Public Economics 85(3): pp. 409-434. 
Plambeck, E. L. and Hope, C. (1996). "PAGE95: An Updated Valuation of the Impacts of 
Global Warming." Energy Policy 24(9): pp. 783-793. 
Poterba, J. M. (1993). "Global Warming Policy: A Public Finance Perspective." Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 7(4): pp. 47-63. 
Preston, B. J. (2009). "Water and Ecologically Sustainable Development in the Courts." 
Macquarie Journal of International and Comparative Environmental Law 6(1): pp. 129. 
Quirion, P. (2005). "Does Uncertainty Justify Intensity Emission Caps?" Resource and 
Energy Economics 27: pp. 343-353. 
Rees, D. (2013). "Terms of Trade Shocks and Incomplete Information." Reserve Bank of 
Australia, RBA Research Discussion Papers, Accessed October 2014, 
http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/rdp/2013/pdf/rdp2013-09.pdf. 
Rehdanz, K. and Maddison, D. (2005). "Climate and Happiness." Ecological Economics 
52(1): pp. 111-125. 
Reilly, J. M. and Anderson, M. e. (1992). Economic Issues in Global Climate Change: 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Natural Resources. Westview Press, Boulder and Oxford. 
 
255 
 
Rickman, D. S. (2010). "Modern Macroeconomics and Regional Economic Modeling." 
Journal of Regional Science 50(1): pp. 23-41. 
Roach, T. (2014). "Optimal Dynamic Carbon Taxation in the Presence of Business Cycles 
and Market Frictions." Working Paper, Accessed August 2014, 
http://www.travisroach.com/uploads/7/7/3/0/7730267/optimal_dynamic_carbon_taxation_in_
the_presence_of_business_cycles_and_market_frictions.pdf. 
Robinson, T. (2013). "Estimating and Identifying Empirical BVAR-DSGE Models for Small 
Open Economies." Reserve Bank of Australia, RBA Research Discussion Papers, Accessed 
September 2014, http://www.rba.gov.au/publications/rdp/2013/pdf/rdp2013-06.pdf. 
Roson, R. (2013). "A Modelling Framework for Assessing the Economic Impact of Climate 
Change in the Caribbean." CEPAL Review(111): pp. 23-35. 
Roson, R. and van der Mensbrugghe, D. (2012). "Climate Change and Economic Growth: 
Impacts and Interactions." International Journal of Sustainable Economy 4(3): pp. 270-285. 
Rotemberg, J. J. and Woodford, M. (1997). "An Optimization-Based Econometric 
Framework for the Evaluation of Monetary Policy". NBER macroeconomics annual 1997. B. 
S. Bernanke and J. J. Rotemberg, Cambridge and London: MIT Press: pp. 297-346. 
Saltmarsh, M. (2010). "France Abandons Plan for Carbon Tax." The New York Times, 
Accessed December 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/business/global/24iht-
carbon.html?_r=0. 
Schumacher, I. and Zou, B. (2008). "Pollution perception: A challenge for intergenerational 
equity." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 55(3): pp. 296-309. 
Shafik, N. (1994). "Economic Development and Environmental Quality: An Econometric 
Analysis." Oxford Economic Papers 46: pp. 757-773. 
Spash, C. L. (2002). Greenhouse Economics: Value and Ethics. Routledge, London. 
Spash, C. L. (2010). "The Brave New World of Carbon Trading." New Political Economy 
15(2): pp. 169-195. 
Spash, C. L. and Lo, A. Y. (2012). "Australia's Carbon Tax: A Sheep in Wolf's Clothing?" 
Economic and Labour Relations Review 23(1): pp. 67-85. 
Springmann, M., Zhang, D. and Karplus, V. J. (2015). "Consumption-Based Adjustment of 
Emissions-Intensity Targets: An Economic Analysis for China's Provinces." Environmental 
and Resource Economics 61(4): pp. 615-640. 
Stern, N. (2007). "Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change." Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, UK. 
Stern, N. (2008). "The Economics of Climate Change." The American Economic Review 
98(2): pp. 1-37. 
 
256 
 
Stockman, D. R. (2001). "Regular Article: Balanced-Budget Rules: Welfare Loss and 
Optimal Policies." Review of Economic Dynamics 4: pp. 438-459. 
Sumner, J., Bird, L. and Dobos, H. (2011). "Carbon Taxes: a Review of Experience and 
Policy Design Considerations." Climate Policy (Earthscan) 11(2): pp. 922-943. 
Tabellini, G. (2005). "Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott'`s Contribution to the Theory of 
Macroeconomic Policy." Scandinavian Journal of Economics 107(2): pp. 203-216. 
Tarui, N. and Polasky, S. (2005). "Environmental Regulation with Technology Adoption, 
Learning and Strategic Behavior." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 
50(3): pp. 447-467. 
Taylor, L. (2016). "Labor Proposes Two Emissions Trading Schemes Costing $355.9m " The 
Guardian, Accessed May 2016, http://www.theguardian.com/australia-
news/2016/apr/27/labor-proposes-two-emissions-trading-schemes-costing-555m. 
Thampapillai, D. J. (2016). "Ezra Mishan's Cost of Economic Growth: Evidence from the 
Entropy of Environmental Capital." Singapore Economic Review 61(3): pp. 1-10. 
Thampapillai, D. J. and Sinden, J. A. (2013). Environmental Economics : Concepts, Methods, 
and Policies Oxford University Press, 2013, South Melbourne, Vic. . 
The Treasury (2011). "Strong Growth, Low Pollution Modelling a Carbon Price." Canberra, 
Accessed Devember 2013, 
http://carbonpricemodelling.treasury.gov.au/content/report/downloads/Modelling_Report_Co
nsolidated_update.pdf. 
The United Nations. (2013). "Kyoto Protocol."   Accessed 17/10/2013, from 
http://maindb.unfccc.int/public/country.pl?country=AU. 
The World Meteorological Organization (2010). "Understanding Climate Change: 22 Years 
of IPCC Assessment." Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2010, World 
Meteorological Organization, Switzerland. 
Tol, R. J. (2002). "Estimates of the Damage Costs of Climate Change, Part II. Dynamic 
Estimates." Environmental and Resource Economics 21(2): pp. 135-160. 
Tol, R. S. J. (1995). "The Damage Costs of Climate Change toward More Comprehensive 
Calculations." Environmental and Resource Economics 5(4): pp. 353-374. 
Tol, R. S. J. (2009). "The Economic Effects of Climate Change." The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 23(2): pp. 29-51. 
Tol, R. S. J. (2015). "The Impacts of Climate Change according to the IPCC." Accessed May 
2016, https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=wps-78-2015.pdf&site=24. 
Uhlig, H. (1999). "A Toolkit for Analyzing Nonlinear Dynamic Stochastic Models Easily". 
Computational Methods for the Study of Dynamic Economies. R. Marimon and A. Scott. 
Oxford, GBR, Oxford University Press, UK: pp. 30-61. 
 
257 
 
UNFCCC (1992). "United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change." United 
Nations, Accessed February 2013, https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf. 
UNFCCC (2014a). "Sixth Compilation and Synthesis of Initial National Communications 
from Parties not Included in Annex I to the Convention." Accessed May 2016, 
http://unfccc.int/documentation/documents/advanced_search/items/6911.php?priref=6000035
78#beg. 
UNFCCC (2014b). "UNFCCC- 20 Years of Effort and Achievement: Key Milestones in the 
Evolution of International Climate Policy." Accessed May 2016, http://unfccc.int/timeline/. 
UNFCCC (2016a). "CDM Insights." Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Accessed April 
2016, http://cdm.unfccc.int/index.html. 
UNFCCC (2016b). "Paris Climate Change Conference - November 2015." Accessed July 
2016, http://unfccc.int/meetings/paris_nov_2015/meeting/8926.php. 
URS Australia Pty Ltd (2011). "Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Forecast for the Proposed Yeelirrie 
Development ", Prepared for BHP Billiton Yeelirrie Development Company no. 42907132 
Accessed March 2013, https://consultation.epa.wa.gov.au/seven-day-comment-on-
referrals/yeelirrieuraniumproject/supporting_documents/Greenhouse%20gas%20forecast%20
CMS14381.pdf. 
Varvarigos, D. (2008). "Environmental Quality, Life Expectancy and Sustainable Economic 
Growth." Working Paper 08/19, University of Leicester, UK.: pp. 
Vaughan, A. (2016). "Seven Climate Records Set so far in 2016." the Guardian, Accessed 
June 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/jun/17/seven-climate-records-
set-so-far-in-2016. 
Vella, E., Dioikitopoulos, E. V. and Kalyvitis, S. (2015). "Green Spending Reforms, Growth, 
and Welfare with Endogenous Subjective Discounting." Macroeconomic Dynamics 19(6): pp. 
1240-1260. 
Wang, M., Zhao, J. and Bhattacharya, J. (2015). "Optimal Health and Environmental Policies 
in a Pollution-Growth Nexus." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 71: 
pp. 160-179. 
Watson, W. D. and Ridker, R. G. (1984). "Losses from Effluent Taxes and Quotas under 
Uncertainty." Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 11(4): pp. 310-326. 
Webster, M., Santen, N. and Parpas, P. (2012). "An Approximate Dynamic Programming 
Framework for Modeling Global Climate Policy under Decision-Dependent Uncertainty." 
Computational Management Science 9(3): pp. 339-362. 
Weitzman, M. L. (1974). "Prices versus Quantities." The Review of Economic Studies 41(4): 
pp. 477-491. 
 
258 
 
Winschel, V. and Kratzig, M. (2010). "Solving, Estimating, and Selecting Nonlinear 
Dynamic Models without the Curse of Dimensionality." Econometrica 78(2): pp. 803-821. 
Wissema, W. and Dellink, R. (2007). "AGE Analysis of the Impact of a Carbon Energy Tax 
on the Irish Economy." Ecological Economics 61(4): pp. 671-683. 
World Bank (2016). "Putting a Price on Carbon with a Tax." Accessed June 2016, 
http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/SDN/background-
note_carbon-tax.pdf. 
World Health Organization. (2011). "Air quality and health."   Accessed September 2013, 
from http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs313/en/. 
World Meteorological Organization (2015). "WMO: 2015 likely to be Warmest on Record, 
2011-2015 Warmest Five Year Period." Media Centre, Accessed February 2016, 
https://www.wmo.int/media/content/wmo-2015-likely-be-warmest-record-2011-2015-
warmest-five-year-period. 
World Meteorological Organization (2016). "Global Climate Breaks New Records January to 
June 2016." World Meteorological Organization Media, Accessed July 2016, 
http://public.wmo.int/en/media/press-release/global-climate-breaks-new-records-january-
june-2016. 
Zagaglia, P. (2005). "Solving Rational-Expectations Models through the Anderson-Moore 
Algorithm: An Introduction to the Matlab Implementation." Computational Economics 26(1): 
pp. 91-106. 
 
